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Abstracts
This thesis contributes to the emerging literature of macroprudential policy
by investigating the macroeconomic and welfare impacts of various regulations in
banking sector.
First, I examine the long-run impact of government subsidies on the banks
information costs by evaluating the combination of di¤erent types of subsidies
and taxes. By extending the basic model of De Fiore & Uhlig (2015), I nd
that subsidy on banks information acquisition cost improves aggregate welfare
if the government funds the subsidy with labour-income tax or lump-sum tax.
In contrast, subsidy on monitoring cost generates welfare losses for both the
household and the entrepreneur. Therefore, government supports in lowering the
costs of bank access are preferable to government supports for default resolution
costs.
Second, I evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the macroprudential policy in a frame-
work that accounts for the possible substitution from bank-based nancial inter-
mediation to non-bank intermediation in response to the policy. Employing the
model of De Fiore & Uhlig (2015), I nd that a countercyclical macroprudential
regulation improves welfare in the case of banking shocks and uncertainty shocks
but not in the case of technology shocks. A modied rule, which reacts not only to
bank credit growth but to total credit growth, provides welfare gains in the case
of technology shocks. Consequently, macroprudential authorities should consider
not only the condition of the banking sector but also the non-banking nancial
markets.
ii
Finally, I study the impact of the reserve requirement and Liquidity Coverage
Ratio (LCR) by extending the framework of Gerali et al. (2010). I nd that
the e¤ect of the two liquidity requirements on lending and output are relatively
similar. However, changing the LCR has consequences on demand for govern-
ment bonds, and thus di¤erent impacts on taxes, household deposits and banks
prot. I also nd that countercyclical liquidity regulations can improve welfare
and reduce the volatility of bank loans.
iii
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Chapter 1
Overview of Thesis and
Related Literature Review
1.1 Overview of Thesis
"More academic research is needed on macroprudential regulations.
This is not an easy eld to delve into. It requires learning a substantial
number of acronyms and technical language none of which is taught
in graduate school" (Forbes (2019)).
The implementation of macroprudential policy aims to provide nancial and
macroeconomic stability and has become a more important area of research since
the global nancial crisis. There have been increasing e¤orts to develop theo-
retical and empirical models in this research area to provide better guidance for
policymakers around the world. The modelling framework of the interaction be-
tween the nancial system and the macroeconomy becomes more critical with
the development of nancial intermediation (Woodford (2010)).
This thesis contributes to the growing literature of macroprudential policy by
investigating the macroeconomic and welfare impacts of various regulations in
banking sector.1 The thesis consists of introductions and three chapters which is
1As mentioned in Svensson (2018), the ultimate goal for overall economic policy is to safe-
1
1.1. OVERVIEW OF THESIS
followed by a summarising conclusion. Each of the main chapters investigates a
particular regulation in an elaborated model environment.
In the second and third chapter, I employ the model of the De Fiore & Uhlig
(2015) to study the e¤ects of subsidy on the banks agency cost and the impact
of macroprudential policy in an economy where rms have access to bank nance
and market nance. Most of the literature on the macroprudential policy has fo-
cused on the impact of this policy on banks without accounting for the possibility
that nancial risk is shifted to the non-banking sector. Thus, the main contribu-
tion of my two chapters is to bring the existence of non-bank debt nancing as
a substitute for bank nancing into macroprudential policy analysis. The second
and the third chapters assume a exible price economy and assume monetary
policy in the form of liquidity injection. Those assumptions are not commonly
used in the recent central bank modelling framework. Therefore, in the fourth
chapter, I employ a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking
sector as in Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014) that includes nan-
cial, price and wage frictions. I enhance the model by adding liquidity features of
the banking sector to study the impact of macroprudential policy in the form of
countercyclical liquidity regulations: Reserve Requirements (RR) and Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR). The implementation of LCR is relatively new, and only
a few research has been done to analyse the impact of this policy in a general
equilibrium framework. Therefore, the main contribution of my fourth chapter
is to bring together RR and LCR regulation into a DSGE modelling framework
and to calibrate the model for the Indonesian economy.
The second chapter studies the long-run impact of government subsidy on
banks information acquisition cost and banks monitoring cost on rmsdebt
structure, various macroeconomic variables, and welfare.2 The motivation of this
guard and improve the welfare of citizens. This ultimate goal can be represented in terms of a
few more specic goals that contribute to welfare such as, e¢ cient resource allocation (including
an e¢ cient nancial system), high and stable growth, full and stable employment, price stability,
etc.
2The draft of the second chapter was presented at the 4th Workshop in International Eco-
nomics and Finance "Macro-stabilisation policies and bank risk-taking", University of Bordeaux,
2
1.1. OVERVIEW OF THESIS
research emerges from the thought that one cause of the slowdown in lending ac-
tivities after the crisis is the costly information acquisition and monitoring process
in the banking sector. How if the government intervene by giving support in the
form of subsidy to reduce the information cost in the credit market? Using a
numerical simulation of the steady-state values of the general equilibrium model,
I found that government subsidy on the banks information acquisition cost could
improve aggregate welfare. However, the policy is not Pareto improving since it
increases entrepreneurswelfare at the expense of householdswelfare. The gov-
ernment could gain economic e¢ ciency by imposing taxes on the labour income
to nance the subsidy and impose a redistribution policy on the entrepreneur and
household consumption. This chapter suggests that government support in low-
ering the cost of access to banks has a more positive impact on welfare, compared
to government support for default resolution cost.
The third chapter evaluates the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policy in a
framework that accounts for the possible substitution from the bank-based nan-
cial intermediation to the non-bank intermediation in response to such policy.3
Macroprudential policy is modelled in the form of a premium introduced by reg-
ulation to the banks cost of borrowing and thus transmitted to the economy
through the change in credit spread. First, I consider a policy when the reg-
ulation premium rises proportionally with bank credit growth. The simulation
shows that a countercyclical macroprudential regulation has desirable benets on
nancial stability and welfare in the case of banking shock. However, in the case
of technology and uncertainty shocks, the unintended consequences from the risk
shifting from the bank to the non-bank sector make the policy less e¤ective. I
found that a modied rule, which reacts not only to bank credit growth but total
credit growth, provides welfare gains in the case of technology shock. Therefore,
France on 13 December 2016.
3The drafts of the third chapter were presented at: (1) 12th BiGSEM Doctoral Workshop on
Economic Theory organised by the Bielefeld University, Germany on 4-5 December 2017; (2) 5th
MMF PhD-students conference at University of Kent, Canterbury on 19 - 20 April 2018; and (3)
International Conference on Economic Modeling organised by the Global Economic Modeling
Network (ECOMOD) at Università CaFoscari Venezia, Italy, on July 4-6, 2018.
3
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it is essential that macroprudential authorities take into consideration not only
the condition of the banking sector but also the non-banking nancial markets.
The fourth chapter investigates a medium-scale DSGE model in which the
bank endogenously determines the optimal level of reserves and high-quality liq-
uid assets under reserve requirement and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) regula-
tion.4 The model is calibrated to match data for Indonesia. I employ the model
to study the impact of liquidity shock, technology shock and liquidity regulations
shock on the banking sector and the real economy. Since the impact of liquidity
shock is non-linear, I use piecewise linear perturbation method by utilising Occbin
toolkit (Guerrieri & Iacoviello (2015)). The results show that the e¤ects of a neg-
ative liquidity shock into credit, investment and total output are relatively small.
Additionally, the simulation shows that the impact of changing the two liquidity
requirements on lending and output are relatively similar. However, lowering the
LCR has consequences on the decline of demand for government bonds, so that
it has a di¤erent impact on taxes, household deposits and banks prot. This
chapter also found that countercyclical liquidity regulations can improve welfare
and reduce the volatility of bank loans.
The results from this thesis indirectly deliver some policy implications con-
cerning the implementation of macroprudential policy. First is the importance
of coordination among policy authorities. Supports on the banking sector in the
form of subsidy surely need to be coordinated with the scal policy regarding the
optimal source of funding for the subsidy. Moreover, the implementation of bank
liquidity regulations also needs to be coordinated with the scal authorities, for
example regarding the supply of government bond as risk-free assets. Second,
there is a need to broaden the scope of macroprudential policy analysis not only
focus on the banking sector but also to the non-banking sector considering regu-
latory arbitrage across sectors. The third is the need of awareness regarding the
4The drafts of the fourth chapter were presented at: (1) CEGAP PhD Workshop, Durham
University on 12 November 2018 and (2)International Symposium on Economics, Finance and
Econometricson 6-7 December 2018 in Bandirma University, Turkey.
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welfare implications of macroprudential policies. Since the welfare benet of some
macroprudential policies goes only to entrepreneur at the cost of household, the
policy authorities should consider some redistribution policy to make everyone
better o¤.
The research I conducted can be extended in many exciting directions. The
studies in this thesis still focus only on evaluating the impacts of macroprudential
policies on welfare and macroeconomic stability, i.e. smoothing credit expansion
period and helping to preserve the nancial systems capability to give loans to
the economy during a credit contraction period, whilst the aims of macropruden-
tial policies are much wider. Therefore, one interesting area of future research
is to extend the models in this thesis and evaluate the impact of macropruden-
tial policies on reducing negative externalities that can lead to systemic risk and
controlling the build-up of the nancial system vulnerabilities. Another possible
area of future research is to explore the interaction of macroprudential policies
with monetary policy and capital ow management which are also essential issues
for the central bankers. There is plenty of scope for future studies to complete
the ndings in this thesis allowing a better understanding of the e¤ect of macro-
prudential policy and to help policymakers designing strategy in maintaining
nancial and macroeconomic stability.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Macroprudential Policy and Externalities in Financial Sys-
tem
Before discussing the macroprudential policy, we need to examine why govern-
ment intervention or government policy within the nancial system is necessary
in the rst place. According to Stiglitz (1994), the main reason is that market
failures in the nancial market are more appearing than in other markets. Gov-
ernment intervention could make the functioning of the nancial system better
5
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and also improve the performance of the economy. In contrast with the standard
theory of the e¢ ciency of competitive markets that are based on the assumption
of perfect information, the nancial markets information is imperfect and the
market is incomplete. Therefore, the nancial market is not Pareto e¢ cient, and
there are possible government interventions that can make all individuals better
o¤ (Stiglitz (1994)). One example of government policy in the nancial system
that became popular after the global nancial crisis is macroprudential policy.
Unlike monetary policy, which has been established over time, the denitions,
goals, and instruments of macroprudential policy are less well-dened (Galati &
Moessner (2018)).5 According to FSB et al. (2011), macroprudential policy aims
to limit systemic risk, dened as the risk of widespread disruptions to the func-
tionality of nancial services that have a severe impact on the overall economy.
In contrast to microprudential policies that focus on the individual component
of the nancial system, the focus of macroprudential policy is on the nancial
system as a whole, including the interactions between the nancial and real sec-
tors. The externalities of the nancial system that can induce systemic risk in
the economy, justify the need for macroprudential policy. De Nicolo et al. (2012)
classied externalities that can lead to systemic risk as:
1. Externalities related to strategic complementarities. Strategic complemen-
tarities mean that the payo¤ from a particular strategy increases when more
agents undertake the same strategy. This incentive induces banks and other
nancial institutions to choose to correlate their risk, and it increases the
vulnerabilities during the nancial cycle expansion phase.
2. Externalities related to re-sales. In the nancial downturn, the nancial
institutions are typically forced to sell assets at a price below their funda-
mental value because of limited potential buyers. The generalised sell-o¤
of nancial assets will lead to a decline in asset prices. It is not only that
5The term "macroprudential" has been used in the Basel Commitee documents since 1979.
However, only since the Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008 macroprudential policy becomes an
important development in central bank policymaking circles (Mizen et al. (2018)).
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particular asset price that declines but also other similar assets held by
other banks, which causes deterioration of the banks balance sheet.
3. Externalities related to interconnectedness. A failure of a bank can have
contagious e¤ects on other banks or nancial institutions because banks
operate in an interconnected system.
Other literature classies externalities into: (i) externalities that are more
related to a time-series dimension and (ii) externalities that are more related to
a cross-sectional dimension. For example, Galati & Moessner (2013) suggest that
from a time-series dimension, the nancial system tends to have a pro-cyclical
behaviour that is characterised by excess risk-taking during booms and excess
deleveraging during busts. Additionally, from a cross-sectional dimension, the
simultaneous failure of nancial institutions can lead to a contagion risk to the
other nancial institutions or the real sector.
To contain those externalities and to increase the nancial systems resilience,
the IMF suggested that macroprudential policy has the following tasks: the rst
is to provide cushions that absorb the impact of aggregate systemic shock and
help preserve the nancial systems capability to continue lending to the economy.
The second is to decrease the pro-cyclical feedback between asset prices and credit
as well as to decrease unsustainable rises in leverage and unstable funding. The
third is control of the build-up of the nancial system vulnerabilities that arise
through the interconnectedness between nancial intermediaries (Nier & Osinski
(2013)).
A recent paper by Forbes (2019) denes three broad objectives for macropru-
dential policy. Firstly, to address excessive credit expansion and build resilience
in the overall nancial system. Secondly, to reduce key amplication mecha-
nisms of systemic risk, and thirdly to mitigate structural vulnerabilities related
to important institutions and markets.
A general representation of macroprudential policys role during the expansion
and contraction phase of the nancial cycle is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Macropru-
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dential policy aims to reduce excessive risk-taking behaviour during the expansion
phase (lower the peak of the nancial cycle) and to reduce excess deleveraging
during the contraction phase (lessen the severity of the nancial cycles trough).
Figure 1.1: Financial Cycle and Macroprudential Policy
According to the IMF survey in 2010, an increasing number of emerging
and advanced countries have used various instruments for macroprudential ob-
jectives after the global nancial crisis.6 Various tools, including credit-related,
liquidity-related, and capital-related instruments, have been used to address sys-
temic risks. According to Blanchard et al. (2013), macroprudential tools are
divided into three classications: (1) tools focusing on lendersbehaviour, such
as cyclical capital requirements, leverage ratios, or dynamic provisioning; (2)
tools focusing on borrowersbehaviour, such as ceilings on loan-to-value ratios
(LTVs) or on debt-to-income ratios (DTIs); and (3) capital ow management
tools. The countriesexchange rate regime, their degree of economic and nan-
cial development, and their vulnerability to specic shocks determined the choice
of instruments (Lim et al. (2011)). According to the most recent survey of the
usage of macroprudential policy, LTV limit is the most popular tool among ad-
vanced economies, while limits on foreign exchange (FX) position are the tools
6The most recent survey of macroprudential policy is available in the IMF integrated Macro-
prudential Policy Database (iMaPP) which provides (1) dummy-type indices of tightening and
loosening actions for 17 macroprudential policy instruments and their subcategories; (2) detailed
description of each policy action; and (3) country-level averages of the regulatory limits on loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios at a monthly frequency. The scope is for 134 countries from January 1990
to December 2016 (Alam et al. (2019))
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most widely used among emerging economies (Alam et al. (2019)). The choice
of tools may reect di¤erences in key risks: advanced economies tend to be more
concerned about housing sector vulnerabilities while emerging economies are more
exposed to vulnerabilities from external shocks, including volatile capital ows
and exchange rate. On the other hand, some instruments such as capital require-
ments and liquidity requirements are widely used in both advanced and emerging
economies.
Most of the central banks use banking regulation as macroprudential policy
instruments. However, many externalities stretch beyond the banking sector. Ac-
cording to Jeanne & Korinek (2014), dealing with the externalities of the nancial
system using only banking regulation could lead to di¤erent types of leakage. The
authors added that one of the possible leakages in implementing macropruden-
tial policies in the banking sector occurs when corporate borrowers substitute
domestic bank loans with borrowing from unregulated nancial institutions, bor-
rowing from domestic capital markets, or borrowing from abroad. These leakages
can reduce the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policy (Financial Stability Board
(2015), Aiyar et al. (2014), Bengui & Bianchi (2018)). Therefore, the scope of
macroprudential policies should be extended beyond banking regulation, for ex-
ample, by targeting policies on borrowers rather than lenders (Jeanne & Korinek
(2014)).
The implementation of macroprudential policies cannot be exclusively sep-
arated from other policies because they are not the only policy aimed at eco-
nomic and nancial stability. Macroprudential policies interact with monetary,
microprudential, scal, capital ow and competition policies (Claessens (2015)).
Macroprudential and monetary policies can be used for countercyclical manage-
ment, but each has a di¤erent primary function. Monetary policies focus on price
stability; macroprudential policies are more concerned with the nancial stability.
However, both policies interact with each other and each policy may enhance or
diminish the e¤ectiveness of the other. Therefore, much research analyses the in-
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teraction between macroprudential and monetary policy and looks for the optimal
coordination between these policies. Fiscal policies such as taxes and levies can
also a¤ect nancial stability. Therefore, coordination between macroprudential
and scal agencies is essential (Claessens (2015)).
1.2.2 DSGE Models with Macroprudential Policies
Financial frictions in DSGE Model
Since the global nancial crisis, DSGE models have been criticised for relying
heavily on the assumption of a perfect nancial market without asymmetric in-
formation or non-convex transaction cost (Bank for International Settlements
(2012)). The crisis highlighted the need to incorporate the role of nancial fric-
tions in macroeconomic modelling. According to Vlcek & Roger (2012), there
are three typical approaches to modeling nancial frictions: (i) The nancial ac-
celerator or external premium framework (Bernanke & Gertler (1989); Bernanke
et al. (1999); Carlstrom & Fuerst (1997)), (ii) The collateral constraints frame-
work (Kiyotaki & Moore (1997)), and (iii) via explicit modelling of nancial
intermediaries.
A comparison of the moments and impulse response generated by the rst
and second approaches with US data found that the business cycle properties
of the external nance premium framework are more closely matched with the
US data compared to the collateral constraint model (Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2013)). One example of a DSGE model that uses the explicit modelling of
nancial intermediaries approach is the credit and banking model of the Euro
Area (Gerali et al. (2010)). In their model, the banks have some degree of market
power and accumulate bank capital subject to a capital requirement. Banks enjoy
some degree of market power by setting di¤erent rates for households and rms
although they face the cost of adjusting the retail rate. Banks also face a capital
requirement target, so that they accumulate capital from retained earnings to
keep close to the target. The research showed that the existence of the banking
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sector to some extent reduces the e¤ect of demand shocks, while it helps propagate
supply shocks. The model also showed that unpredicted shocks of bank capital
have a signicant impact on the real economy, especially on investment.
The DSGE model with nancial frictions has now been widely used to explain
the transmission channels of various shocks to the economy and the transmission
of di¤erent economic policies, including macroprudential policy. Regardless of
their limitations, DSGE models bring important advantages for macroprudential
analysis including: (i) they can be compared with a benchmark in which there is
only monetary policy, (ii) they include many sources of shocks that can be used
to check for di¤erent economic trajectories, and (iii) they rely on general equilib-
rium analysis and are suitable for simulations to study the impact of new policy
instruments (Mizen et al. (2018)). The DSGE model has been enhanced to com-
pare the e¤ects of various macroprudential instruments, such as countercyclical
capital requirements and loan-to-value ratios, with traditional monetary policy
in mitigating the business-cycle uctuations after technological shocks, monetary
shocks or nancial shocks. Furthermore, many DSGE models have also been
enhanced to assess the interaction between monetary and macroprudential poli-
cies and the design of an optimal mix of these policies (Bank for International
Settlements (2012)).
Modelling Macroprudential Policy in DSGE
Modelling macroprudential policy in the DSGE model can be done in various
ways. The rst way is by using an explicit type of macroprudential instrument
such as capital requirements (for example: Angelini et al. (2014), Kollmann
(2013)), reserve requirements (for example: Tavman (2015), Primus (2017)) or
loan to value ratio (for example: Mendicino & Punzi (2014), Rubio & Carrasco-
Gallego (2014), Garbers & Liu (2018)). The second way is by imposing a tax or
subsidy that incentivises banks to adjust their liabilitiesstructure (for example:
Aoki et al. (2016), Gertler et al. (2012), Levine & Lima (2015)). The third way
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is by using a generic form of macroprudential policy that a¤ects the fraction of
liabilities that banks can lend or a¤ects the spread between lending-deposit rate
(for example: Kannan et al. (2014), Ozkan & Unsal (2014), Quint & Rabanal
(2014)). Most of the macroprudential policy rules in DSGE models are introduced
in a counter-cyclical manner to obtain a smoother nancial cycle.
The Impact of Macroprudential Policy and Interaction with Other
Policies
The e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policy in reducing the volatility of output
depends on the type of shocks and the coordination between other policies such as
monetary policy. According to Angelini et al. (2014), when the economy experi-
ences only a technological shock, the impact of time-varying capital requirements
on reducing output or ination volatility is relatively small. Moreover, their study
showed that the absence of cooperation between the macroprudential and mon-
etary authorities might produce excessive volatility of the policy instrument. In
contrast, when the economy experiences nancial shock, capital requirements can
reduce the volatility of output and the volatility of loan to output ratio, regard-
less of the cooperation between monetary and macroprudential policy. Therefore,
the authors argue that capital requirements should not be treated as a substitute
for monetary policy or as an all-purpose tool for stabilisation. Instead, capital
requirements should be addressed as an additional mean to deal with the nancial
shock.
The interaction of macroprudential policy and monetary policy is also neces-
sary for dealing with house price uctuations. Kannan et al. (2014) found that
the interaction of monetary policy with macroprudential policy will reduce house
price uctuations and increase welfare if the economy faces a nancial shock.
However, the study found that when the source of the housing boom arises from
a productivity shock, the macroprudential policy will decrease welfare.
Macroprudential policy is also useful in altering the risk-taking behaviour
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that arises from other policies. For example, government credit policy has the
e¤ect of incentivising risk-taking (moral hazard) for banks, especially in a high-
risk economy. Therefore, the combination of macroprudential policy and govern-
ment credit policy leads to a more stable economy and brings the highest welfare
(Gertler et al. (2012)).
Globalisation has deepened the connection between the nancial and the real
sector among the countries throughout the world. Thus, it is essential to add
open economy aspects into the analysis of macroprudential policy. The impact
of monetary or macroprudential policy in one country may a¤ect the macroeco-
nomic variables in other countries and vice versa. Ozkan & Unsal (2014) examine
the role of the sources of borrowing (domestic versus foreign) on the relative ef-
fectiveness of the monetary and macroprudential policy. They adopt a small
open economy framework to analyse the crisis scenario brought about by a sud-
den reversal in capital ows and its impact on the exchange rate. In their model,
entrepreneurs can have two funding sources: foreign borrowing and domestic bor-
rowing. Each of the sources of nance has a di¤erent interest rate because the
interest rate depends on the nominal interest rate of each country and also its
risk premium. The paper shows that both monetary policy and macroprudential
policy help macroeconomic and nancial stability, even though macroprudential
policy implies a better result. Furthermore, the ndings of this paper suggest
that it is better to use macroprudential policy to handle credit/nancial issues
rather than monetary policy because the impact of the monetary policy that
reacts to credit growth, in the presence of macroprudential policy, is negligible.
However, the benet of macroprudential policy depends on the size of foreign
borrowing. The macroprudential instrument can directly inuence the cost of
credit when the source of borrowing is external. Thus, the more signicant the
size of foreign borrowing, the higher the benet of macroprudential policies in
helping macroeconomic and nancial stability.
The interaction between macroprudential and monetary policy could opti-
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mally dampen the macroeconomic and nancial uctuation that rises from the
inter-linkages between current account decit and nancial vulnerabilities (Men-
dicino & Punzi (2014)). The authors analyse several types and combination of
monetary and macroprudential policy parameters and do some welfare analysis
to nd optimal policy. There are six shocks discussed in the paper to explain
the performance of each type and combination of policies: productivity shocks,
house preference shocks, domestic borrowing limits shocks, risk premium shocks,
foreign discount factor shocks and monetary policy shocks. Calibrated using US
and G7 countriesdata, the paper concludes that the optimal policy which can
dampen macroeconomic and nancial uctuation, as well as Pareto improving,
is the combination of macroprudential policy featuring a countercyclical LTV ra-
tio that responds to house price dynamics and with a monetary policy rule that
reacts not only to ination but also to household credit.
The introduction of macroprudential policy within a currency union, like
in the Euro area where ECB controls the monetary policy, can help in reduc-
ing macroeconomic volatility and improving welfare (Quint & Rabanal (2014)).
Quint and Rabanal developed a two-country model using nancial frictions where
there are two types of nancial intermediaries, domestic and foreign. Domestic
nancial intermediaries take deposits, grant loans and issue bonds. Foreign -
nancial intermediaries trade the bonds across countries to channel funds from
one country to the others. Using the Bayesian estimation to analyse the opti-
mal policies, they found that the introduction of macroprudential policy reduces
macroeconomic volatility and improves welfare. Additionally, the macropruden-
tial regulation also helps monetary policy so that the optimal response of the
nominal interest rate to a shock is smaller. Welfare improvement to the economy
is achieved when macroprudential policies respond to nominal credit growth.
In emerging market economies, macroprudential policy is better able to with-
stand the impact of external nancial shocks (Aoki et al. (2016)). The source
of funds of nancial intermediaries in the Aoki et al. model is obtained from
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domestic deposits (denominated in domestic currency) and from foreign borrow-
ing (denominated in foreign currency). By incorporating the external source
of nancing, their model can capture the dynamics of the taper tantrum in
2013. The paper found that the relative impact of the macroprudential policy
depends on the extent of external nancial and non-nancial shocks to the econ-
omy. Moreover, there is a signicant welfare gain from cyclical macroprudential
policy, especially when foreign interest rates have a more substantial role and
when the prices are more exible. Additionally, when a foreign interest rate hike
triggers a recession, then a conservative monetary policy which aims to stabilise
ination rate tends to worsen the economy.
Which macroprudential instrument is more e¤ective? Since the nature and
objective of each instrument is di¤erent, it might not be reasonably to compare.
One of the researches that tried to compare some macroprudential tools using the
DSGE model is that of Tavman (2015)). Within a closed economy framework,
she compared three macroprudential policy tools (i) reserve requirement, (ii) cap-
ital requirement and (iii) regulation premium. She used the New Keynesian with
nancial frictions DSGE model referring to Gertler & Karadi (2011) calibrated
with US data. She used welfare maximising monetary and macroprudential pol-
icy rule analysis and found that all the macroprudential tools are successful in
lowering the adverse e¤ects of exogenous shocks to the economy and decreas-
ing welfare loss. Among those three tools, she found that capital requirement
is the most e¤ective macroprudential tool in lowering the negative e¤ects of the
shocks and generates higher welfare gains, both under technology shocks as well
as capital quality shocks.
1.2.3 The Role of Bond Finance as an Alternative Corporate
Source of Financing
The majority of DSGE models with the macroprudential policy described in the
previous subsection assumed that rms obtain external nance only from banks.
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However, in reality, rms have other sources of external funding including issuing
bonds in the capital market. Adrian et al. (2012) supported this opinion and
argued that the current macroeconomic models with nancial frictions do not
capture some facts during the crisis. Most models suggest that loans to corporate
borrowers contracted during the crisis. However, the evidence of their research
showed that although there was a contraction in bank lending, nancing through
bond issuance increased to ll the gap, although the cost of both types of credit
rose during the crisis. The role of bond nancing is essential in providing credit to
non-nancial corporations during an economic downturn. Model of Adrian et al.
(2012) captures the relation between bank and bond nance. However, their
model is not within a general equilibrium framework, and there is no analysis of
the macroeconomic implications of debt substitution.
The importance of bond nancing during the nancial crisis is also pointed
out by Contessi et al. (2013). The authors analyse the cycle of United States
corporate bond and bank loans from 1952 2013 and found that bank loans are
pro-cyclical while the bond market is countercyclical. The correlation between
real GDP and the cyclical component of real bank loans is 0.34, whereas the
correlation with the cyclical component of real corporate bonds is -0.21. Based
on the result, the authors argue that the impact of a nancial crisis is less harmful
to rms which have access to a bond market. Therefore, examining heterogeneity
in access to nancing through bank loans and bonds is important in the analysis
of business cycle dynamics. This substitution of bank loans with market nance
was also found in the United Kingdom. Loan growth increases when corporate
bond spreads widen, whereas it falls during periods when corporate bond spreads
decline. Bank loans appear to substitute for other forms of nance in some
periods of bad market conditions such as in 1998 Q3 (Baumann et al. (2005)).
Some literature has tried to model how rms choose their sources of exter-
nal nance. Boot & Thakor (1997) put forward a theory of nancial system
architecture which explained comprehensively how and why banks and the nan-
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cial market emerge and why borrowers prefer either banks or nancial markets.
Their model showed that high-quality borrowers would access the nancial mar-
ket. A nancial system that is in its early stages will be bank-dominated, and
after that, it will develop to be a more sophisticated nancial market, and bank
lending will diminish. Additionally, Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) constructed a
model of nancial intermediation in which rmschoice of the form of nancing
are inuenced by the nancial status of the rm as well as of the intermediaries.
The features of the model show that rms with substantial net worth will be able
to access market nancing directly, whereas rms with low net worth have to
turn to nancial intermediaries (banks), who intensively monitor the project so
the demand for collateral can be reduced. Firms with very low net worth cannot
convince investors to give loans. Thus, those rms cannot obtain external nance
to fund their project. Holmstrom & Tirole (1997) emphasised two types of moral
hazard problem in the nancial intermediation process. The rst is known as
a demand-side moral hazard. An entrepreneur can choose to conceal the actual
condition of the project for his benet because the depositor or the bank cannot
observe it. To mitigate this type of moral hazard, bankers need to monitor the
entrepreneur, but that is costly. The second type is known as a supply-side moral
hazard. Bankers can choose not to monitor the entrepreneur properly because
it is costly, and because the depositors can only see the result of the project
but cannot verify whether the bank is properly monitoring the entrepreneur. To
mitigate this type of moral hazard bankers need to invest some of their funds
(capital) to be properly incentivised to monitor the project.
Repullo & Suarez (2000) also develop a static partial equilibrium model of
choice between bank and market nance which depends on the rms net worth.
The characteristics of the equilibrium credit market are similar to those of Holm-
strom & Tirole (1997) in which rms with high net worth prefer market lending,
those with medium net worth choose bank lending and those with small net
worth are unable to obtain external funding. They expand the model to analyse
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the transmission of some monetary policies such as deposit interest ceilings and
capital requirement.
A more recent model of rms dynamics where rms can choose the source of
their debt is developed by Crouzet (2015). In his model, rms can choose between
bank nance, market nance or a combination of the two. The advantage of bank
nance is that it provides exibility: the rm can ask for a loan restructuring
during a time of economic distress. However, bank intermediation costs are higher
compared to market nance because banks are more restrictive in giving loans.
One of the conclusions of his paper is that as rms grow, or as their credit risk
declines, they will reduce their reliance on bank debt because the advantage of
the exibility of banks nance is of little value to them. He also found that
when the banks intermediation costs increase, some of the rms will switch to
market debt. Theferore, the share of bank nance over the total debt decreases.
However, since market debt doesnt provide exibility in di¢ cult times, rms
reduce their borrowing and investment.
Chang et al. (2016) develop a theoretical framework for a small open econ-
omy in which the quantities of bank loan versus bond nance are determined
endogenously. Their model, which is embedding the model of Holmstrom & Ti-
role (1997), provides an economic explanation of the increase of the ratio of bonds
to bank loans as a response to the falling world interest rates. One of the conclu-
sions of the study is that the leverage e¤ects are quite di¤erent in the banks-only
economy vis-à-vis the bonds-only economy. They found that an economy which
can rely only on bond-nancing is less volatile than the benchmark or an economy
with banks only. The reason is that because the existence of banks, by alleviating
moral hazard problems, allows us to accommodate more investment projects than
otherwise, which leads to amplication of aggregate shocks. When both modes
of nance are possible, the nancial accelerator changes over time in response to
the endogenous choice of bonds versus bank loans.
How does the development of nonbank nancing sources such as the corporate
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bond market and shadow banking a¤ect nancial fragility? If overall credit de-
mand doesnt change, an increase in the size of nonbank nancing sources creates
a condition of excess bank supply. Thus, bank spread will be lower, and banks
will be more attracted to holding riskier assets. This behaviour makes banks
become more fragile and a¤ects the fragility of the nancial system as a whole.
The impact of shadow banking is more signicant than corporate bonds because
shadow banking allows banks to have higher leverage. On the other hand, cor-
porate bonds could help rms to access credit during a crisis when bank lending
contracts. In conclusion, although non-bank nancing sources could increase the
fragility of the banking sector, they also make a banking crisis less costly (Aoki
& Nikolov (2015)).
Is a bank-based nancial system better than a market based nancial sys-
tem? According to Levine (2002), there are two competing theories of nancial
structure: one supports a bank-based nancial system and the second supports a
market-based nancial system. The supporters of a bank-based system give em-
phasis to some positive roles of banks in (i) obtaining information about rms and
managers so as to design a better capital allocation and corporate governance;
(ii) managing the risks such as cross-sectional, intertemporal, and liquidity risk
so they can enhance investment e¢ ciency and economic growth, and (iii) mo-
bilising capital to exploit economies of scale. In contrast, the supporters of a
market-based system emphasised the growth-enhancing role of well-functioning
markets in (i) fostering bigger incentives to research rms because the informa-
tion gathered can lead to a more protable trading in big, liquid markets; (ii)
improving corporate governance by easing takeovers and making it easier to link
managerial reward to a rms performance; and (iii) facilitating risk management.
The supporters of the market-based view highlight that markets will decrease the
ine¢ ciencies related to banks and boost economic growth.
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1.2.4 Liquidity Regulation as Macroprudential Policy and Inter-
action with Other Policies
The global nancial crisis highlighted the importance of liquidity regulation in
the banking sector.7 Liquidity regulations have been important instruments used
for microprudential, macroprudential, and also monetary policy purposes. From
the microprudential perspective, Basel III regulation specically required a bank
to hold su¢ cient liquidity which is measured as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).8 On the other hand, macroprudential
authorities also use liquidity regulation as part of their macroprudential instru-
ments. Liquidity regulation such as countercyclical reserves requirements can be
used to mitigate the systemic risk caused by the credit cycle.9 Liquidity regu-
lation also plays an essential role in monetary policy. Reserve requirement has
been used as part of monetary policy instruments to control the money multi-
plier in the economy and to strengthen the transmission of policy rate on the
interbank market rate. Remuneration on reserves has now also been considered
as an instrument of central bank monetary policy, mainly when the central bank
operates in zero lower bound interest rate (Bowman et al. (2010)).
The need for a liquidity-based macroprudential policy is supported by Lan-
dau (2016). He argues that unlike countercyclical capital bu¤er ratios that have a
cyclical component, liquidity requirements in Basel III are xed over the cycle. A
constant liquidity requirement may become a source of ine¢ ciency because nan-
cial cycles are created by the interaction between leverage on the one hand and
maturity transformation on the other. Consequently, he suggests macropruden-
tial measures that would act directly on liquidity and maturity transformation.
7The necessities of liquidity regulation on banking sector and related literature regarding
liquidity regulation are comprehensively discussed in Allen & Gale (2017) and Bouwman (2014).
8Basel III regulations on liquidity are sometimes also categorised as macroprudential policy
(Nier et al. (2018))
9Some examples of macroprudential policy instruments regarding liquidity are the counter-
cyclical reserves requirements, macroprudential liquidity bu¤er, limits on currency mismatch,




Cecchetti & Kashyap (2018) highlight the importance of examining interac-
tions among banking regulations: this research inspired my fourth chapter. In
the paper, they present a simplied framework to explore the interactions be-
tween the risk-weighted capital ratio, the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage
ratio, and the net stable funding ratio. The framework helps us understand which
requirements are likely to bind and how those regulations a¤ect banksbusiness
models. One of their conclusions is that LCR and NSFR requirements almost
inevitably will never bind at the same time.
Evaluating the interaction between monetary policy and bank liquidity regu-
lations, particularly Reserve Requirement (RR) and LCR, is also crucial. Bech
& Keister (2017) extend the standard model of interbank borrowing/lending to
study how the introduction of an LCR requirement a¤ects interbank interest
rates, and how it alters the e¤ects of central bank monetary policy operations. In
the model, banks can borrow and lend in the interbank market, and they trade
two types of contract: overnight and term loans. They introduce a payment shock
after the interbank market closed so that the bank may need to borrow from the
central bank at the end of the period to meet two liquidity regulations: reserve
requirement and LCR requirement. The strength of the model is the di¤erent
runo¤-rate for each type of liability (deposits, overnight loan and term loans)
in the calculation of LCR which is closer to the real regulation. Their paper
strongly inuences the critical features regarding how I model the interaction of
RR and LCR of my fourth chapter. The main di¤erent is that they use a static
model and focus on the impact of LCR on the open market operation, while my
chapter tries to see the e¤ect of the RR and LCR regulation in a dynamic general
equilibrium setting.
There are several ways to model the banks reserves requirement in a DSGE
model. Roger & Vlcek (2011) developed a model with nancial frictions in credit
markets to assess the costs of increasing capital and liquidity requirements. The
disadvantage of their model is that they assume an always binding reserve re-
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quirement constraint, so the bank will maintain reserves equal to the required
reserve. However, as stressed by Chadha & Corrado (2012), it is essential to
allow banks to endogenously choose excess reserve holding. They compare the
economy responses in an environment where commercial banks have incentives to
endogenously select their optimal reserves versus an economy where the banks
reserve to deposit ratio is constant. They nd that the rst case performs better
concerning welfare. The reserves holding over the business cycle can reduce the
volatility of interest spreads to shocks and can act as a stabiliser in the econ-
omy. Therefore, the paper supports the countercyclical policy in liquidity that
encourages banks to increase reserve holdings in a boom to limit the expansion
of loans and then to release the liquidity in recession preventing too rapid reduc-
tion in loans. Primus (2017) developed a model with endogenous excess reserves
as banks voluntarily demand these assets, and there are convex costs associated
with holding reserves. However, di¤erent from my model, he assumes a perfectly
elastic supply of liquidity, so that the bank is not subject to stochastic with-
drawal risk which has been an essential aspect in reserve management models.
Therefore, increased uncertainty about the size of deposits withdrawals does not
inuence the quantity of the banks excess reserves in his model. The optimal
bank reserves holding are determined by the spread between the interest rate on
reserves and the cost of borrowing from the central bank, and a¤ected by the
convex cost of holding reserves. Primuspaper found that the countercyclical
reserve requirement rule has no e¤ect on the real variables. However, the model
suggests that the combination of an augmented Taylor rule which reacts to excess
reserves, and a countercyclical reserve requirement rule, is optimal to mitigate
the macroeconomic and nancial volatility associated with liquidity shocks.
Another strand of literature studies the interaction of capital requirement
and liquidity requirement. Covas & Driscoll (2014) develop a non-linear model
to study the macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard
for banks on top of existing capital adequacy requirements. The strengths of the
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model are: bankers are heterogeneous concerning wealth holdings, loan balances,
deposit balances and productivity; and both liquidity and capital constraints
are occasionally binding. However, the authors did not di¤erentiate between
reserve and other liquid assets in the liquidity requirements and bundled it is
as safe assets. Although the authors do not explicitly model the supply of risk-
free assets, they nd that increasing the availability of safe assets can mitigate
the macroeconomic impact of introducing a liquidity requirement. They also
highlight the importance of using general equilibrium modelling to estimate the
macroeconomic impact of the new regulations. The partial equilibrium model
provides an overstated e¤ect due to the muting of the adjustment of the loan
interest rate and rate of return on securities, a channel that would decrease the
impact of the new regulation.
Corrado & Schuler (2015) also develop a DSGE model to study the interac-
tion of liquidity requirement and capital requirement. The focus of their model
is on the impact of those requirements on macroeconomy through the interbank
market lending. The authors use liquidity measure as a proxy for the LCR and
NSFR and do not explicitly discuss reserve requirements. The paper concludes
that an increase in the liquidity requirements e¤ectively reduces the impact of an
interbank shock on output and employment, while an increased capital require-
ment propagates only through nominal variables as ination and interest rates.
De Bandt & Chahad (2016) studies the impact of solvency and liquidity regula-
tions using a large scale DSGE model. The authors use an ad-hoc approach to
model the banks capital and liquidity holding by imposing quadratic adjustment
costs when a bank is deviating from all regulations (CAR, LCR and NSFR). The
strength of their model is that they use multi-period assets so they can address
the maturity mismatch problem and able to model the liquidity ratio in a more
relatable way with the Basel III regulation.
Only a few studies have attempted to empirically examine the impact of LCR
because the regulation is relatively new and full implementation is just started
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in 2019. Rezende et al. (2016) shows that implementation of LCR increases
bank demand in the Federal Reserves monetary policy operations. Banerjee &
Mio (2017) indicate that a stricter Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG), which
is similar in design with LCR, changes the composition of bank balance sheet in
the United Kingdom. Banks respond to the tightening regulation by increasing
the share of high-quality liquid assets and non-nancial deposits while reducing
intra-nancial loans and short-term wholesale funding. However, the impact on
lending to the non-nancial sector is not signicant. Bonner & Eij¢ nger (2016)
analyses the implication of liquidity rule, that similar to LCR, on bank lending
in the Netherlands. The authors found that the bank does not pass on the higher
cost to their lending rate. A tighter liquidity regulation seems to lower the banks
interest margin.
Much recent monetarist literature studies the bank liquidity management with
a search frictions feature to explain the behaviour of bank reserves and interbank
rates in the OTC market such as Afonso & Lagos (2015), Bianchi & Bigio (2014),
Bech & Monnet (2016). However, those areas of new monetarists research are




Government Subsidy on Bank
Information Cost
2.1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis in 2008 brought a consensus among policy makers and
researchers about the interdependencies between nancial sector stability and
macroeconomic stability. The externalities of the nancial system spread the
problem in some banks into a systemic issue in the nancial sector and then af-
fected the real sector. The contraction in bank loans during the crisis had an
impact to the signicant drop in investment and output. The government has
been conducting various policy to support the banking sector to stabilize the
aggregate demand, particularly investment. Most euro area government have
provided substantial nancial assistance to nancial institutions with the objec-
tive to safeguard nancial system stability and prevent a credit crunch (ECB
(2015)).1 The common measures of government support are in the form of de-
1Various forms of credit policies also has been considered as an alternative tools for macro-
economic stabilization since the usage of standard monetary policy is limited by the zero lower
bound constraint (Correia et al. (2016))
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posit insurance, credit guarantees, capital injections and asset support (Stolz &
Wedow (2011)). Public support to increase bank credit for entrepreneur are com-
monly implemented. However, it is not clear whether the intervention increases
welfare and relatively few theoritical literature address the topic (Arping et al.
(2010), Williamson (1994)).
Argument of government intervention in credit markets tends to be based
on asymmetric information problem leading to the adverse selection, moral haz-
ard problem and credit rationing. When information is endogenous or market
incomplete, the economy is not constrained Pareto optimal. Therefore, govern-
ment interventions (e.g. taxes and subsidies or credit guarantees) that take into
account the costs of information might make everyone better o¤ (Greenwald &
Stiglitz (1986)). After the global crisis, a costly information acquisition and mon-
itoring process can cause a slowdown in lending activities so that the potential of
economic growth and development is not being realised. How if the government
intervene by giving subsidy to reduce the information cost in the bank credit?
This chapter tries to examine the long-run impact of government subsidies on
the banks information cost and evaluate the combination of type of subsidies and
nancing strategy under which government intervention might raise welfare. In
the model, banks information costs consist of banks information acquisition cost
and banks monitoring cost. Information acquisition cost is an up-front fee paid
by the rms that approach a bank, and it covers the banks cost of information
acquisition about some of the rms productivity level. Thus, subsidy on this fee
is related to the reduction of screening cost in the banking sector. Monitoring
cost is the fee paid by the lenders to reveal actual realisation of the rms output
in the case of default.2. Therefore, subsidy on monitoring cost is somewhat can be
associated with a loan guarantee, a policy that has been used in many countries,
although in this case, the guarantee is only on a small part of the banks cost.
The aim of both subsidy policy is to increase the access of the rms to banks





The main research questions of this chapter are:
1. What is the impact of government subsidy on banks information cost on
the nancial structure and macroeconomic variables?
2. What is the welfare implication of government subsidy on banks informa-
tion cost given that the government is nancing the subsidy using taxes?
Several studies show that the role of bond nancing is essential in providing
credit to non-nancial corporations during an economic downturn (for example:
Contessi et al. (2013), Adrian et al. (2012), Baumann et al. (2005)). Therefore
this chapter employs a framework that takes into account the existence of both
bank and bond markets. One comparative advantage of banks, compared to the
bond market, is the banks ability to give information about the rms productiv-
ity before the rm decide to proceeds with the loan. Therefore, increasing access
to the bank will not only increase the production and the economic output but
also reduce the risk faced by the uninformed rms about their productivity.
This chapter found that a subsidy on banks information acquisition cost im-
proves aggregate welfare if the government funds the subsidy by the tax on labour
income or lump-sum tax. Benets of the subsidy mostly go to the entrepreneurs
welfare because a cheaper access to bank lending leads to higher rms prots, net
worth, and consumption. In contrast, the households welfare decrease because
they consume less due to the distortionary tax and because they have to work
more. Some economic e¢ ciency can be gained from the policy if the government
imposes a redistribution policy on the entrepreneur and household consumption.
In contrast, I found that a subsidy on monitoring costs generates welfare loss
both for households and entrepreneur. Therefore, this chapter suggests that the
government support for lowering the cost of accessing bank have a more positive
impact on welfare, compared to government support for taking care of the cost
of the loan default.
This research is related with the recent literature on government subsidy on
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the banking sector such as credit subsidies by Antunes et al. (2014); Li (2002) and
Correia et al. (2016). In that literature, the government subsidises some of the
loan interest payment to increase bank lending. My study is di¤erent from theirs
regarding the type of subsidy given to the banking sector which is more specied
on information cost. Furthermore, their paper and other related literature about
government support for banking sector usually only focuses on bank loans as
the nancial intermediary in the model, such as Kollmann et al. (2012), Arping
et al. (2010), and Williamson (1994).3. Meanwhile, I use a DSGE model that has
taken into account the role of bond nancing in providing credit to non-nancial
corporations in the analysis of government policy. To my knowledge, this is the
rst study that combines the analysis of subsidy on banks information costs and
the role of bond nancing in providing credit to non-nancial corporations using
a DSGE model.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the
set-up of basic model. In Section 3 I show some modication of the model to
include various types of government subsidy on banks information cost and types
of taxation. Section 4 provides the results regarding the impact of subsidy on
nancial structure, macroeconomic variables and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Basic Model
The basic model of my research is based heavily on De Fiore & Uhlig (2015)
and De Fiore & Uhlig (2011). It is a closed economy with a exible price. The
economy is constituted by households who consume, save and supply labour, and
productive entrepreneurs who can borrow either from the bank or directly from
the capital market fund (CMF). The central bank injects liquidity. The model has
3Kollmann et al. (2012) model government support for the banking system as a transfer
to banks that is nanced by higher taxes. The government support will boosts bank capital,
and it lowers the spread between the bank lending rate and the deposit rate, which stimulates
investment and output. Arping et al. (2010) and Williamson (1994) discuss theoritically the
impact of credit guarantees and direct government loans in the presence of informational frictions
in the bank market.
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features of informational frictions in the credit market which make it suitable for
the purpose of the study. In this chapter I add government as the authority who
provides subsidy on the banking sector and collects taxes. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the overview of the model. The red dashed lines show the new components that
I add to the basic model.
Figure 2.1: Overview of Model
2.2.1 Households














where ct is the consumption, and ht is the labour.  denotes the households
discount rate,  is a preference parameter, and  is the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply. The budget constraint of households is given by:
Mt +Dt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] Wt; (2.2)
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where Wt is the nominal wealth, Mt is the cash kept for transaction purposes,
Dt denotes total deposits which consist of deposits with banking sector, DBt ; and





The safe return, Rt; on banks deposits and capital market securities must be the
same to avoid arbitrage. Bt+1 is nominal bonds which pay a unit of currency in
period t+1, and Qt;t+1is the nominal stochastic discount factor for pricing assets.
The nominal wealth at the beginning of period t is:
Wt = Bt +Rt 1Dt 1 + Ptt + fMt 1; (2.3)
where Ptt denote the nominal transfers from the central bank and ~Mt 1 is the
cash which held by the households at the beginning of period t.
Moreover, the households are subjected to the cash-in-advance constraint
which is provided by:
fMt Mt   Pt [ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt] + Pt(wtht + rtkt)  0; (2.4)
where kt is capital,  is depreciation rate, wt is real wage and rt is the real rent on
capital. This constraint limits the household expenditures for consumption and
investment not more than their total available cash. In this model, household can
go to the goods market after receiving wages and rental payment in cash. Since
keeping money to the next period does not giving any returns, equation 2.4 is
always binding.



















(1   + rt+1)

; (2.7)






There is a continuum i 2 [0; 1] of entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur enters the
period holding capital zit that depreciates at rate , earns a rental rate rt, and
accumulates the net worth nit given by:
nit = (1   + rt) zit: (2.9)
An entrepreneur produces yit by employing capital Kit and hiring labour Hit:
The model assumes that each entrepreneur need cash xit as working capital to
pay workerswages wt; and capital rental prices rt before the start of production.
xit = wtHit + rtKit: (2.10)






where At is aggregate productivity common to all entrepreneur and "j;it are the
entrepreneur-specic levels of productivity. "1;it; "2;it; and "3;it are random shocks
that realised sequentially during the period. "1;it are known before production,
"2;it can only be revealed by the bank, and "3;it are known by the entrepreneur
after the production. The shocks are strictly positive and mutually indepen-
dent with probability density functions '("1;1t); '("2;2t); '("3;3t) and cu-
mulative distribution functions ("1;1t); ("2;2t); ("3;3t) with expectations
normalised to 1, E ["j;it] = 1:
The size of the project that an entrepreneur is capable of running, represented
by its working capital xit, is proportional to his net worth:
xit = nit;   1: (2.12)
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Furthermore, a fraction of the working capital is borrowed from a nancial
intermediary and the amount of loan is proportional with the entrepreneurs net





De Fiore & Uhlig (2011) emphasise the necessity of the assumption regarding
the xed ratio of loan to net worth to ensure that all rms raise nite amounts
of external nance; otherwise, only entrepreneurs with high initial productivity
would receive all the funding. This situation may creates a homogenous pool of
rms with a potentially high leverage ratio.
The entrepreneur can choose to borrow from a bank or the capital market fund
(CMF). Following De Fiore & Uhlig (2011), I assume that banks are institutions
that have close relationships with entrepreneurs. The bank acquires costly addi-
tional information about the entrepreneurs second productivity shock ("2;it) and
adapting the terms of the debt nancing arrangements accordingly. In contrasts,
CMF relies on publicly available information about the rst productivity shock
only.4 The cost obtain some additional information about the productivity is
borne by the entrepreneur, and the amount is equal to a proportion  of the en-
trepreneurs net worth. After approaching a bank, and learning the value of "2;it;
the entrepreneur has an opportunity to choose whether to drop out or proceed
with the loan and continue producing. An entrepreneur who decides to drop out
will hold his remaining net worth (1  )nit to the end of the period.
An entrepreneur chooses the composition of inputs maximising the production
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (equation 2.10) which limits working
4As explained in De Fiore & Uhlig (2011), the distinction between banks and CMFs in the
model is consistent with recent theories of nancial intermediation. Banks treat rms di¤erently
in situations of nancial di¢ culties because they are long-term players in the debt market,
while bondholders are not. Therefore, banks have an incentive to acquire more information
about rms. By obtaining information about rms, banks minimize the possibility of ine¢ cient
liquidation and build a reputation for nancial exibility. Based on that reason, banks are more
attractive for rms that are likely to face temporary situations of distress.
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where "ite is the known productivity factor which is dened as:6
"eit 
8>><>>:
"1;it if using CMF nance,
"1;it"2;it if using bank nance,











Both bank and CMF o¤er a break-even costly state verication contract based on
the ex-ante available information about productivity level ("eit) as in Townsend
(1979). At the end of the period, all the remaining uncertainties of productivity
level (!it) are revealed and the actual output of an entrepreneur, yit; is given by:




"2;it"3;it if using CMF nance,
"3;it if using bank nance.
(2.17)
The optimal contract sets a threshold !it corresponding to repayment of the
loan. If the realisation of the level of uncertain productivity is higher than the
threshold (!it  !it); the entrepreneurs will pay !"iteqtxit to the lender and keep
5The detailed derivation is available in Appendix 6.1.2.
6One of the comparative advantage of banks is that they are able to obtain information
about some of the entrepreneurs productivity shocks ("2;it). Therefore, an entrepreneur who
approaches a bank knows his "1;it and "2;it before the contract. While an entrepreneur who
borrows from the CMF only know his "1;it
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(!it  !it)"iteqtxit as prot. Otherwise, if the realisation of the level of uncertain
productivity is lower than the threshold (!it < !it), the entrepreneur will default
and gain nothing. In the case of default, the lender pays some monitoring costs
that are a xed proportion  of the output and takes all the remaining output,
!it"it
eqtxit.
Given the threshold ! = !it, the expected share of nal output for the entre-




(!   !)' (!;) d!; (2.18)
and the expected share of nal output for the lender is given by:
g (!;; ) =
Z !
0
(1  )!' (!;) d! + ! [1   (!;)] : (2.19)
The rst part of the right-hand side of equation 2.19 represents the expected
share for the lender if the borrower defaults, and the second part of the equation
represents the expected share if the entrepreneur payback the loan.
With the assumption of perfect competition between the nancial intermedi-
aries, the expected return earned by a nancial intermediary from giving a loan
must be equal to the funding cost. The zero prot condition for the nancial
intermediaries is given by:
(   1)

xitRt = g (!it;it; ) y
e
it: (2.20)
The left hand side of equation represents the funding cost that lender has
to pay to their depositors and the right hand side represents the expected total
payment from a borrower. By using equation 2.14, we can rewrite the zero prot
7' (!;) and  (!;) are the probability distribution function and cumulative density func-
tion of !it implied by the distributional assumptions for "2;it and "3;it and the lending decision
of the entrepreneur as described in equations 2.17 and 2.22.
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condition of equation 2.20 as:














3t if using CMF nance,
3t if using bank nance,
(2.22)




!c ("1;it; qt; Rt; 2t; 3t) if using CMF nance,
!b ("1;it"2;it; qt; Rt; 3t) if using bank nance.
(2.23)
Based on this contract, we can calculate the loan rate paid by each rm (Rlit)












The stages of entrepreneurs borrowing decision can be divided into three stages.
In the rst stage, "1;it is realised and publicly observed. An entrepreneur chooses
among these following options: (i) abstain from production and retain his net
worth, (ii) approach a bank and pay  of his net worth for information acquisition
cost, or (iii) borrow from a CMF. In the second stage, an entrepreneur who
approaches a bank will obtain information about his "2;it. Then, he can decide
to proceed with the bank loan or to drop out and retain his net worth (bnit =
(1   )nit). In the third stage, the entrepreneur produces and the remaining
uncertainties (!it) are revealed. The entrepreneur decisions on production and
source of external nancing are based on the expected share of output from each
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nancial intermediary and the expected payo¤ from holding the remaining net
worth until the end of the period. We derive the solution of the entrepreneurs
nancing decision backward, starting from the second stage decision.
In the second stage, the entrepreneur will proceed with the bank loan if the




!b ("1;it"2;it; qt; Rt; 3t) ;3t

| {z }





F d ("1; "2; q;R; 3) = "1"2qf

!b ("1"2; q;R; 3) ;3

; (2.26)
as the expected prot from production when the entrepreneur borrow from bank.
Then, the entrepreneur will proceed with the bank loan if the value of "2it is





it; qt; Rt; 3t

= 1: (2.27)
In the rst stage, given the information about "1;it, the entrepreneurs expected
prot if he approaches the bank is:8
F b ("1; q;R;  ; 2; 3)  (1  )
Z
"d("1;q;R;3)
F d ("1; "2; q;R; 3)  (d"2)
+  ("d ("1; q;R; 3) ;2)

: (2.28)
The rst part of the right-hand side of the equations is the expected prot if "2;it 
"dit such that he will proceed with the bank loan and pursue production. The
second part is the expected prot if "2;it < "dit such that he will not proceed with
the loan and choose to abstain from production. Adhering to the assumptions of
De Fiore & Uhlig (2015) model9, there is a threshold "bt = "b (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t)
8We denote  (d"i) = '("i;i)d"i for i=1,2,3.
9They assume that @Fb()
@"1







for "1;it below which the entrepreneur will choose not to borrow from bank. The
condition where "1;it = "bt will satisfy:
F b ("bt; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) = 1: (2.29)
The entrepreneur will borrow from the CMF if the expected prot is not only
higher than that of holding net worth to the end of the period, but also greater
than the expected prot of borrowing from the bank. Based on De Fiore & Uhlig
(2015) assumptions, there exists a unique threshold "ct = "c (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t)
for "1;it above which entrepreneurs will choose nancing from the CMF. Let
F c ("1; q;R; 2; 3) = f(!
c ("1; q;R; 2; 3))"1q denes the expected prot of
entrepreneur if borrowing from CMF. The condition where "1;it = "ct will satisfy:
F c ("ct; qt; Rt; 2t; 3t) = F
b ("ct; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) : (2.30)
The entrepreneur calculates the expected prot from all options and chooses the
best option giving the highest prot:
F ("1; q;R;  ; 2; 3)  max

1;F b ("1; q;R;  ; 2; 3) ;F




Given the thresholds "bt and "ct, entrepreneurs will spread into three groups. We
can compute the shares of each groups as follows:
 Shares of the rms that abstain from producing:
sat = 

"b (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t

: (2.32)
 Shares of the rms that approach a bank:
sbt = ("
c (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t) 

"b (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t

: (2.33)
Conditional on obtaining information from the bank, some of the rms will
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 (d"2)  (d"1) : (2.34)
 Shares of the rms that borrow from CMF:
sct = 1   ("c (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t) : (2.35)
Consumption and Capital
Following the literature on nancial accelerator, entrepreneurs are risk-neutral
and have a nite life period. I assume that entrepreneurs have linear prefer-
ence over consumption and have a constant probability, ; to "die".10 Moreover,
entrepreneurs who "die" in period t are not allowed to purchase capital, but in-
stead simply consume their accumulated resources and exit from the economy.11
When an entrepreneur dies or defaults, he is replaced by a new entrepreneur
who receives a very small amount of transfer from the government to start the
production. Thus, the aggregate rms consumption, et; and capital, zt follow:
et =  
f ({t)nt; (2.36)
zt+1 = (1  ) f ({t)nt; (2.37)




11The explanation of this assumption can be found in Bernanke et al. (1999): Entrepreneurs
are assumed to be risk-neutral and have nite horizons. The assumption of nite horizons is
intended to capture the phenomenon of ongoing births and deaths of rms, as well as to avoid
the possibility that the entrepreneurial sector will ultimately accumulate enough wealth to be




where  f ({t)nt denotes the aggregate prots in the entrepreneurial sector and
{  [qt; Rt;  t; 1;t; 2;t; 3;t]. The formulation of  f ({t) is given by:
 f ({) = sa +
Z "c(q;R; ;2;3)
"b(q;R; ;2;3)




F c ("1; q;R; 2; 3)	 (d"1) : (2.38)
2.2.3 Aggregation
Given the share of rms in each group from equation 2.32, 2.33, 2.34 and 2.35,
we can compute the aggregate bank loan (lbt ) and CMF loan (l
c
t ) as follows:
lbt = (1   t) sbpt (   1)nt; (2.39)
lct = s
c
t(   1)nt: (2.40)
The aggregate cash for production xt is calculated as the sum of all the producing
entrepreneurs loans and net worth, which is given by:
xt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
nt: (2.41)
The total economic output, yt; follows:
yt =  
y ({t) qtnt; (2.42)
where  y ({) is the aggregation of the realised productivity factors across all
producing rms. The formulation of  y ({) is given by:










"1 (d"1) : (2.43)
The agency cost which consists of information cost and monitoring cost are
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sunk cost which turns into output losses for the economy. The aggregate of those









where  tsbt measure the loss due to bank information acquisition costs, while
 m ({t)qt measure the loss due to bank and capital market monitoring cost.
The calculation of  m ({) is given by:
 m ({) = (1  ) mb ({) +  mc ({) ; (2.45)
where







!b ("1"2; q;R; 3) ;3

 (d"2)  (d"1) ;
(2.46)
and
 mc ({) =
Z
"c(q;R; ;2;3)
 (!c ("1; q;R; 2; 3) ;23)  (d"1) : (2.47)
The aggregate capital demand, labour demand, and investment follows:
rt (kt + zt) = (1  )xt; (2.48)
wtht = xt; (2.49)
It = kt+1 + zt+1 + (1  ) (kt + zt) : (2.50)
The aggregate ratio of funds raised by bank nanced-rms to the funds raised
by CMF-nanced rms (bank/bond ratio), #; is given by:
# =

















The formulation of  rb ({) and  rc ({) is given by:











b ("1"2; q;R; 3)
R
  1
35 (d"2)  (d"1) ;
(2.54)









c ("1; q;R; 2; 3)
R
  1
35 (d"1) : (2.55)
The aggregate debt to output ratio is given by:
 =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
(   1) nt
yt
: (2.56)
The default rate on banks (%ct) and bonds (%
c
t) are given by the share of rms










The central bank undertakes monetary policy in the forms of liquidity injections
by transferring nominal money to households (Ptt). The total amount of liquid-
41
2.2. BASIC MODEL
ity injections is given by:
Ptt =M
s
t  M st 1; (2.59)




where v is equal to the target ination rate ( = ).12
2.2.5 Market Clearing
The market clearing conditions for labour, capital and output are given by:
Ht = ht; (2.61)
Kt = kt + zt; (2.62)
yat = yt   ct   et  Kt+1 + (1  )Kt: (2.63)
The market clearing conditions for money, asset, and loans, in real terms, are
given by:
mst = mt + dt; (2.64)
bt = 0; (2.65)
dt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
(   1)nt: (2.66)
2.2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is dened by the set of allocations and prices such
that all agents behave optimally and markets clear. Appendix 6.1.3 compiles all
the equations of competitive equilibrium condition.
12Although I am not conducting monetary policy analysis, for this thesis I choose to follow
entirely the De Fiore & Uhlig (2015) model regarding cash-in-advance constraint and liquidity





I use all the parameters used by De Fiore & Uhlig (2015) as presented in Table
2.1. Parameters ; ; ;  and  were set to follow common values in related lit-
erature. Other parameters ;  ; ; 1; 2; 3 were calibrated to match the steady
state values of the model with the nancial facts of some Euro-area nancial
structure in the period of 1999-2010. Some nancial facts used as the target are:
the ratio of aggregate bank loans to debt securities for non-nancial corporations
(5.5), the ratio of aggregate debt to equity (0.64), the annual average spread on
debt securities (143 bps), the annual average spread on bank loans (119 bps),
the annual default rate of debt securities (5%), and the expected return of en-
trepreneurial capital (9.3%). The disutility of labour parameter, , is calibrated
such that consumption in the steady state is unity. The entrepreneur-specic
levels of productivity shock "j;it are assumed to be lognormally distributed, i.e
log("j;it) are normally distributed with variance j;t and mean  2j;t=2; so that
E ["j;it] = 1:
Table 2.1: Parameters
Parameters Value Description
 0.99 Household discount factor
 0.02 Depreciation rate
 0.64 Shares of labour on production function
 0.15 Monitoring cost
 3 The inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply
 3.195 Working capital to net worth ratio
 0.0099 Information acquisition cost
 0.022 Probability of rm dies
 3.753 Preference parameter
1 0.0165 Standard deviation of "1
2 0.0225 Standard deviation of "2
3 0.1711 Standard deviation of "3
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2.3 Modication of the Basic Model
In this section, I present the modication of the model to include various types
of government subsidy on banks information cost and taxation. There are six
combinations of policy, which are categorised based on the type of the subsidy
and the form of the tax. The alternative types of subsidy policies are:
1. Government subsidy on the banks information acquisition cost (sIt )
2. Government subsidy on the banks monitoring cost (sMt )
I assume that the government has a balanced budget nanced by one of the
following type of taxes:
1. Lump-sum tax (tls)
2. Tax on labour income (tl)
3. Tax on consumption that applies to the household and the rms consump-
tion (tc)
In the next subsection, I will derive the modication of some equations from
the basic model for each combination of subsidy and tax policies.
2.3.1 Subsidy on The Banks Information Acquisition Cost
I assume that the government subsidy sIt is proportional to the banks information
acquisition cost. This subsidy enters the entrepreneurs expected prot from
approaching a bank (equation 2.28) in the following:
F b
 
"1; q;R;  ; 2; 3;s
I
   1   + sIt Z
"d("1;q;R;3)
F d ("1; "2; q;R; 3)  (d"2)
(2.67)
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Moreover, the subsidy a¤ects the total bank loan in the economy and the
aggregation equations 2.39 and 2.41 become:
lbt =
 
1   t + sIt  t

sbpt (   1)nt; (2.68)
xt =
h 







The subsidy also a¤ects total output in the economy through the change in the
aggregation of the realised productivity factors across all producing rms (in
equation 2.42):
 y ({) =
 
1   + sIt  t









"1 (d"1) : (2.70)
In response to the changes in the total bank loan equation, the computation
of some nancial structure variables also need to be modied. The change in the
calculation of bank/bond ratio, # (from equation 2.51) and the calculation of the
aggregate debt to output ratio (equation 2.56) are:
# =
 







(1   t + st t) sbpt + sct
i
(   1) nt
yt
: (2.72)
The market clearing condition for loans (equation 2.66) are modied as:
dt =
h 






(   1)nt: (2.73)
In addition, I add the government budget constraint equation which varies
with the type of tax policy as follows:
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t(ct + et); (2.76)
The taxation a¤ects the budget constraints and thus the rst-order conditions
of household and entrepreneur. The complete modication of household and
entrepreneurss competitive equilibrium conditions is available in the Appendix
6.2.1.
2.3.2 Subsidy on The Banks Monitoring Cost
I assume that the government subsidy sMt is proportional to the banks monitoring










1  + sM!' (!;) d! + ! [1   (!;)] ; (2.77)
whilst the calculation of the expected share of nal output to the CMF is not
a¤ected
gc (!;; ) =
Z !
0
(1  )!' (!;) d! + ! [1   (!;)] : (2.78)
The subsidy on the banks monitoring cost indirectly a¤ects the threshold !b
in the debt contract between the bank and the entrepreneur. Consequently, it
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a¤ects the loan rate paid by the rms who borrow from the bank and have e¤ects
on the value of other variables.
The total amount of subsidies depends on the value of aggregate bank loan
that default. The government balanced budget equation varies with the govern-
ment nancing strategy as follows:
 Case 1: Subsidy is nanced by a lump-sum tax
sMt (1  ) mbqtnt = tlst ; (2.79)
 Case 2: Subsidy is nanced by the labour income tax
sMt (1  ) mbqtnt = tltwtht; (2.80)
 Case 3: Subsidy is nanced by the consumption tax
sMt (1  ) mbqtnt = tct(ct + et); (2.81)
2.3.3 Welfare
I evaluate the long-run benet of subsidy policy using welfare analysis at the
steady state. I compute social welfare as the summation of households and
entrepreneursutility with equal weights:
W (c; h; e) = U(c; h) + U(e): (2.82)
Furthermore, I use consumption equivalents as an indicator of welfare changes.
As mentioned in Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego (2014), the consumption equivalents
dene the constant fraction of consumption that the agents should give to ac-
quire the benets of the policy. A positive value means that the policy is welfare
improving. Household and entrepreneur would be willing to pay in consumption
units for the implementation of the policy because it increases their utility. The
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concept of consumption equivalent is expressed in the equation 2.83. co, h0; and
eo denote the households consumption, work hours, and entrepreneursconsump-
tion in the baseline model respectively, and c1, h1; and e1 denote the households
consumption, work hours, and entrepreneursconsumption in the modied model
with policy.
W0(c0(1 + CE%); h0;e0(1 + CE%)) =W1(c1; h1; e1): (2.83)
With the functional form of utility, we can compute the consumption equiv-
alent by solving the following formula:13
log(1 + CE%) + e0:CE% =W1(c1; h1; e1) W0(c0; h0; e0): (2.84)
2.4 Simulation Results
2.4.1 Impact of Subsidies on Financial Structure
In this section, I present some simulation results regarding the e¤ects of subsidy
policies on the nancial structure variables at the steady state.14 Figure 2.2
shows the sensitivities of the steady-state values to the changes in the rate of
subsidy. The horizontal axes denote the rate of subsidy as a proportion of the
total cost, while the vertical axes denote the value of the corresponding variables
in percentage terms.
The upper left panels show that the shares of rms abstaining from external
nance and the shares of rms borrowing from CMF decrease as the rate of
subsidy on the banks information acquisition rise (Figure 2.2 A). In contrast,
more rms approach the bank and obtain information on "2 because the subsidy
raises their expected prot. For example, if government subsidies 30% of the
banks information cost, the share of rms who abstain from production decreases
13The derivation for this is available in the Appendix 6.2.2.




from 39% to 33%; the share of rms who approach a bank increases from 56% to
65%; and the share of rms who choose CMF decreases from 5% to 2%. However,
not all the rms who approach the bank will proceed with the loan. After learning
their "2; some of the low productive rms will choose to drop out. Therefore, in
the case of subsidy more than 40%, the share of rms who borrow from the bank
starts to decline. The upper right panels show that higher subsidy rates lead to a
rise in the banks average risk premium and a decline in the CMFs average risk
premium. The reason for that is because the subsidy encourages low productive
rms to approach the bank. The bank will charge a higher risk premium on
these low productive rms to avoid losses. Consequently, the average banks risk
premium increases. In contrast, the risk premium of CMF decreases because only
rms with higher productivity level choose to borrow directly from this market.
In general, subsidy on the banks information acquisition cost could increase the
bank lending but at the same time, increase the credit risk in the banking system.
The lower left panels (Figure 2.2 B) show that as the rate of subsidy on
banks monitoring cost raises, the shares of rms abstaining from external nance
and the shares of rms borrowing from CMF decrease while the shares of rms
approaching a bank increase. However, unlike in Figure 2.2 A, there is no bending
shape in the graph about the share of rms who borrow from banks. Higher
subsidy on banks information cost will raise the share of rms who proceeds
with the loan almost linearly. The reason for that is because the risk premium of
bank loan declining with the subsidy. Therefore, it is still protable for the lower
productive rms to proceed with the bank loan, although their "2 is not high.
Di¤erent impacts of those two types of subsidy on the banks risk premium
can be explained by the simple graph analysis in Figure 2.3. This gure shows
the relationship between the quantity and the interest rate of the loan. Subsidy
on bank information cost encourages more rms to approach the bank, so the
policy a¤ects the demand side of loans. Thus, the policy shifts the demand curve
upward (from DL0 to DL1). The equilibrium point thus moves from (R0, L0)
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A. Subsidy on Banks Information Cost









































Risk Premium of Bank








Risk Premium of CMF
B. Subsidy on Banks Monitoring Cost
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to (R1, L1) where the quantity of loans and the loan rate (risk premium) are
higher than before. In contrast, the subsidy on banks monitoring cost has more
impact on the supply side of loan because the bank is exposed to a smaller credit
risk cost. The policy shifts the supply curve upward (from S0to S1), and the
equilibrium point (R1, L1) is then characterised by a higher quantity of loans but
a lower loan rate (risk premium).
Figure 2.3: Impact of Policy on Loan Supply - Demand Curve
2.4.2 Impact of Subsidies on Macroeconomic Variables
Both types of the subsidy policies lead to higher levels of total bank lending,
capital accumulation and total output in the economy. The impact of the subsidy
on the consumption, net output and utility vary with the types of taxes imposed
to nance the subsidy. In the case of subsidy on banks information acquisition
cost (Figure 2.4), householdsconsumption will increase only if the government
imposes a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. Entrepreneurs consumption and
aggregate consumption increase with all types of taxation. Entrepreneursutility
increase but the households utility decrease for all three types of tax policy,
because households consume less and work more in the steady state (Figure
2.5). The aggregate utility in the economy increases only in the case where the
government nances the subsidy by imposing a labour income tax or a lump-sum
tax. The aggregate utility is higher with a lump-sum tax. However, this type of
taxation is almost impossible to implement in practice.
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Aggregate Entrepreneurial Markup Over Input Cost
Tax on Labour Income
Tax on Consumption
Lump-sum Tax
Figure 2.4: Impact of the Subsidy on Banks Information Cost on Macroeconomic
Variables
The impact of subsidy on banks monitoring cost on macroeconomic variables
are quite small (Figure 2.6). Householdsconsumption will increase only if the
government imposes a non-distortionary lump-sum tax. Furthermore, the bene-
t of monitoring cost subsidy is still not large enough to raise the entrepreneurs
consumption. Although the subsidy increases the total output of the economy,
it brings even higher loss in resources due to the increases in information acqui-
sition and monitoring cost (sunk cost). Thus, the net output decreases when
the government imposes a distortionary tax (Figure 2.7). With all three types
of tax policies, subsidy on banks monitoring cost reduces both householdsand
entrepreneursutility. Therefore, this type of the subsidy is not preferable in the
long run.
2.4.3 Impact of Subsidies on Welfare
In this subsection, I evaluate the benet of each combination of the type of
subsidy and tax in terms of social welfare. As shown by Figure 2.8, the subsidy
on bank information cost would improve the aggregate welfare if it is funded
by the labour income tax or a lump-sum tax. Benets of the subsidy mostly
go to the entrepreneurs because a cheaper access to the bank lending leads to a
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Tax on Labour Income
Tax on Consumption
Lump-sum Tax
Figure 2.5: Impact of the Subsidy on Banks Information Cost on Macroeconomic
Variables (Continued)
higher prots, net worth, and consumption. In contrast, the welfare of households
decrease not only because households consume less due to the distortionary tax
but also because they have to work more. In general, the government support for
bank lending has a good impact on the nancial sector and entrepreneurs, but
it decreases the householdswelfare. The second graph of Figure 2.8 shows that
a subsidy on monitoring cost generates a welfare losses for both households and
entrepreneurs.
The results from previous the section shows that the subsidy on banks infor-
mation acquisition cost could improve social welfare but the benet only goes to
entrepreneurs. Therefore, the policy is not Pareto improving. The government
can conduct another intervention by redistributing the benet of the policy to
households. Redistribution of some entrepreneursconsumption for households
can improve economic e¢ ciency. By using an optimisation solver, I nd the pos-
sible economic e¢ ciency in the scenario with tax on labour income and subsidy
on the banks information acquisition cost (Figure 2.9). For example, the subsidy
policy will generate a 0.03% welfare gain for households and a 2.31% welfare gain
for entrepreneurs if the government o¤ers 30% of the subsidy on banks infor-
mation acquisition cost and redistribute 2.3% of entrepreneursconsumption to
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Aggregate Entrepreneurial Markup Over Input Cost
Tax on Labour Income
Tax on Consumption
Lump-sum Tax
Figure 2.6: Impact of the Subsidy on Banks Monitoring Cost on Macroeconomic
Variables
households. With this combination, all agents in the economy are better o¤.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the e¤ects of two types of government subsidies to
support bank credit in an environment where non-bank credit also exist. I found
that both subsidies on the banks information acquisition cost and subsidy on the
banks monitoring cost can increase bank lending and may prevent the bank credit
crunch. Both subsidy policies generate a higher total lending, a higher capital
accumulation and higher total output in the economy. However, the subsidy
potentially increases the banks credit risk and each policy has di¤erent impacts
on welfare. The main nding of this chapter is that a subsidy on the banks
information cost has a better impact on the aggregate economic welfare rather
than a subsidy on the banks monitoring cost. However, the policy is not Pareto
improving since it increases entrepreneurswelfare at the expense of households
welfare. The government could gain economic e¢ ciency by imposing taxes on
the labour income to nance the subsidy and impose a redistribution policy on
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Tax on Labour Income
Tax on Consumption
Lump-sum Tax
Figure 2.7: Impact of the Subsidy on Banks Monitoring Cost on Macroeconomic
Variables (Continued)
the entrepreneurs and the householdsconsumption. This chapter suggests that
the government support for lowering the cost of access to banking have a more
positive impact on welfare, compared to government support for taking care of
the cost of the lenders default.
Possible future research would be to analyse the dynamic impact of the poli-
cies. As mentioned by Auerbach & Kotliko¤ (1987), the steady state analysis
of scal policy can reect the long-run position of an economy. But, it can be
misleading if used to compare alternative scal policies. Studying scal policy
in a dynamic model provides a more comprehensive analysis because it considers
both current and future generations and permits one to di¤erentiate policies that
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Figure 2.8: Impact of Policies on Welfare

















































































The implementation of macroprudential policy aims to provide nancial and
macroeconomic stability and has become a more important area of research since
the global nancial crisis. There have been increasing e¤orts to develop theo-
retical and empirical models in this research area to provide better guidance for
policymakers around the world. The modelling framework of the interaction be-
tween the nancial system and the macroeconomy becomes more critical with
the development of nancial intermediation (Woodford (2010)).
In practice, macroprudential policy has mainly been designed to regulate the
banking sector.1 However, as pointed out by Galati & Moessner (2018), one
1Cerutti et al. (2015) presented some examples of macroprudential policies that have been
implemented such as Debt to Income Ratio (DTI), Loan to Value Ratio (LTV), countercyclical
capital bu¤er, dynamic provisioning, tax/levy on banks, leverage ratio, etc. In July 2016 ECB
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of the major issues that inuence the e¤ectiveness of macroprudential policy is
regulatory arbitrage because the introduction of macroprudential policy can cause
the risk to move outside the regulated banking sector (Jeanne & Korinek (2014),
ECB (2016)).2
Most of the literature on macroprudential policy has focused on the impact of
this policy on banks without accounting for the possibility of the shifting of nan-
cial risk to the non-banking sector.3 Therefore, Galati & Moessner (2018) suggest
further research on the substitution from bank-based nancial intermediation to
non-bank intermediation in response to the macroprudential policy to obtain a
better understanding of the e¤ectiveness of the policy. As non-bank nancial
intermediation has taken on an increasing role in the global nancial system, the
shifting from bank lending to bond issuance becomes a more important concern
for the policymakers (Chapter 3 IMF (2016)).
This chapter contributes to the literature of macroprudential policy by pro-
viding new insights regarding the transmission and the impact of the policy by
taking into account the existence of non-bank debt nancing as a substitute for
bank nancing. Moreover, unlike most related literature that focuses only on the
e¤ects of macroprudential policy on smoothing credit growth and welfare, this
chapter also investigates the transmission of the policy on the average default of
loan in the economy. Specically, the main research questions of this chapter are:
1. How does the introduction of macroprudential policy a¤ect the rms
choices of bank nancing or non-bank debt nancing?
published a strategy paper regarding the need for macroprudential policies beyond banking
(ECB (2016))
2Another important issue is the interaction of macroprudential policy and monetary policy.
There has been a great deal of research on this issue, such as Angelini et al. (2014), Kannan
et al. (2014), Suh (2014), Quint & Rabanal (2014), Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego (2014), Levine
& Lima (2015), Svensson (2018), Silvo (2019) which showed that the two policies are closely
interrelated and need to be coordinated.
3Recently few studies discuss the regulatory arbitrage e¤ect of macroprudential policy, for
example: Cizel et al. (2019), Aiyar et al. (2014), Reinhardt & Sowerbutts (2015), Danisewicz
et al. (2015), Bengui & Bianchi (2018), and Fève et al. (2019). The rst paper discusses
empirical ndings of the substitution from bank nancing to bond nancing; the next three
papers focus more on the regulatory arbitrage involving foreign banks, and the last two papers
discuss the presence of shadow banking.
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2. How e¤ective is the macroprudential regulation in increasing macroeco-
nomic stability, nancial stability and social welfare under various shocks to the
economy?
To answer those questions, I utilise a closed economy with a exible price
model of De Fiore & Uhlig (2015), featuring the nancial frictions as in Carl-
strom & Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999). A key feature of the model
is entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in terms of productivity risk, and they can
choose to borrow from a bank or issue bonds in the capital market to nance
their working capital cost. The bank has some advantages compared to the cap-
ital market fund. Firstly, the bank acts as an informed lender who can obtain
information about some of the entrepreneurs productivity risk. Secondly, the
bank o¤ers a more exible contract, in which an entrepreneur can choose not to
continue borrowing after learning about their risk.
I employ the model to study a macroprudential policy, represented in the form
of a "regulation premium", to the banks cost of intermediation. The additional
premium reects the increase in banks funding cost that, for instance, arises
from an increase in capital requirements or liquidity requirements. I choose to use
regulation premium as a general representation of macroprudential policy because
the model featuring neither bank capital nor liquidity, so I can not explicitly study
specic macroprudential instruments. A similar approach has been used in Filiz
Unsal (2013), Kannan et al. (2014), Ozkan & Unsal (2014), and Quint & Rabanal
(2014). The regulation premium a¤ects lending spread through the changes in
the optimal lending contract between a bank and borrower.4 This chapter adopts
a positive approach and takes the presence of macroprudential regulation for
granted. Moreover, this study concentrates only on corporate loans; therefore a
change in bank lending spread a¤ects the entrepreneurs decision on the source
of nancing.
4 In reality, banks are likely to use some combination of strategies to meet new capital or
liquidity regulations such as increasing retained earnings, reduce risk-weighted assets, or issue
new equity. However, some studies shows that the changes in those regulations a¤ect bank
interest rate spread (Roger & Vlcek (2011), Angelini et al. (2011))
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I consider a policy where the regulation premium rises proportionally with
bank credit growth, and implemented only in the banking sector. This chapter
found that increasing the regulation premium in the banking sector is not only
raising the bank lending rate but also the non-bank rate because of the risk
shifting. Tighter regulation in the banking sector leads to a reduction in the
bank lending but at the same time increasing the non-bank nancing; therefore
the impact on total credit is limited. Since the bank has superiority in terms of
its ability to reduce rmsuncertainty of production output and has more exible
contract arrangement, the shifting to the non-bank lending can lead to a higher
risk across the overall nancial system.
The results of this chapter show that the countercyclical macroprudential reg-
ulation has a desirable benet on improving nancial stability and increasing wel-
fare particularly in the case of banking shock. In the case of an uncertainty shock,
the implementation of the macroprudential policy increases macroeconomic sta-
bility and improving social welfare but can have unintended consequences in
terms of increasing average default. In contrast, the policy is less e¤ective in
the case of technology shock because it generates a welfare loss. I found that
a modied rule, which reacts not only to bank credit growth but total credit
growth, provides welfare gains in the case of technology shock. Therefore, it is
essential for the policymaker to take into account the regulatory arbitrage e¤ects
of macroprudential policy and take into consideration not only the condition of
the banking sector but also the credit in the nancial markets.
This chapter relates to a recent work by Fève et al. (2019). Their paper shows
that shifting from traditional bank loan toward less regulated nancial interme-
diation (shadow bank) reduces the ability of macroprudential policies to stabilise
the economy. The macroprudential policy in their paper a¤ects the banks assets
portfolio: traditional loans and asset-backed securities issued by shadow bank.
When a higher capital requirement is applied only on the traditional loan, the
bank will hold more asset-backed securities, and consequently, shadow banking
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activity expands. Thus, the shifting of the bank toward the non-bank loans is
coming from the nancial intermediaries decision (lenders perspective). Di¤erent
from this approach, in my study the shifting is decided by the entrepreneur (bor-
rowers perspective). This chapter also relates to Rubio (2017b). She shows that
banking regulation in terms of Loan to Value (LTV) and capital regulation will
cause a shifting of the source of household loan from a formal bank toward pri-
vate lenders, and cause an unexpected risk to nancial stability. Concern about
whether macroprudential policy remains desirable in the presence of leakages due
to regulatory arbitrage are also raised in the paper of Bengui & Bianchi (2018).
Their paper provides a rationale for macroprudential policy to limit pecuniary
externalities and shows that the regulation improves aggregate welfare, even in
the presence of leakages. However, those papers are absent from endogenous
credit risk, an aspect that is important in discussing nancial stability.
This study is consistent with the empirical research of Cizel et al. (2019) who
found evidence of substitution e¤ects from bank loan towards non-bank credit,
especially in advanced economies. As a consequence, the macroprudential poli-
ciese¤ect on total credit can be less e¤ective. Therefore, they also suggest that
macroprudential policy should account for the expansion of non-bank nance.
The organisation of the remaining chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model and the modelling of macroprudential policy in the form of a
regulation premium. Section 3 analyses the transmission and e¤ectiveness of the
macroprudential policy under various case of economic shock. This section also






This chapter employs model of De Fiore & Uhlig (2015) and De Fiore & Uhlig
(2011). It is a closed economy with a exible price. There are households who
consume, save and supply labour, and productive entrepreneurs who can borrow
either from the bank or directly from the capital market fund (CMF). The central
bank injects liquidity. The details of the model had been explained in section 2.2.
Table 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the equations of the model. I employ the model to
study macroprudential policy.
Table 3.1: Summary of the Basic Model
Households
Consumption-labour trade o¤ h
1

t ct = wt












(1   + rt+1)
i




CIA constraint 0 = mt + wtht + rtkt   ct   kt+1 + (1  ) kt
Entrepreneurs








Cost of capital rt (kt + zt) = (1  )xt
Cost of labour wtht = xt
Ent. consumption et =  f ({t)nt
Ent. capital zt+1 = (1  ) f ({t)nt
Ent. net worth nt = (1   + rt) zt
Financing decisions
Threshold of productivity levels to





it; qt; Rt; 3t

= 1
Threshold of productivity levels to
approach a bank ("b)
F b ("bt; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) = 1
Threshold of productivity levels F b ("ct; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) =
to borrow from CMF ("c) F c ("ct; qt; Rt; 2t; 3t)















Table 3.2: Summary of Model (Continued)
Central Bank
Money supply mst = 
mst 1
t




Aggregation & Market Clearing
Output (expenditures) yt = ct + et + It + yat
Investment It = kt+1 + zt+1   (1  ) (kt + zt)
Money market mst = mt + dt
Loan market dt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
(   1)nt
Bank loan lbt = (1   t) sbpt (   1)nt
CMF loan lct = s
c
t(   1)nt
Total working capital xt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
nt
Output (production) yt =  y ({t) qtnt









Risk premium bank rpbt   
rb({t)
sbpt
Risk premium CMF rpct   
rc({t)
sct
Average default of bank loan %bt =
 mb({t)
sbpt
Average default of CMF loan %ct =
 mc({t)
sct











Shares of the rms that approach a
bank
sbt = ("




Shares of the rms that proceed






 (d"2)  (d"1)
Shares of the rms that borrow
from CMF
sct = 1   ("c () ;1t)
Note: c = HH consumption, h = labour, w = real wages, R = return on deposits,
 = ination, m = real cash holding, d = real deposits,  = transfer, r = real rent
on capital, k = HH capital, q = ent. markup, A = TFP, z = ent. capital, x =
working capital, e = ent. consumption, n = ent. networth; "j;i = ent. idiosyncratic
productivity levels; "e = known productivity level before the contract, j = std.dev of
"j ,  = information acquisition cost, ms = money supply,  = growth rate of nominal
money supply, y = output, I = investment, ya = agency cost,  f ({t) = aggregation
of ent. prot (as in eq. 2.38),  y ({t) = aggregation of realised productivity factors (as
in eq. 2.43),  mb ({t) = aggregation of defaulted bank loan (as in eq. 2.46),  mc ({t)
= aggregation of defaulted CMF loan (as in eq. 2.47), {  [qt; Rt;  t; 1;t; 2;t; 3;t] ;




3.2.2 Modeling Macroprudential Policy
The macroprudential policy is modelled in the form of "regulation premium" that
adds or reduces the banks cost of borrowing. The additional premium reects
the increase in banksfunding cost that, for instance, arises from an increase in
capital requirements or liquidity requirements.5 The regulation premium a¤ects
lending spread indirectly through the changes in the optimal lending contract
between a bank and an entrepreneur. An increase in the regulation premium
raises the banks cost of borrowing and a¤ects the banks participation constraint.
Specically, the regulation premium (RPt) a¤ects the banks break-even condition
in equation 2.20 to be:6
(   1)




















An increase in the regulation premium (RPt > 1) raises the threshold !b in the
lending contract and raise both of the banks lending rate and banks lending
spread.7 Consequently, adding this RPt into the model a¤ects the entrepreneurs
optimal decision through all other equations related to !b.8
In line with the practices in many countries, the macroprudential policy is
adjusted countercyclically to bank credit so that it act as stabilisers on the nan-
5For example, an increase in capital requirements could increase banks funding costs by
requiring them to nance more of their loan with equity, which is typically perceived to be more
expensive than the cost of deposit (Rt). In related literature, one alternative explanation for
the higher cost of equity is that interest payments on deposit are tax-deductible.
6The formulation of break-even condition for CMF loan is not a¤ected and still same as in
the equation 2.20.
7 In the case of credit downturn, this regulation premium is similar to the credit subsidies
which are nanced by lump-sum taxes as in Correia et al. (2016). In their model, the subsidy
reduces the amount of borrowers payment but does not a¤ect the lending rate set by the bank.
In my model, the regulation premium a¤ects the banks lending rate through the changes in the
bank zero prot condition.
8Such as the equations that characterise F d(); F b(); sa(); sb(); sbp(); sc();  f ();  y();
 mb();  mc();  rb(); and  rc():
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cial imbalances. First, in accordance with the practice of many studies regarding
macroprudential policy (e.g Ozkan & Unsal (2014), Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego
(2014) and Rubio (2017a)), I consider bank credit growth as the indicator of
nancial imbalances. Specically, I consider that the regulation premium (RPt)
rises proportionally with the bank credit (lbt ) growth with feedback parameter 	:







where RP is the regulation premium policy shock. I assume that the policy
shock follows an AR(1) process as follows:
log RPt =  log RPt 1 + "RP;t; "RP;t  N(0; 2RP ): (3.4)
3.2.3 Calibration
The parameters of the model are summarised in Table 3.3. Most of the parameters
are taken from the model of De Fiore & Uhlig (2015), which is calibrated to match
the data of the Euro-area over the period 1999-2010. The households discount
factor is set at  = 0:99: Depreciation rate  and the Frisch elasticity  are set
at 0:02 and 3 respectively. The share of labour on the production function  is
0:64, monitoring cost  is 0:15, and the persistence parameter is set at  = 0:95 to
follow common values in the related literature. The disutility of labour parameter,
, is calibrated such that consumption in the steady state is unity.
Other parameters ;  ; ; 1; 2; and 3 are calibrated to minimise the squared
log-deviation of the steady state values from some facts of the Euro-area nancial
structure. Table 3.4 presents the comparison between the facts and the steady
state values of the model. I set the entrepreneurs discount factor at E = 0:999
to be consistent with the assumption that the entrepreneur has a high rate of time
preference.9 A high discount factor implies that it is optimal for the entrepreneur
9As explained in De Fiore & Uhlig (2015), we assume E is su¢ ciently high so that the
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to postpone consumption until the time of death and invest their prots for
the next period capital during their lives. The entrepreneur-specic levels of
productivity shock "j;it are assumed to be lognormally distributed, i.e log("j;it)




 0.99 Household discount factor
 0.02 Depreciation rate
 0.64 Shares of labour on production function
 0.95 Persistence coe¢ cient of autoregressive process
 0.15 Monitoring cost
 3 The inverse of Frisch elasticity of labour supply
E 0.999 Entrepreneurs discount factor
Calibrated
 3.753 Preference parameter
 3.195 Working capital to net worth ratio
 0.0099 Information acquisition cost
 0.022 Probability of rm dies
1 0.0165 Standard deviation of "1
2 0.0225 Standard deviation of "2
3 0.1711 Standard deviation of "3
Table 3.4: Facts versus Model
Variables Facts Model
Ratio of aggregate bank loans to debt
securities
5.3591 5.5000
Ratio of aggregate debt to equity 0.6371 0.6400
Average risk premium of debt securi-
ties
0.0029 0.0036
Average risk premium of bank loans 0.0030 0.0030
Average default rate of debt securities 0.0144 0.0125
Expected return of entrepreneurial
capital
0.0230 0.0233
return on internal funds is always higher than the preference discount. It is thus optimal for
entrepreneurs to postpone consumption until the time of death.
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3.3 Simulation and Model Dynamics
This section presents the results of simulations and covers the discussion of the
performance of macroprudential regulation in terms of macroeconomic stability,
nancial stability, and social welfare. First, I conduct an exercise to analyse the
response of nancial structure and macroeconomic variables under a one per cent
macroprudential policy shock (RPt): Second, I present impulse responses of the
economy under various individual shocks for three cases: the case where no macro-
prudential policy is implemented, the case where the macroprudential policy is
implemented with medium feedback parameter, and the case where the macro-
prudential policy is implemented with high feedback parameter. I utilise Dynare
to compute the policy functions and generate the impulse responses following
various individual shock scenario using the rst-order approximation around the
steady state.10 Third, I analyse the benet of the introduction of the macropru-
dential policy by comparing some indicators of macroeconomic stability, nancial
stability and social welfare before and after the implementation of policy using
the results of second-order approximation around the steady state.
I consider three types of shocks in the simulation: banking shocks (";t), tech-
nology shocks ("A;t), and the uncertainty in entrepreneurs productivity shocks
("2;t). These shocks are assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and
a¤ect the stochastic process of the bank information acquisition costs ( t); ag-
gregate productivity (At); and the standard deviation of the productivity shocks
(2;t) as follow:
log  t   log  =  (log  t 1   log ) + ";t; ";t  N(0; 2 ) (3.5)
10Since this model features heterogenous agents, I use several external MATLAB functions to
compute the changes of each entrepeneur decision and compute the aggregation. Then, I call
the external functions into the Dynare routine to compute policy functions, generate impulse
responses and compute moments of the aggregate economy. My approach is di¤erent with
De Fiore & Uhlig (2015) who log-linearise all the equations and employ the Uhlig (1995) toolkit
to nd the policy function and impulse response functions.
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logAt   logA =  (logAt 1   logA) + "A;t; "A;t  N(0; 2A) (3.6)
log 2;t   log 2 =  (log 2;t 1   log 2) + "2;;t ; "2;t  N(0; 22;t) (3.7)
3.3.1 Responses to an Increase of Regulation Premium Policy
Figure 3.1 displays the dynamic response of some variables in the nancial sector
to a positive regulation premium shock (RPt in equation 3.3). In this exercise,
a tighter macroprudential policy is represented as an increase in the regulation
premium which causes a higher bank funding cost. Consequently, the demand
for bank loan decreases. Some entrepreneurs who have medium levels of produc-
tivity then shift from bank to the capital market fund, resulting the increases in
the amount of the CMF loan. Figure 3.2 illustrates the movement of the entre-
preneurs distribution in response to the increase in the regulation premium. In
aggregate, the total loan as well as total agency cost decreases. The result of this
simulation is in accordance with the empirical event study carried by Cizel et al.
(2019). Using data from 30 countries within period 1997-2014, they found that
macroprudential policy measures tend to reduce the growth rate of bank credit
but increase the growth of nonbank credit. However, the total credit still decline
because the substitution e¤ect does not fully compensate for the impact on bank
credit.
Figure 3.1 also shows that the regulation premium increases average default
of both bank and CMF loan. This result is emerges as a consequence of the
assumption of the model where entrepreneurs idiosyncratic productivity shock
"3;it is random and not a¤ected by the policy, so an increase in the banks lending
rate leads to a higher average default of bank loan.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the transmission of increasing the regulation premium
on the average loan default. E¤ect of regulation premium on banking sector
can be transmitted through two channels. The rst is the "cost e¤ect" channel,
where the higher regulation premium a¤ects the funding cost (left-hand side of
equation 3.1) and induces the bank to raise the threshold of debt repayment (!bit).
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Impact of Regulation Premium
Figure 3.1: Impact of Regulation Premium on Financial Structure
Figure 3.2: Impact of Regulation Premium on the Distribution of Entrepreneurs
The second is the "selection e¤ect" channel, where a higher regulation premium
discourages entrepreneur from borrowing from the bank. The minimum threshold
of "bt increases and "ct decreases. Thus, the average ex-ante productivity level of
entrepreneurs who approach the bank ("1;it"2;it) can be higher or lower. Following
the right-hand side of equation 3.2, a higher (lower) level of known productivity
reduces (increases) the threshold of debt repayment (!bit): With the opposing
impacts provided by the two channels, the overall e¤ect of the regulation premium
on bank lending rate depends on the value of parameters used in the model.
The simulation shows that regulation premium increases the average bank risk
premium (lending rate). A tighter regulation in the banking sector also raises the
lending rate in the non-banking sector through the "substitution e¤ect" channel.
A higher cost of bank borrowing causes the minimum threshold of "ct decreases.
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Therefore, the average ex-ante productivity level of entrepreneurs who approach
CMF ("1;it) is lower. Referring to equation 3.2, a lower level of known productivity
raises the threshold of CMF debt repayment (!cit). Since unknown productivity
is random and i.i.d, a higher threshold increases the average default of the CMF
loan.
Figure 3.3: E¤ect of Regulation Premium on Average Default
Figure 3.4 shows the response of some real macroeconomic variables. A de-
terioration in the total loan a¤ects the decline in almost all macro-variables. A
lower level of production leads to lower levels of working hours, investment, GDP,
and entrepreneursnet worth. The simulation shows that a 1% increase in the
regulation premium leads to a 0.5% deterioration of GDP. Although the gures
are not displayed here, the real interest rate and real wage also decrease which
lead to a lower householdsincome from working and renting his capital.
The above exercise is useful to explain the possible unintended consequences
of imposing tighter banking regulation. Increasing regulation premium in the
banking sector raises not only the bank lending rate but also the non-bank lending
rate because of risk shifting. Stricter regulation in banking sector leads to a
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Impact of Regulation Premium
Figure 3.4: Impact of Regulation Premium on Macroeconomic Variables
reduction in the bank lending but simultaneously raises the non-bank credit. A
shift to the non-bank lending implies a higher risk to the overall nancial system
because the bank has a more exible arrangement in contract and the ability to
reduce rmsuncertainty of output. The benet of macroprudential policy is not
obvious in the previous exercise because it seems that an increase in the regulation
premium may provide a worse economic condition by lowering output and raising
default of both bank and non-bank credit. Benets of macroprudential policy will
be discussed in the next subsection using welfare and stability analysis.
3.3.2 Welfare and Stability Measures
Social welfare evaluation is a common approach to examine the benets of poli-
cies. Following Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego (2014), I dene social welfare (Wt) as
a weighted sum of the householdsand entrepreneurswelfare (WHt and W
E
t ).
The welfare of each agent is weighted by their discount factor so that each agent
receives the same level of utility from a constant consumption stream:
Wt = (1  )WHt + (1  E)WEt ; (3.8)
where
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I then employ the standard approach documented in the literature by express-
ing each agent utility function recursively:



















U (et) = et: (3.14)
To compare the welfare benets across policies, I follow suggestions of Kim
et al. (2008) to use the conditional welfare criterion and choose the steady state as
the initial condition.11 Furthermore, following the standard literature, I present
welfare changes in terms of consumption equivalents and take the case without
macroprudential policies as the baseline.12 A positive value means a welfare gain
which indicates that the introduction of macroprudential policy is preferable for
the agent.
Macroprudential policy is mainly used to improve nancial stability, so it is
essential to perform a stability benet analysis in addition to the welfare analysis.
To evaluate the stability benet of the macroprudential policy, I use two types of
11 I evaluate policies with both conditional and unconditional welfare criterion, and the results
are consistent.
12Derivation of the consumption equivalents are available in Appendix 6.3.2.
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measures. The rst measures are the standard deviations of the main macro and
nancial variables which consists of GDP, bank loan and non-bank loan. The
second measures are the average default rates of bank loan and non-bank loan. I
evaluate the average default rates for a given policy with the unconditional mean
of %bt and %
c
t which I obtain from the second-order approximation.
3.3.3 Case 1: Banking shock
In this subsection, I consider a shock in the banking sector which causes a pos-
itive banks loan growth. I dene the banking shock as a negative shock on the
banks information acquisition cost (" as in equation 3.5) that makes the cost to
approach a bank loan is cheaper. The intuition is as follows: During an economic
boom, it is easier for the bank to select a protable borrower. Therefore, banks
tend to decrease their lending requirements which implicitly reduces the cost paid
by the entrepreneur to approach a bank. A lower bank information acquisition
cost may induce a credit boom.13
Figure 3.5 presents the response of the economy to a temporary one per cent
negative shock on the banks information acquisition cost. The solid black line
shows the response of the economy in an environment where there is no macro-
prudential policy. A negative shock on the banks information acquisition cost
generates a higher banks loan. Some of the entrepreneurs with low productivity
are attracted to approach the bank, and some of them will proceed with the loan.
Some other entrepreneurs with high productivity shift from market nance to
bank nance because bank nance becomes less costly. With the current cali-
bration, a 1% decrease in the bank information acquisition cost leads to a 0.5%
increase in bank loan and -2.5% decrease in CMF from its steady state. 14 In
aggregate, total loan increases. The simulation shows that the resulting increased
13This argument is supported by DellAriccia & Marquez (2006) who show that when the
e¤orts needed by the bank to obtain information about borrowers decline, banks may loosen their
lending standards. These lower lending standards are associated with greater credit expansion
and a greater risk of nancial instability.
14Steady state values of the bank loan and the non-bank loan are 0.76 and 0.14.
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share of rms who choose bank leads to a higher average default of bank loan.
On the contrary, average non-bank default decreases. Figure 3.6 illustrates the
transmission of the e¤ect of banking shock on average default. When the cost to
approach a bank decreases, the minimum threshold of "bt also decreases. More
rms with low "1 decide to go to the bank. Given information about their "2;
some of the rms then proceed with the loan. On average, the ex-ante productiv-
ity level of rms who approach the bank ("eit = "1;it"2;it) is smaller, resulting in a
higher average threshold in the debt contract !b (equation 3.2). Since "3;it is i.i.d,
an increase !b leads to a higher probability of bank loan default. On the other
hand, a lower cost to approach the bank generates a higher minimum threshold
of "ct: As a result, the average ex-ante productivity level of entrepreneurs who
go to the non-bank nancing increases and the threshold in the debt contract,
!c; decreases. Consequently, the average non-bank risk premium and the average
default decline. From the macro perspective, the situation that more entrepre-
neurs decide to produce leads to an increase in total output. Consumption and
investment of households increase because they earn more income from work and
renting capital.
The dashed line and the dotted line represent the responses of the economy in
an environment where the central bank implements the macroprudential policy
with medium and high feedback rule (	 = 0:5 and 	 = 2).15 As shown in
Figure 3.5, the implementation of the countercyclical regulation premium helps
to stabilise the uctuations in both total lending and GDP in the case of a banking
shock. A negative shock on the banks information cost still increase the bank
loan but in a much smaller magnitude. The reason is that the banks lending
rate becomes more expensive. In the rst period after the shock, the regulation
premium increases sharply in response to the high bank credit growth, but then it
decreases slowly. The introduction of a countercyclical regulation premium with
15For illustration, here I consider reaction parameters 0.5 and 2. I have experimented with
several values of the feedback parameter for the policy rule 	, from 0.5 until 2 and the results in
terms of the direction of responses are consistent. A higher value of feedback parameters leads
to smoother responses of bank loan.
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medium feedback increases the bank loan by a maximum only 0.16%, and CMF
loan decreases by only 0.8% after a one per cent banking shock. As discussed
in the previous subsection about the impact of regulation premium, an increase
in the banks lending rate due to a tighten macroprudential policy leads to a
higher average default of both bank loan and CMF loan. In the economy with
macroprudential policy, the impact of the banking shock on the total output and
consumption is also smaller. In this exercise, the presence of macroprudential
policy leads to a decline in the total cash available for working capital. Therefore,
entrepreneurs need to re-optimise their composition of labour and capital in the
production function, and also to compute the optimal wage and rent of capital.
The simulation shows that the optimal real rent of capital declines after the
introduction of macroprudential policy while real wage still increases, although
in a smaller magnitude. Consequently, rms use more capital to produce and
reduce the labour working hours.16
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Figure 3.5: Responses to a Positive Banking Shock with and without Regulation
Premium
The objective of introducing counter-cyclical macroprudential policy is to
improve nancial stability and thus improve macroeconomic stability and social
welfare. Figure 3.7 presents the comparison of some measures that might become
16The graph of responses of some other variables are available in Appendix 6.3.1.
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Figure 3.6: E¤ect of Banking Shock on Average Default
the central banks concern regarding nancial stability, macroeconomic stability
and welfare. I obtain the values of those measures from theoretical moments
computed at second-order approximation around the steady state. The horisontal
axis is the value of feedback parameter in the policy rule (	): The graphs in
the gure show that, in the presence of a banking shock, the introduction of
macroprudential policy reduces the average volatility of GDP and both loan.
In addition, the countercyclical policy also improves social welfare and reduces
average default of both the bank and the non-bank loan. The gure indicates
that a higher feedback rule provides a higher benet. However, the marginal
benet decreases with the feedback parameter. Table 3.5 shows more details
about the incremental benet of a macroprudential policy when the feedback
rule is set as 0.5. The welfare benet of the macroprudential policy goes to the
entrepreneurs at the expense of households welfare. This nding is consistent
with Rubio & Unsal (2017) who found that entrepreneurs are beneted from the
active macroprudential policy because it delivers a more stable nancial system,
but make savers worse because their consumption is not directly a¤ected by
nancial stability. They also nd that the economy is better o¤ with the policy
in the aggregate.
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Figure 3.7: Financial Stability and Welfare - Case 1: Banking shock
3.3.4 Case 2: Technology shock
In this subsection, I simulate a one per cent positive shock in technology ("A as
in equation 3.6) to the economy. As in the literature, I dene technology shock
as the aggregate productivity shock which a¤ects the production function of all
rms. Figure 3.8 shows that a positive aggregate technology shock incur increases
in both bank loans (1.2%) and CMF loans (2.6%). A higher level of aggregate
productivity generates a higher marginal productivity from the production and
increases entrepreneurs markup over input costs (qt): Therefore, the expected
payo¤ from production increases and entrepreneurs are then encouraged to bor-
row more from nancial intermediaries. As a result, the demand for both bank
and non-bank nancing increase. It then leads to a higher levels of credit growth,
GDP, consumption, and labour working hours. The simulation shows that a pos-
itive shock in technology causes a higher average default of both the bank and
the CMF loans. At rst glance, the direction of the impact seems counterintu-
itive. However, the transmission of the aggregate productivity shock on average
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Table 3.5: Macroprudential Policy Impact - Case 1: Banking Shock




Bank Loan 0.0119 0.0079






Bank Loan 1.4943 1.4610
CMF Loan 1.4281 1.4188
Total 1.4848 1.4539
Note : Total welfare gain in terms of consumption equivalent is computed numerically using
the formulation derived in Appendix 6.3.1.
default can be explained by the two channels as in Figure 3.9. The rst channel
is the "production e¤ect" channel. As shown in equation 3.2, a higher average
markup over the input cost induces a lower threshold of debt repayment as well
as the average lending rate of both the bank and the non-bank loan. The second
channel is the "selection e¤ect" channel. A lower debt repayment threshold gen-
erates a lower levels of both "bt and "ct; hence, the expected productivity level
during the optimal debt contract decision is low. In this case, both nancial
intermediaries increase their debt repayment threshold. Those two channels pro-
vide opposite direction regarding the e¤ect of technology shock on the lending
rate. My simulation with calibrated parameters shows that the selection e¤ect
dominates. The risk premium of both intermediaries increases and consequently
the average default of loans also increases.
As shown in Figure 3.8, the implementation of a regulation premium does
not have a substantial e¤ect on reducing the impact of a temporary technology
shock on the real sector. The substitutability between bank borrowing and CMF
borrowing makes the regulation premium less potent in decreasing the total loan.
Accordingly, the policy does not impact GDP, consumption and working hours.
Therefore, the regulation premium has a sizeable impact on the nancial structure
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of the economy (in terms of decreasing the loan to bond ratio), but only have small
e¤ects on real macro variables. The impact of increasing regulation premium on
default is similar to the discussion in the previous subsection.
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Figure 3.8: Responses to a Positive Technology Shock with and without Regula-
tion Premium
Figure 3.10 presents the impact of policy on the average nancial stability
and welfare in the presence of a random technology shock. The rst panel shows
that the impact of the policy on improving output stability is relatively small.
Moreover, the second panel shows that although the policy reduces the bank
lending volatility, it has an unintended impact which increases the volatility of
the non-bank loan. The aggregate nancial stability is thus not improving. As
a result, the economy faces a social welfare loss. Table 3.6 presents a more
detail dissagregation of the impact of policy on the welfare and nancial stability
measures. The simulation shows that the aggregate default in the case of with
policy is relatively higher than that in the case of without policy. This exercise
shows that the unintended consequences of policy leakage may exceed the benet
of imposing a regulation premium on the banking sector. Macroprudential policy
is not e¤ective to curb the e¤ects of technology shocks. This result is consistent
with the studies which nd that a countercyclical regulation maybe not e¤ective
and that it provides small welfare loss during the presences of technology shock
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Figure 3.9: E¤ect of Technology Shock on Average Default
(for example: Angelini et al. (2014), Benes & Kumhof (2011)).
3.3.5 Case 3: Uncertainty shock
In this subsection, I simulate the impact of an increase in the uncertainty of the
entrepreneurs productivity that realisation is observable once they approach a
bank (2;t as in equation 3.7): An increase in the standard deviation 2;t of "2
makes the disclosure of additional information provided by banks more valuable.
Thus, it raises the attractiveness of banks as intermediaries and the share of rms
who approach banks increases. Moreover, since the distribution of "2 has fatter
tails, a higher 2;t means that a larger share of rms would experience su¢ ciently
high realisations of "2: Therefore, the proportion of rms who proceed with the
bank loan increases.17
17The result is di¤erent from Christiano et al. (2014). In their paper, an increase in the level
of uncertainty (risk shock) leads to a higher probability of low productivity. Then, to cover
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Figure 3.10: Financial Stability and Welfare - Case 2: Technology shock
As shown in Figure 3.11, a 1% increase in the 2;t generates a rise in the bank
loan by around 1.2% and a decline in the CMF loan by around 6%. In aggregate,
the total loan increases. The increase in the total credit is followed by the rises
in GDP, investment, and consumption. The simulation shows that an increase
in 2;t leads to a lower average default of both bank and CMF loan. Figure
3.12 o¤ers the explanation of the impact of increasing uncertainty on the loan
default with two possible channels. The rst channel is the "selection e¤ect".
As mentioned before, an increase in 2;t raises the attractiveness of banks as
intermediaries so that the threshold "bt decreases while "ct increases. Therefore,
the average level of "1t of entrepreneurs who approach the bank can either be
lower or higher; on the other hand, the average level of "1t of entrepreneurs who
approach CMF become higher and induce a lower CMF loan rates. The second
the uncertainty, the bank raises the loan rate. Consequently, credit, investment, and output
all drop. The di¤erence stems from the di¤erent information availability about the uncertainty.
In this model, the bank can give information about the "2, and the threshold above which the
entrepreneur decides to proceed with the loan depends more on the tail of the distribution.
Thus, more rms proceed with loans when the tail of the distribution increases.
81
3.3. SIMULATION AND MODEL DYNAMICS
Table 3.6: Macroprudential Policy Impact - Case 2: TFP Shock




Bank Loan 0.0371 0.0269






Bank Loan 0.4040 0.7275
CMF Loan 14.5458 12.0897
Total 1.7427 1.8067
Note : Total welfare gain in terms of consumption equivalent is computed numerically using
the formulation derived in Appendix 6.3.1.
channel is the "distribution e¤ect" that generates higher realisation of "2 and thus
a lower level of the contract threshold !b: The simulation shows that the average
lending rate and average default of bank loan decreases. Increasing uncertainty
also reduce the average default of CMF loan.
The dashed and dotted line in Figure 3.11 shows that the response of the
central bank by increasing regulation premium dampen the uctuation in the
bank loans and smoothen the impacts of the uncertainty shock on GDP and con-
sumption. In the case with a medium feedback rule (	 = 0:5); the maximum
increase in the bank loan is reduced by around one third (from 1.2% to 0.4%) and
the maximum decline in the CMF loan also reduced by around one third (from
-6% to -2%). The implementation of the countercyclical regulation premium also
generates a smaller decline in average default of both the bank and the non-bank
loans. Furthermore, the presence of macroprudential policy generates a decline
in the total cash available for working capital. Therefore, entrepreneurs need to
re-optimise wage, real rent of capital, and their composition of labour and capi-
tal in the production function. The simulation shows that optimal wage slightly
increases while real rent of capital declines after the introduction of macropruden-
tial policy. Consequently, the usage of capital increases, whereas labor working
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hours decline.18
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Macropru 1 ( =0.5)
Macropru 2 ( =2)
Figure 3.11: Responses to Uncertainty Shock with and without Regulation Pre-
mium
Next, I compute the moments of nancial stability and welfare measures by
using the second-order approximation around the steady states. The rst two
graphs in Figure 3.13 show that the countercyclical regulation premium reduces
the volatility of GDP and the volatility of the bank and the non-bank loans. The
introduction of the policy also generates a higher level of social welfare, even
though the benet of nancial stability goes to entrepreneurs at the expense of
the welfare of households as in the previous case. The last graph shows that the
average default increases as the regulation premium is implemented. Table 3.7
presents the values in detail and shows that the rise in total average default is
due to an increase in the average default of the CMF loans.
The results from the above subsections show the importance for the central
bank to recognise the type of shock that causes the uctuations in the bank credit
before imposing the regulation premium policy because the impact could be con-
tradictory with their objective. Macroprudential policy performs the best in the
case of banking shock but generates undesirable impact in the case of technology
shock. Figure 3.8 presents the summary of the e¤ect of macroprudential policy
18The graph of responses of some other variables are available in Appendix 6.3.1.
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Figure 3.12: E¤ect of Uncertainty Shock on Average Default
on macroeconomic stability, nancial stability and welfare.
3.3.6 Alternative Policy Rule
The previous simulations show that macroprudential policy could reduce social
welfare in the case of a technology shock. In this subsection, I consider an alter-
native macroprudential policy rule by including the non-bank (CMF) credit and
evaluate whether this new policy could provide better results regarding welfare









#	 RPt : (3.15)
Under this policy rule, the regulatory premium reacts to the total loan growth.19








RPt to di¤erentiate the
feedback parameters of bank loan growth and CMF loan growth. However, the results are not
stable. Some combination of parameters generates a violation of the Blanchard Kahn condition.
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Figure 3.13: Financial Stability and Welfare - Case 3: Uncertainty shock
Figure 3.14 shows that this alternative rule generates a positive gain in welfare.
The welfare gain increases with the policy rule parameter. Under this alternative
rule, we only need small values of the feedback parameter because the total loan
increases signicantly under technology shock. Even a feedback parameter with
a small value can generate a signicant increase in the regulation premium.
The main idea of this new regulation rule is that under the aggregate pro-
ductivity shock, the regulation premium needs to react more aggresively such
that the total loan decreases, even after some of entrepreneurs move from the
bank to the non-bank nancing (Figure 3.15). This nding is inline with Bengui
& Bianchi (2018) who suggest that, in the presence of leakages, the regulator
should induce an even tighter regulation on the regulated sector to o¤set the
increase in the borrowing by the unregulated sector.
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Table 3.7: Macroprudential Policy Impact - Case 3: Uncertainty Shock




Bank Loan 0.0281 0.0186






Bank Loan 1.3918 1.3683
CMF Loan 1.3506 1.7788
Total 1.3893 1.4072
Note : Total welfare gain in terms of consumption equivalent is computed numerically using
the formulation derived in Appendix 6.3.1.
Table 3.8: Summary of Macroprudential Policy Benet
Banking Shock Technology Shock Uncertainty Shock
Improving Macroeconomic Stability
GDP Volatility ü ü ü
Bank Loan Volatility ü ü ü
CMF Loan Volatility ü û ü
Improving Financial Stability
Average Default ü û û





denotes yes whilst  denotes no.
3.4 Conclusion
Macroprudential policies implementation has been predominantly bank-focused.
The possibility of the regulatory arbitrage in the form of substitutability be-
tween direct banking nance and market-based credit underscores the need for a
broader analysis of the impact of macroprudential policies. As non-bank nancial
intermediation has taken on an increasing role in the global nancial system, the
shifting from bank lending to bond issuance become more signicant concern for
the policymakers.
This chapter examined the e¤ect of macroprudential policy in a framework
that accounts for the possible substitution from bank-based nancial intermedia-
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Social Welfare Gain - Alternative Rule
Figure 3.14: Social Welfare Implication - Alternative Policy
tion to non-bank intermediation in response to such policy. Our main results can
be summarised in the following way. First, I show that an imperfect substitu-
tion between bank nance and market nance emerges when the macroprudential
policy is applied only to the banking sector. Second, I show that macropruden-
tial policy has possible unintended consequences of increasing the average default
through the cost e¤ect channel and the substitution e¤ect channel. Tightening
banking regulation could be transmitted into higher risk premiums of both bank
and non-bank loans and increase the average default. Third, I nd that the
macroprudential policy is more e¤ective in the case of banking shocks in terms
of the improvements in long-term nancial stability and social welfare. In the
case of uncertainty shocks, the macroprudential policy is e¤ective in improving
social welfare and reducing the volatility of both the bank and non-bank loans.
However, this policy bring about the unintended consequences of increasing the
average default of the non-bank loans in this case. Imposing a countercyclical
macroprudential policy is not desirable in the case of technology shocks because
it increases the bank loan default and reduces social welfare, although the policy
generates a lower volatility of the bank loan and GDP. Fourth, I nd that a mod-
ied rule, which reacts not only to bank credit growth but total credit growth,
provides welfare gains in the case of technology shock. Therefore, it is essential
that macroprudential authorities take into consideration not only the condition
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Macropru 1 (reacts on bank loan)
Macropru 2 (reacts on total loan)
Figure 3.15: Benchmark versus Alternative Policy Rule
of the banking sector but also the credit in the nancial markets.
The study I conducted in this chapter could be extended in many directions.
For example, we can extend the model to capture the e¤ect of the policy on risk-
taking incentives of nancial intermediaries. One possible way is by introducing a
choice of the amount of credit which depends on the rms leverage and presents
a macroprudential policy in the form of taxes on credits. Banks should then react
to that tax by lowering the amount of credit extended for given rm leverage. In








The global nancial crisis highlighted the importance of liquidity regulation in
the banking sector. Liquidity regulation has been an important instrument used
for microprudential, macroprudential, and also monetary policy purposes. From
a microprudential perspective, Basel III regulation specically required a bank
to hold su¢ cient liquidity which measured as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).1 The LCR regulation was implemented
progressively from 2015, and the bank has to meet the full LCR requirement in
2019 (BCBS (2013)). The implementation of LCR aims to ensure that the bank
has an adequate stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that
can be converted into cash easily and immediately in private markets to meet its
liquidity needs for a 30-day liquidity stress scenario. The LCR regulation will
improve the banking sectors ability to absorb shocks arising from nancial and
1Basel III regulations on liquidity are sometimes also categorised as macroprudential policy
(Nier et al. (2018))
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economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the
nancial sector to the real economy.
On the other hand, macroprudential authorities also use liquidity regulation
as part of their macroprudential instruments. Liquidity regulation such as coun-
tercyclical reserves requirements can be used to mitigate the systemic risk caused
by the credit cycle.2 Liquidity regulation also plays an essential role in mon-
etary policy. Reserve requirement has been used as part of monetary policy
instruments to control the money multiplier in the economy and to strengthen
the transmission of policy rate on the interbank market rate. Remuneration on
reserves has now also considered as instruments of central bank monetary pol-
icy, mainly when the central bank operates in zero lower bound interest rates
(Bowman et al. (2010)).
Despite the awareness regarding the interaction among liquidity regulations,
there have been few studies that examine the interaction of LCR and reserves
requirement in a general equilibrium framework.3 This chapter contributes to
the literature of macroprudential liquidity regulation by developing an explicit
model of Reserve Requirement and LCR regulation in a medium scale DSGE
model with nancial frictions. Then, I employ the model to investigate these
following research questions:
1. What is the impact of a change in the liquidity regulations and liquidity
shocks on bank balance sheets and macroeconomic variables?
2. What is the welfare implication of introducing countercyclical liquidity reg-
ulations?
The model extends and modies the framework of Gerali et al. (2010) that
includes nancial frictions in terms of borrowing constraints, price and wage
2Some examples of macroprudential policy instruments regarding liquidity are the counter-
cyclical reserves requirements, macroprudential liquidity bu¤er, limits on currency mismatch,
reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits or foreign liabilities, and many others (Hardy
& Hochreiter (2014))




frictions. In their model, the bank faces only one regulation: capital requirement.
In my model, the bank has to comply with other two liquidity regulations: reserve
requirement and liquidity coverage ratio. Parameters of the model are calibrated
to match Indonesia data.4
The main reason for choosing Indonesia as the basis of the calibration is
because their central bank, Bank Indonesia, recently issued a new liquidity-
based macroprudential policy regulation called Macroprudential Liquidity Bu¤er
(MPLB). MPLB is a renement of the secondary reserve requirements that ex-
pected to overcome liquidity risk in the banking industry. The central bank
recognised the need for a countercyclical liquidity-based macroprudential policy
instrument after nding evidence of a procyclical nature of liquidity in banking
that could amplify other risks to become systemic risk. The ratio of liquidity re-
quirement in this new regulation is time-varying and act countercyclically to the
liquidity risk-taking behaviour in the banking industry (Bank Indonesia (2018)).
Therefore, the MPLB is expected to complement the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which are constant and regulated
by the nancial service authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan, OJK).5
Considering the introduction of this new regulation on the top of existing re-
serve requirements, studying the interaction among liquidity regulations and the
welfare analysis of countercyclical liquidity regulation in Indonesia become timely
and relevant.6 Furthermore, Indonesia imposes more liquidity requirements in the
banking sector compared to other ASEAN emerging countries. Only Indonesia,
Cambodia, and Brunei Darussalam utilise reserve requirement policy for macro-
prudential purposes.7
4The DSGE model of Bank Indonesia also follows Gerali et al. (2010) framework in modelling
the banking sector. Therefore this paper also aims to enrich their DSGE model.
5The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is regulated by OJK Regulation (POJK) No.
42/POJK.03/2015 concerning the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) for Commercial Banks.
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is regulated by OJK Regulation (POJK) No.
50/POJK.03/2017 concerning the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for Commercial Banks.
6Bank Indonesia (2018) page 209 explicitly mentioned the need to study the interactions
between meeting the new policy requirements and the impact on other policies.
7The list of liquidity regulations adopted by emerging ASEAN countries based on the IMF
Macroprudential Policy Survey Database is available in Appendix 6.4.1.
91
4.1. INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is one of the big emerging market economies (the 7th largest econ-
omy in the world in terms of GDP (PPP)) and member of the G20. Banking
sector plays a dominant role in the Indonesian nancial sector, with asset share
around 70% of the nancial institutionstotal asset so that the issue about bank-
ing regulation is crucial for the Indonesian economy as a whole. However, in
the context of ASEAN emerging market, the ratio of total assets of the banking
sector over nominal GDP in Indonesia is relatively low (54%).8
I model the liquidity coverage ratio as in the Cecchetti & Kashyap (2018).
Specically, I assume that high-quality liquid assets consists of risk-free assets
(government bonds) and reserves; and I model the 30-day liquidity needs as a
fraction of total deposits.9 The bank chooses endogenously the optimal level of
risk-free assets and reserves taking into consideration the expected liquidity risk
and the cost of borrowing from central bank in the case of liquidity shortage. I
introduce a liquidity shock as a random withdrawal variable to the banks reserves
holdings.10 Since the impact of liquidity shock is non-linear, I use piecewise linear
perturbation method by utilising Occbin toolkit (Guerrieri & Iacoviello (2015))
to capture the possibility of 4 conditions of the bank liquidity position: (i) bank
complies with both liquidity regulations, (ii) bank has a liquidity problem to meet
reserve requirements (iii) bank has a liquidity problem to meet LCR requirements,
and (iv) bank has a liquidity problem to meet both regulations.
The results of this study shows that the e¤ects of a negative liquidity shock on
credit, investment and total output are relatively small compared to the impact
of a technology shock. The simulation also shows that the impact of changing the
two types of liquidity requirements on lending and output are relatively similar.
However, lowering the LCR regulation have consequences on the decline of de-
8Banking assets as percentage of nominal GDP in 2016: Indonesia: 54%, Philippine 82%,
Thailand 127%, Vietnam 146%, Malaysia 199% (Kotanko et al. (2017))
9The way I model the LCR is similar to the Macroprudential Policy Liquidity Bu¤er (MPLB)
in Indonesia. The di¤erence is that under the MLB regulation, liquid assets that bank has
to maintain only include risk-free assets. In my model, I also include reserves to follow the
component of the High-Quality Liquid Asset (HQLA) in the LCR regulation.
10 I follow classical literature on reserve management models as in Freixas & Rochet (2008)
Chapter 8 and Baltensperger (1980).
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mand for government bonds, so that it has a di¤erent impact on taxes, household
deposits and bank prot. In the last part, this chapter also found that counter-
cyclical liquidity regulations can improve welfare and slightly reduce the volatility
of bank loan.
This chapter is related to Bech & Keister (2017) who study the impact of the
introduction of an LCR requirement. They extend the standard model of inter-
bank borrowing/lending to study how the introduction of an LCR requirement
a¤ects interbank interest rates, and how it alters the e¤ects of central bank mon-
etary policy operations. However, they use a partial static equilibrium model and
focus more on the impact of LCR on the central bank open market operation.
This chapter also relates to several recent works of literature on DSGE model
with liquidity regulations. Roger & Vlcek (2011) developed a model to assess the
costs of increasing capital and liquidity requirements. The disadvantage of their
model is that they assume an always binding reserve requirement constraint so
that the bank will maintain reserves equal to the required reserve. However, as
stressed by Chadha & Corrado (2012), it is essential to allow banks to choose
excess reserve holding endogenously. Chadha & Corrado (2012) nd that the re-
serves holding over the business cycle can reduce the volatility of interest spreads
to shocks and can act as a stabiliser in the economy. Therefore, their paper
supports the countercyclical policy in liquidity that encourages banks to increase
reserve holdings in a boom to limit the expansion of loans and then to release the
liquidity in recession preventing a too rapid reduction in loans. Primus (2017)
developed a model with endogenous excess reserves as banks voluntarily demand
these assets, and there are convex costs associated with holding reserves. How-
ever, di¤erent from the approach in this chapter, he assumes a perfectly elastic
supply of liquidity, so that the bank is not subject to stochastic withdrawal risk
which has been an essential aspect in reserve management models. Primuspa-
per found that the countercyclical reserve requirement rule has no e¤ect on the
real variables. However, the model suggests that the combination of an aug-
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mented Taylor rule which reacts to excess reserves, and a countercyclical reserve
requirement rule, is optimal to mitigate the macroeconomic and nancial volatil-
ity associated with liquidity shocks.
Furthermore, this chapter relates to a strand of literature on the interaction of
capital requirement and liquidity requirement. Covas & Driscoll (2014) study the
macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks on
top of existing capital adequacy requirements. In their model, both liquidity and
capital constraints are occasionally binding. However, the authors did not di¤er-
entiate between reserves and other liquid assets in the liquidity requirements and
bundled it is as safe assets. Covas & Driscoll (2014) also highlight the importance
of using general equilibrium modelling to estimate the macroeconomic impact of
the new regulations. The partial equilibrium model provides an overstated e¤ect
due to the muting of the adjustment of the loan interest rate and rate of return
on securities, a channel that would decrease the impact of the new regulation.
Corrado & Schuler (2015) also develop a DSGE model to study the interaction of
liquidity requirement and capital requirement. The focus of their model is on the
impact of those requirements on macroeconomy through the interbank market
lending. The authors use liquidity measure as a proxy for the LCR and NSFR
and do not explicitly discuss reserve requirements. De Bandt & Chahad (2016)
studies the impact of solvency and liquidity regulations using a large scale DSGE
model. Unlike this chapter, the authors use an ad-hoc approach to model the
banks liquidity holding by imposing quadratic adjustment costs when a bank is
deviating from the regulations. In general, none of those existing literature that
explicitly model both reserve requirement and LCR as in this chapter.
The organisation of the remaining chapter is as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the economy set-up of this model where I mainly present each agent
objective function, the corresponding constraints and the competitive equilibrium
conditions. The additional liquidity features that become my main contribution
are explained in the subsection regarding banks. Section 3 deals with the cal-
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ibration of the model. Section 4 presents simulation results. The last section
concludes and describes some possible extensions of the research for future re-
search.
4.2 The Model
This chapter employs a simplied medium scale DSGE model with banking sector
developed by Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014).11 The population
of the economy comprises households, entrepreneurs, monopolistic competitive
banks and rms. The representative household is modelled as a patient agent with
a high discount factor such that he would save in bank deposits. On the other
hand, the representative entrepreneur is modelled as a less patient agent with a
lower discount factor so that he would borrow from bank. This model includes
price and wage frictions as in Smets & Wouters (2003), and nancial frictions in
the form of borrowing constraints as in Iacoviello (2005). This section presents
the overview of the model and detailedly describes my contribution regarding the
introduction of liquidity-related features such as liquidity assets, liquidity shocks
and liquidity regulation. Figure 4.1 illustrates the general relationship among
agents in the economy. The red dashed lines show the new main components
that I add to the basic model.
4.2.1 Households
The representative household (i) maximises the expected utility which depends
on current individual consumption cPt (i), lagged aggregate consumption c
P
t 1, and






(1  aP ) log  cPt (i)  aP cPt 1  lPt (i)1+1 + 

; (4.1)
11Their model has two types of households that di¤er in the degrees of impatience. Moreover,
they also include the housing good in the households utility function and budget constraint. In
this paper, I model only one type of household (patient household who acts as the lender for the
bank), and I do not consider the housing good because it is not the focus of analysis. However,
I enhance the model by adding government as the issuer of risk-free assets.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the Model
where P denotes the household discount factor, a
P is the external habit
coe¢ cient, and  is the inverse of Frisch elasticity12.
The household choose their consumption and deposits (dPt ) subject to the
following budget constraint (in real terms):
cPt (i) + d
P











The household revenue consists of income from wages (wt), gross interest
income on last period deposits (1 + Rdt 1)dPt 1(i)=t, and transfers (tPt ) which
include a labour union membership net fee, dividends from banks, dividends
from rms and a lump-sum tax (Pt ) to government. R
d
t denotes the nominal
deposit rate, dPt is the amount of deposits, and t is the ination rate.
The rst-order conditions of the household with respect to consumption and
deposits are:13
(1  aP )
cPt   aP cPt 1
= Pt ; (4.3)
12Frisch elasticity is the elasticity of labour supply to the wage, given a constant marginal
utility of wealth. It measures the substitution e¤ect. The higher the Frisch elasticity, the higher
the willingness of the households to work if wages increase.
13Because of the presence of labour union and wage frictions, the equation regarding labour










where P is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
4.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs buy capital and hire labour to produce homogenous intermediate
goods (yEt ). Entrepreneurs buy the capital from capital-good producers at price
qkt and sell the intermediate goods to the nal good producers (retailer) at the
wholesale price (Pwt ):
A representative entrepreneur maximises his utility which is a function of
the deviation of his own consumption cEt (i) from the aggregate lagged group
consumption cEt 1 with aE as the degree of habits formation. 
t
E denotes the






t (i)  aEcEt 1) (4.5)
The entrepreneur chooses consumption cEt , physical capital k
E
t , loans from
banks bEt ; and labour inputs l
E;P
t taking into account the budget constraint:
















+ bEt (i) + q
k











Equation 4.7 limits the maximum value of gross debt repayment below the
LTV ratio multiplied by the market value of physical capital (collateral). wPt
denotes the real wage, RbEt is the nominal loan rate, and b
E
t is the amount of
entrepreneurs loan. 1=xt = Pwt =Pt is the relative competitive price of the whole-
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sale good produced by the entrepreneur,  is the depreciation rate of capital, and
mE is the LTV ratio of the entrepreneur loan.










where aEt is the stochastic total factor productivity, and  is the capital share
parameter.
The rst-order conditions of the entrepreneurs problem with respect to con-
sumption, borrowing, capital, and labour decisions are:14
1
(cEt (i)  aEcEt 1)



































where E is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the entrepreneurs bud-
get constraint, sE is the Langrange multiplier associated with the borrowing











14The detailed derivation of the model is available in Appendix 6.4.3.
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4.2.3 Capital Goods Producers
Capital goods producers operate in a perfectly competitive market. They buy
capital used in the last-period, (1   )kt 1; from the entrepreneurs at price Qkt :
They produce new capital stock kt by investing It of nal goods bought from
nal good producers at price Pt. The transformation of the nal goods into new
capital goods is subject to an adjustment cost. The capital good producers then
sell the new capital to entrepreneurs at price Qkt :






qkt (kt   (1  )kt 1)  it

; (4.14)
subject to capital formation technology:










where i denotes the cost of adjusting investment. The rst-order condition

































4.2.4 Final Goods Producers (Retailers)
Each nal good retailer is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. The
retailers buy the intermediate good from the entrepreneur at a price Pwt ; convert
the intermediate good to a di¤erentiated nal good yt(j) and sell it at retailer
price Pt(j). Retailers price their nal product with a mark-up taking into account
the demand function of the nal good which is characterised by the price elasticity
15The capital producers value future prots by using the entrepreneur discount factor E0;t,














Retailers face a quadratic price adjustment cost that make the retail price
sticky (with parameter p). This adjustment cost is indexed to a combination of
the past and steady-state inations, with relative weights parameterised by P :



























The rst-order condition of retailers after imposing symmetric equilibrium is
given by:




















Households supply di¤erentiated labour input to a labour union (or a labour
packer). The labour union bundles the di¤erentiated labour input into a ho-
mogeneous labour input, and then sell it to entrepreneurs for production. The
labour union sets nominal wages for each type of labour WPt (m) by maximising
their utility, with the constraints of a labour demand function and a quadratic
wage adjustment cost (with parameter w). The adjustment cost is indexed to a
weighted average of lagged wage and steady-state ination. w denotes the rela-
tive weights parameter. The labour union charges each member of the household
16The retailers value future prots by using the patient discount factor P0;t , which can be













a net membership fee to cover adjustment costs.





















subject to a downward-sloping demand for each variety of labour that depend
on the aggregate labour demand and the relative wage of variety labour as follows:








The parameter "l measures the elasticity of substitution among di¤erent types
of labour and it is assumed to be greater than one so that di¤erent types of labour
are substitutes.
The rst-order condition of the labour union in a symmetric equilibrium pro-



































The banks have three di¤erent units in conducting their intermediation activi-
ties: the deposit unit, the loan unit and the wholesale unit. The deposit unit is
responsible for raising di¤erentiated deposits from patient households. The loan
unit is responsible for giving out di¤erentiated loans to entrepreneurs. Banks
are assumed to operate in a monopolistic competitive deposit and loan markets.
Thus, the loan and deposit units have a power to adjust rates on loans and de-
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posits subject to both the demand from entrepreneurs and adjustment costs. The
wholesale unit receives funds from the deposit unit and issues wholesale credits
to the loan unit. The wholesale unit is responsible for managing the banks bal-
ance sheet composition to maximise prot, subject to the capital and liquidity
regulation.
I expand the models of Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014) by
including the liquid assets in the bank balance sheet. The asset side of balance
sheets consists of two types of liquid assets: (i) reserves in the central bank and
(ii) government bonds as risk-free assets, and one type of non-liquid assets: loan
to entrepreneurs. On the liability side, the wholesale unit manages deposits and
bank capital.
The bank has to obey capital regulation and liquidity regulations imposed by
the central bank. I follow Angelini et al. (2014) to model the cost that banks
incur when they deviate from the capital adequacy ratio requirement. I add two
types of liquidity regulations in the model: reserve requirements and Liquidity
Coverage Ratio (LCR)17. In the case of violation of those requirements, the bank
has to borrow from the central bank and pay back in the next period at a penalty
rate. Since the model only includes one-period type of assets, I model the liquidity
coverage ratio in a simple way. High liquidity assets only include risk-free assets
(government bonds) and reserves, whilst the 30-day liquidity needs are assumed
to be proportional to the value of deposits.
Deposit unit
The retail deposit branch of bank j collects deposits dPt (j) from households and
passes the funds on to the wholesale unit, which remunerates them at rate Rt in
the next period. The retail deposit branch maximises prot by setting deposit
rate Rdt (j); considering interest rate adjustment costs (with adjustment parameter
17The way I model the LCR is similar to the Macroprudential Liquidity Bu¤er (MLB) that
has been implemented in Indonesia since March 2018. The di¤erence is that under the MLB
regulation, liquid assets that bank has to maintain only include risk-free assets. In my model, I























subject to an upward-sloping demand of deposits for each bank, that depend







where dt is the aggregate deposit collected by the deposit units of all banks
and "d denotes the elasticity of substitution of deposits demand among banks.18
The total fund received by the wholesale unit of bank j (Dt(j)) is equal to the




With a symmetry equilibrium, the rst-order condition for the deposit interest






























The retail loan branch of bank j obtains wholesale loans Bt(j) from the wholesale
units at rate Rbt that will be paid in the next period: The loan unit di¤erentiates
18We can also interpret "
d
"d 1as the markdown on the deposit rate in steady-state.
19Detailed derivation is available in Appendix 6.4.3. In the derivation, I use the Euler equation





: The result is slightly di¤erent with the Angelini
et al. (2014). The reason is that I consider that the interest payment is paid/received in the
next period. Some of the terms are therefore should be discounted at deposit rate.
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the loans and lend them to entrepreneurs bEt (j) at rate R
bE
t (j):The loan branch
maximises prot by setting the lending rate, taking into consideration the loan
rate adjustment costs (with adjustment parameter bE); and the loan demand.































where "bEdenotes the elasticity of substitution of each type of demand for
loan among banks.
The rst-order condition for entrepreneursloan interest rate (after imposing



































I expand the components of the wholesale banks balance sheet to include the
liquid assets as presented in Table 4.1. The bank holds some assets in the forms
of reserves in the central bank (RV ) and risk-free government bonds (RF b).
Both assets are liquid since they can be easily converted to cash in the case of
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deposit withdrawal. In contrast, loans are illiquid so they cannot be liquidated
easily. Each wholesale branch manages the composition of the balance sheet to
maximise prot subject to capital and liquidity regulations.
Table 4.1: Bank Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities
Liquid Assets Deposits (D)
- Reserves (RV )
- Risk Free Assets (RF b)
Non-liquid Assets Equity (Kb)
- Loans (B)
Capital Management As in Angelini et al. (2014), the bank aims to keep
the capital to weighted-risk asset ratio (CAR) close to an exogenous target vt,
which can be thought as a capital requirement imposed by the regulator. The









where Kb is the cost parameter, and wL is the average of risk weight of loans.
The bank capital is adjusted through bank investment. I assume that the
investment cannot be higher than prot jbt :
Kbt = (1  b)
Kbt 1
t
+ jbt : (4.32)
Liquidity Management To capture liquidity management in the wholesale
banking, I introduce a stochastic liquidity shock in the model. The liquidity
shock is modelled as a random withdrawal "liqt to the banks reserve holdings.
The shock is symmetrically distributed according to a cumulative distribution
function F with mean "liq and standard deviation s"liq . When "liqt is positive














wEt is the risk weight for entrepeneurs loans and w
H
t is the risk weight for household loans. Both
wEt and w
H
t vary with the business cycle. In this paper, I simplify the denominator since I do
not have household loan and assume a constant risk weight wL:
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(negative), the bank receives unexpected outows (inows) of funds.
The bank faces two types of liquidity regulations:
1. Reserve Requirement (RR)
The banks reserves holdings at the end of the period, taking into account
the liquidity withdrawal, have to be higher or equal to the reserve require-
ment. As in practice, the central bank sets the reserve requirement, and
the value is proportional (t) to the banks deposit:
RVt   "liqt Dt  tDt: (4.33)
The central bank pays the remuneration RRRt only to the required reserves
tDt. The bank does not get any remuneration for excess reserve ERt =
(RVt   Dt): If the liquidity withdrawal ("liqt Dt) exceeds the amount of
bank excess reserves, the bank faces a reserves shortage and has to borrow
XRRt from the central bank.
21 The bank repay the loan at a penalty rate
Rx1t > Rt in the next period: The amount of reserves shortage is given by:
XRRt = max
n
"liqt Dt   (RVt   tDt); 0
o
: (4.34)
I assume that the liquidity withdrawal cannot exceed the available deposits
("liqt  1) and the parameters in the liquidity shock distribution function are






("liqDt  RVt + tDt)f("liq)d"liq: (4.35)
2. Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
21There is no interbank market in this model, so banks only borrow from the central bank in
the case of liquidity shortage.
22 I will relax the assumption regarding constant parameters of the liquidity shock distribution
in section 4.5.5. There, I will assume that the mean of liquidity shock distribution is time varying.
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The objective of LCR requirement as mentioned in BCBS (2013) is to en-
sure that banks have adequate stocks of unencumbered high-quality liquid
assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately into cash in
private markets to meet their liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity
stress scenario. Following Cecchetti & Kashyap (2018), I model the LCR
denominator as a fraction of deposits .23 Furthermore, as in Bech & Keister
(2017), my denition of high liquidity assets only includes reserves and risk
free-assets (government bonds).24. The bank receives RRF as the interest
for holding the government bond.




which is equivalent to the following expression:
RFt +RVt   "liqt Dt  #tDt: (4.37)
#t is the average run-o¤ rate of deposits that is also part of the LCR regu-
lation.
As in the case of reserves requirement, if the withdrawal ("liqt Dt) on reserves
make the LCR position of the bank declines to below 100%, the bank faces
an LCR shortage and has to borrow XLCRt from the central bank. The
bank has to pay the loan at a penalty rate Rx2t > Rt in the next period.
23The formulation for LCR in Cecchetti & Kashyap (2018) is R  D + !OBSA; where
R denotes high-quality liquid assets which includes reserves, D denotes deposits, and OBSA
denotes the total of the o¤-balance sheet assets.  denotes the average run-o¤ rate on deposits,
and ! is the average run-o¤ rate on o¤-balance sheets item. Without the o¤-balance sheet items,
my formulation of the LCR is equivalent to R  D.
24 In the Basel III documents, HQLA that can be categorised as Level 1 assets are limited to:
(i) coins and banknotes; (ii) central bank reserves (including required reserves), (iii) marketable
securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, PSEs, the Bank for
International Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and
European Community, or multilateral development banks.
The denition of LCR in this paper is rather simple since the model only has one-period
government bonds and abstracts from other forms of the central-bank money (cash and notes).
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This approach is similar to Bech & Keister (2017). The amount of LCR
shortage is given by:
XLCRt = max
n
"liqt Dt   (RFt +RVt   #tDt); 0
o
: (4.38)










Penalty rates (Rx1t and R
x2
t ) are identical and assumed to be proportional






Prot Maximisation The wholesale unit maximises the sum of discounted
real cash ow by choosing loans, deposits, reserves and risk-free assets, taking





































subject to the bank balance sheet constraint:
Bt +RVt +RFt = Dt +K
b
t : (4.42)
The cost of liquidity shortage is dened as the total of both reserves shortage
25This assumption is in line with the practice in Indonesia where the central banks discount














































The rst-order conditions of banks present the optimal choices between giving


























































The total bank prots are the sum of net earnings from the wholesale unit, the
















































Since the realised penalty cost involves a nonlinear maximum function, I use
the Occbin toolkit developed by Guerrieri & Iacoviello (2015) which applies a
piecewise linear perturbation approach to solve the dynamic models.26 There
are four regimes of the banks liquidity position that a¤ects the banks need to
borrow from the central bank. The rst one is the reference regime, and the other
three are the alternate regimes with conditions listed in Table 4.2:27
Table 4.2: Liquidity Condition Regimes
Regimes XRR XLCR Condition
1: Reference 0 0 Bank can meet both RR and LCR, penalty = 0
2: Alternate 1 > 0 0 Bank cant meet RR, pay penalty cost Rx1t X
RR
t
3: Alternate 2 0 > 0 Bank cant meet LCR, pay penalty cost Rx2t X
LCR
t
4: Alternate 3 > 0 > 0 Bank cant meet both RR and LCR,







26One of the limitations of this method is that it cannot capture precautionary behaviour
linked to the possibility that a constraint may become binding in the future, as a result of
shocks yet unrealised. Thus, in the model, I can not capture the precautionary behaviour of
banks regarding the potential liquidity risk in the future.
27One limitation of this approach is that the total amount that the bank borrows from central
bank in the regime 4 exceed their actual needs. The actual needs is X = maxfXRR; XLCRg:To





Budget Constraint As in Hall & Reis (2015), the central bank issues ad-
ditional reserves to fund the sum of: (1) real interest on the previous level of
required reserves, (2) net government bond purchases (RF cbt ), and (3) trans-
fer/seignorage to the government ( cbt ). The funding needs are reduced by: (4)
interest on last periods bond holdings, and (5) interest payment from the com-
mercial bank loan in the case of liquidity problem (penalty):
RVt  RVt 1=t = RRRt 1t 1Dt 1
1
t
+RF cbt + 
cb









Interest Rate Policy The central bank sets the policy rate according to a











where R denotes the inertia in the adjustment of policy rate,  denotes the
response to deviations of ination from target, and Y denotes the the response
to output growth. "MPt denotes monetary policy shock.
The central bank also sets the remuneration rate for required reserves and the
penalty rate for the bank borrowing in the case of RR or LCR liquidity shortage.
I assume that both the remuneration rate for required reserves and penalty rates





28This equation is needed to avoid multiple solutions of RF cbt and 
cb in the steady state.
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Financial Sector Policy The central bank sets regulations regarding LCR,
RR t and Capital Requirements Ratio vt. By equation 4.37, we can use #t to
denote the LCR regulation. We can interpret the changes in #t as the changes in
the LCR regulation either in the form of new supervisory run-o¤ rates or in the
form of new level of minimum LCR ratio. In the basic model, I use simple policy



















where ; # and v denote the inertia in the adjustment of the RR, the LCR




t denote the RR, the LCR
and the capital requirement shock. In the further analysis (subsection 4.4.5), I
modify the RR and the LCR policy rule to include the countercyclical aspect of
nancial regulation.
4.2.8 Government.
The government purchases nal goods (Gt) and obtains funds from the lump-sum
taxes, the issuance of government bond (RF T ); and the transfers from central
bank ( cbt ): The government budget constraint in real terms is:
29




t 1=t    cbt    t: (4.54)
To simplify the model, I assume a constant ratio of the government spending
29 I do not have government bond price in the equation because the government bond in this
model is only a one-period bond that give return RRF in the next period. This is constrast with
Hall & Reis (2015) who use a long-term government bond.
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to the total output as follows:
Gt =  Yt: (4.55)
Furthermore, I assume that the risk-free interest rate varies proportionally





Market clearing conditions in the good market is:
Yt = Ct + q
k



















































































In this subsection, I simulate the impact of four types of shocks. The rst shock is
the liquidity shock "liqt , which is the unexpected withdrawal from banks reserve
in terms of fraction of deposits. The second shock is the aggregate productivity
shock, aEt ; which illustrates the problem that emerges from the real sector. The
third and fourth shocks are liquidity policy shocks to:(1) the reserve requirement
policy, "t ; and (2) the LCR policy, "
#







 Total factor productivity shock
log aEt = 
a log aEt 1 + 
a
t (4.66)
 Reserve requirement policy shock
log "t = 
 log "t 1 + 

t (4.67)
 LCR policy shock
log "#t = 






I calibrate the model to match the rst moments of some Indonesia data through-
out 2005Q3 - 2017Q4.30 One period is a quarter.31 The targets of the calibration
process are the models steady-state values, which computed using various macro-
economic and aggregate banking data that have been ltered using HP-lter ( =
1600). The detailed description regarding sources of data for calibration is avail-
able in Appendix 6.4.5. I set ination in the steady state to 1.016, which is
equivalent to the average annual ination rate of 6.4%. The discount factor for
patient household, P and the elasticity of deposit demand, "d; are calibrated to
match the steady-state value of interest rate on deposits and policy rate. I use
the rate of deposits with one-month maturity as a benchmark and use BI rate
data for the policy rate.32
The target of capital to loan ratio is 7.6%, which is in line with the average
capital adequacy ratio requirement in Indonesia. The weighted average of the
banks risk prole, wL; is set to 1.079. Reserve requirement ratio in the steady-
state is 6.5%, and the remuneration on required reserves is 0 because recently the
Indonesian central bank gives no more remuneration on the required reserves. I
use government bond yield rate as a proxy for risk-free asset return, and it implies
that the ratio of risk-free assets rate to the policy rate, 
RF ; is 1.01. Parameter
  is set to be 9%, following the average of the ratio of government consumption
to GDP.
Some literature uses the central banks discount window rate or the interbank
market rate as a proxy for penalty rate. However, penalty rate does not only
capture the actual rate of lending facilities but also nonpecuniary costs such as
30 I use data from 2005Q3 because Indonesia starts to adopt Ination Targeting Framework
(ITF) since July 2005, and since then uses the interest rate as the main monetary policy instru-
ment.
31 I realise that there is a potential problem with a quarterly period when we discuss bank
liquidity management. Usually, bank liquidity management is a daily decision. However, to
make it consistent with other quarterly macro variables, I assume that liquidity management is
the sum of daily activities in a quarter.
32Since 2016Q3, Bank Indonesia changes its policy rate from BI Rate to 7 Days Repo Rate.
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a reputational cost, e.g the stigma associated with borrowing from the central
banks emergency facilities (Acharya & Naqvi (2012)). Therefore, it is di¢ cult to
observe the exact value of the penalty rate. Thus, I calibrate the ratio of penalty
rate to policy rate (
RX1; 
RX2) jointly with other unobservable parameters
including ; mE ; #; b; and parameters regarding the distribution of liquidity
shock "liq and s"liq to match several target variables.
First, I need to assume the type of liquidity shock distribution. I did that
by tting the data of the percentage of aggregate deposit withdrawal within the
sample period with various type of distributions using Matlab.33 I found that
the closest type of distribution with the data is logistic distribution and normal
distribution. I choose normal distribution because it is commonly used in the
literature and also consistent with the assumption of the exogenous shocks used
in Dynare program34
Then I do calibration to get the steady-state values of the model as close as
possible with these following target variables: reserves to deposit ratio (8.1%),
liquid assets to deposit ratio (27.8%), capital to risk-weighted loan ratio (19%),
capital to deposit ratio (17%), total risk-free assets to output ratio (40%), in-
vestment to output ratio (24%), and total loan to output ratio (81%). The
calibration process gives a relatively high depreciation rate parameter ( =0.1)
and high run-o¤ rate parameter in the LCR computation (# =27%). The high
value of the run-o¤ rate parameter can be accepted because from the model spec-
ication, the parameter can also be interpreted as a high LCR position. The
evaluation by The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) on Indone-
sian banking sector liquidity shows that as of June 2016 the aggregate bank LCR
position is 227%, which is much higher than the required ratio 100% (Committee
on Banking Supervision (2016)). The calibration shows that the value of mE is
33The histogram and distribution tting result is available in Appendix 6.4.6. I realise that
the liquidity shock in the model is an idiosyncratic shock, and it might be better if I use the data
of individual bank deposit ow. However, I assume that all bank are homogenous regarding the
expectation of liquidity shock. Therefore I can use aggregate deposit outow as a proxy for the
distribution type.
34Logistic distribution looks like the normal distribution in shape but has heavier tails.
116
4.3. CALIBRATION
0.55. In Indonesia, there is no specic regulation regarding LTV ratio on the en-
trepreneur loan, but I think this value makes sense. Depreciation on bank capital
(b) is 2%, which is acceptable because the value is similar to the non-performing
loan ratio. The ratio of penalty rate to policy rate is 1.8. As expected, the value
of the penalty rate is higher than the lending facilities rate, which on average is
1.15 times of policy rate. The mean of the liquidity shock distribution is 0.019,
and the standard deviation is 0.04. Table 4.3 presents the summary of calibrated
parameters.
Remaining parameters follows related literature. Some of parameters follow
the Bank Indonesias DSGE model as in Harmanta et al. (2014) or Purwanto
(2016) (presented in the Table 4.4), and some other parameters follow standard
literature as in Angelini et al. (2014), Chadha & Corrado (2012) and Primus
(2017) (presented in the Table 4.5).35
The calibration of steady-state parameters implies ratios and interest rate as
listed in Table 4.6.
Table 4.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
P 0.999 Patient households discount factor
"d -19.44 "d=
 
"d   1 is the mark down on deposit rate
v 0.076 Minimum capital requirement ratio regulated
wL 1.079 Risk weight of loan for the CAR calculation
 0.065 Reserve requirement ratio
# 0.27 Run-o¤ rate of deposit for LCR calculation

RRR 0 Ratio of reserve remuneration rate to policy rate

RF 1.01 Ratio of risk free rate to policy rate
  0.09 Ratio of government spending/GDP
 0.1 Depreciation rate of physical capital
mE 0.55 Entrepreneurs LTV Ratio
b 0.02 Depreciation of bank capital

RX1;
RX2 1.8 Ratio of RR penalty rate to policy rate
"liq 0.019 Mean of liquidity shock distribution
s"liq 0.04 Standard deviation of liquidity shock distribution
35 I realise that it would be better to estimate some of the parameters a¤ecting dynamics of
the model for example by using Bayesian estimation. However, the method to combine Bayesian




Table 4.4: Parameters following Indonesias DSGE literature
Parameter Value Description
aP ; aE 0.6 Degree of habit formation in consumption
i 0.98 Cost for adjusting investment
bE 3.7 Cost for adjusting rate on loans to entrepreneur
D 3.23 Cost for adjusting rate on deposits
kb 1.78 Cost for adjusting capital-loan ratio
R 0.74 Persistence of the monetary policy rule
v 0.5 Persistence of the capital requirement rule
 1.89 Response of monetary policy to ination
Y 0.25 Response of monetary policy to output
Note : All the parameters on this table are following Harmanta et al. (2014), except
parameter v is following Purwanto (2016)
4.4 Simulation Results
This section presents the numerical simulation to explore the responses of the
bank and macroeconomic variables to the liquidity shock and the technology
shock. In this section I also study the impact of imposing countercyclical liquidity
regulations on welfare and volatilities of various variables.
4.4.1 Long run Impact of Higher Expectation of Liquidity Shock
In the rst exercise, I increase the value of the mean of the liquidity shock distri-
bution ("liq) to learn how it a¤ects banks optimal decision and macroeconomic
variables in the long-run.36 We can relate this shifting in the liquidity distribu-
tion mean with the situation after the global nancial crisis. In the rst quarter
of 2008, there was a quite high deposit outow in the Indonesian banking sector
(3 % nominal deposit outow, equivalent with 7.3% real deposit outow) which
is the biggest outow since 2005. Since the e¤ect of the global nancial crisis
lasts quite long, that event could increase banks long-term expectation about
liquidity shock.
Figure 4.2 and 4.3 show the simulation results. The horizontal lines denote
the value of the mean of the liquidity shock distribution. Higher values imply
36 I change the value of parameter "liq from 0.01 to 0.05 and compute the steady-state values
of all other variables.
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Table 4.5: Parameters following standard literature
Parameter Value Description
E 0.975 Entrepreneurs discount factor
 1 Inverse of the Frisch Elasticity
 0.3 Capital share in the production function
"y 6 "y= ("y   1) is the mark up in the goods market
"l 5 "l=
 
"l   1 is the mark up in the labour market
"bE 2.7 "bE=
 
"bE   1 is the mark up on rate on loans to entrepreneur
P 28.65 Cost for adjusting good prices
W 99.9 Cost for adjusting nominal wages
P 0.16 Indexation of prices to past ination
W 0.276 Indexation of nominal wages to past ination
liq 0.33 Persistence of the liquidity shock
a 0.97 Persistence of the technology shock


0.15 Persistence of the reserve requirement policy rule

#
0.15 Persistence of the LCR policy rule
 0.3 Persistence of reserve requirement shock
# 0.33 Persistence of run-o¤ rate shock
 1.2 Feedback parameter of countercyclical reserve requirement policy
# 1.2 Feedback parameter of countercyclical LCR policy
Note : Most of the parameters on this table are from Angelini et al. (2014). Parameters
related with liquidity (liq; ; #) follow Chadha & Corrado (2012), while parameters






and # =  .
higher liquidity risk perceived by the bank. The vertical lines denote the steady
state values of the corresponding variables. The rst graph of Figure 4.2 shows
that banks optimal reserves depend signicantly on the probability of liquidity
shortage. The bank holds more reserves because they serve both liquidity reg-
ulations. The second graph (top row, middle) shows that it is optimal for the
bank to reduce risk-free assets as long as the reserves ratio and the LCR ratio
are higher than the minimum required level of the regulation. Higher liquidity
risk also raises the marginal cost of giving a loan so the bank will charge a higher
loan rate to the entrepreneurs (middle graph). As a consequence, there will be a
lower level of bank lending in the economy. However, the simulation shows that
the bank still can obtain higher prots because the bank raises the lending rate
such that the total income from lending increases, even though the total loan
decreases. The combination of higher capital from additional prots and lower
lending leads to a rise in the bank capital to loan ratio (bottom row, middle
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Table 4.6: Steady State Values
Variables Data Model
Policy Rate 0.018 0.018
Deposits Rate 0.018 0.017
Loan rate to entrepreneur 0.032 0.023
Risk-Free Asset Rate 0.018 0.018
Total Consumption/Output 0.56 0.58
Government Expenditures/Output 0.08 0.08
Investment/Output 0.24 0.18
Entrepreneurs Loan/Output 0.81 0.89
Risk-free assets/Output 0.40 0.37
Bank Capital/Risk-weighted Loan 0.19 0.18
Bank Capital/Deposit 0.17 0.16
Reserves/Deposit 0.08 0.08
Liquid Assets/Deposit 0.28 0.34
graph).
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Higher Expectation of Liquidity Shock on Steady-state
Values of Bank Variables
As shown in rst row graphs in Figure 4.3, investment and GDP decline as
banks choose to hold more reserves and reduce lending. Furthermore, from the
perspective of the central bank balance sheet, higher demand for reserves must be
backed-up by government bond holding. A higher demand for high-quality liquid
assets can a¤ect governments nancing strategy. The government can nance its
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spending by issuing more bonds and reducing taxes. The reduction of taxes leads
to an increment in the household deposits. Therefore, the exercise shows that,
although the bank capital increases, the proportion of capital to deposit declines
(bottom row, right graph of Figure 4.2).37 The level of total consumption declines
because entrepreneurs borrow less.
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Figure 4.3: Impact of Higher Expectation of Liquidity Shock on Steady-State
Values of Macroeconomic Variables
Some of the responses of the bank toward higher liquidity risk generated by
this model inline with some empirical literature such as de Haan & van den End
(2013). Using Dutch banks data over the period January 2004 - April 2010, they
found that banks respond to a negative funding liquidity shock in a number of
ways including reduce lending and hoard liquidity in the form of liquid bonds
and central bank reserves. Furthermore, the study of Ivashina & Scharfstein
(2010) found that banks with higher liquidity risk, in terms of greater volatility
of deposits and draws on committed credit lines, tend to reduce more lending
during the nancial crisis.
37 It should be noted that this result strongly depends on the assumption that the supply of
the government bond is perfectly elastic. In reality, the government faces constraints in issuing
bonds. I tried to modify the government rule such that the government debt per GDP ratio is
constant (RFTt =  Yt). However, I can not obtain the steady-state solution.
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4.4.2 Dynamic Analysis of Unexpected Liquidity Shock
Explanation of the liquidity shock
In the second exercise, I simulate the impact of an unexpected liquidity shock to
the banking sector. Since my model is a closed economy with no cash, this shock
can be viewed as an unanticipated late-day banks customer payment activity38.
To illustrate the mechanism, I divide each period into three stages. At the rst
stage, the wholesale unit of banks make portfolio decisions of loans, reserves, risk-
free assets and deposits, and solve liquidity and capital management problem. In
this stage, all banks have the same expectation of liquidity shock. At the second
stage, banks are subject to a random idiosyncratic withdrawal of deposits ("liqt Dt).
If "liqt is positive, the bank would experience an unexpected withdrawal of funds.
I assume that household does not hold cash, so a deposit withdrawn from one
bank will be transferred to other banks and deposits are only reshu­ ed across
banks. Moreover, since there is no interbank market in my model, banks that
receive deposit inow (positive "liqt ) are assumed to keep the additional deposits
as excess reserves in the central bank. In the third stage, banks who experience
deposit outow may need to borrow from the central bank to full the liquidity
regulations. These banks pay back the loan with a penalty rate in the next period.
The unexpected liquidity shock a¤ects the banks prot, capital and its optimal
decisions on the lending rate and other components of the balance sheet.
Figure 4.4 shows the changes in the balance sheet during the process. Suppose
Bank A illustrates the bank that experiences positive liquidity shocks and bank
B illustrates the opposites. As we can see, even though the two banks experience
di¤erent liquidity shocks, the balance-sheet constraints of the aggregate bank and
the central bank are still the same as those illustrated by equation 4.42 and 4.49.
38As mentioned in Bech & Keister (2017), introducing this kind of shock is a standard way of
capturing the inability of banks to exactly target their end-of-day reserve balance.
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Size of the shock
Following the calibration process, I assume that the liquidity shock follows a
normal distribution f("liq;0.019,0.04). To determine the size of the shock in the
simulation exercise, I use the quantile function of a normal distribution as follows:
Q(p;; s) = + s:zp (4.69)
I simulate two sizes of shock: rst is in the 90th quantile and second is in the
99th quantile.39 That is to say, the probability for the rst shock to happen is
10% and that for the second shock is 1%. According to the formula above, in
Q90, "liq = 8:5% and Q99 = 12:2% which I round it to 12.5%. Therefore, in the
next subsection, I will simulate the impacts of 8.5% and 12.5% withdrawal to the
bank reserves holding.
Impacts on Aggregate Bank and Macroeconomic Variables
Unexpected withdrawal to some bank reserves holding makes the banks liquidity
position moves across regimes as described in Table 4.2. The rst graph of Figure
4.5 shows that after an 8.5% liquidity shock, the banks liquidity position is in
regime 4, meaning that the bank simultaneously cannot meet the RR and LCR for
one period. The banks liquidity position then moves to regime 2 where the only
problem of the bank is the reserves requirement. The banks liquidity position
ultimately moves back to regime 1. A liquidity shock with larger magnitude
12.5% induces a similar e¤ect, except that the bank will be in regime 2 for two
periods.
Unexpected liquidity shock in some bank can a¤ect the aggregate output
through the transmission mechanism as shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7.
First, a liquidity shock induces some banks to borrow from the central bank at a
higher rate, and both the prots and the capital of the bank therefore decrease
(Graph No.3). With a lower capital position, the bank increases the lending
39According to the standard normal distribution table: z90 = 1:66 and z99 = 2:58
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rate, causing a decline in the lending to the entrepreneur (Graph No.4 - 6).
The problem in the banking sector transmits into the real sector. Investment
decreases because the entrepreneur borrows less from the bank. As a result, total
output in the economy deteriorates, and the demand for labour also decline. The
reduction in the entrepreneur investment leads to a fall in both the real rate and
the price of capital (Graph 2 -3 in Figure 4.7). As consequences, the marginal
cost of production and price of goods decrease which leads to deation. Following
the Taylor rule, the central bank reacts to the drops in ination and output by
lowering interest rate. Total consumption increases temporarily because of the
lower interest rate, but then it decreases because household and entrepreneur
income declines.
Under the current calibrated parameters, the result shows a relatively small
impact of liquidity shock on the aggregate loan and output. For example, 8.5%
of liquidity shock only causes an immediate impact of 0.08% decline in the bank
lending. The lending continues to decline until around 0.13% in the sixth period.
The impact of the liquidity shock on the deterioration of GDP is around 0.13%.
This relatively small impact is understandable due to the constant distribution
parameters of liquidity shock set in my modelling framework. Therefore, there is
no feedback e¤ect of the ex-post liquidity shock on the expectation of the liquidity
shortage in the next period. As can be seen in Figure 4.8, the bank reserves ratio
and the LCR ratio are constant and una¤ected by the liquidity shock. The bank
125
4.4. SIMULATION RESULTS






























2. Liquidity Shortage (X.rr+X.lcr)


























4. Bank Capital (K.b)












5. Ent Loan Rate (R.be)













6. Loan to Ent (B.e)




























Figure 4.6: Impact of Liquidity Shock on Bank Lending and Output
maintains its reserves ratio and LCR ratio at the optimal level as in the steady-
state and there are no precautionary hoarding after the shock. The impact of the
liquidity shock on the banks optimal decision is only transmitted through the
deterioration in bank capital position due to a decline in the banks prot, which
is relatively small.
4.4.3 Technology Shock
Figure 4.9 presents the e¤ects of a one per cent standard deviation negative
technology shock on the economy. A negative technology shock leads to a decline
in the output, consumption and investment. The household chooses to increase
its working hours to avoid further decline in the consumption. The marginal cost
of production increases and leads to a higher ination. The central bank reacts
by raising the policy rate because the Taylor rules reaction to ination is higher
than that to output. The bank lending to the entrepreneur declines not only
because of a higher loan rate but also because of the nancial friction mechanism
where the decline in entrepreneurs capital causes a lower borrowing capacity.
The impact of the technology shock on the bank lending persists relatively longer
because of the feedback loop relationship among lending, investment and capital
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Figure 4.7: Impact of Liquidity Shock on Macroeconomic Variables
induced by the borrowing constraint features of the model.
Figure 4.10 shows how the technology shock transmitted to other components
of banks balance sheet. The decline in households income leads to a decline in
total deposits. Total banks reserves and risk-free assets also decline because
bank optimal reserves and LCR ratio are relatively constant while total deposits
decline. Furthermore, bank capital declines as a consequence of the lower prot
from the lending contraction. Moreover, since I assume that the government
spending is proportional to the total output, a negative technology shock leads
to a lower government spending. Therefore, government issues less bonds and
reduce taxes.
4.4.4 Liquidity Regulations
In this subsection, I compare the impacts of the reserve requirement and the
LCR regulations by doing simulation with the scenario of loosening each liquidity
regulation by 10%. For example, the central bank changes the reserve requirement
ratio from 6.5% to 5.85%. The blue solid lines of Figure 4.11 denote the response
of the variables to a reserve requirement shock, and the red dashed lines indicate
the response to an LCR shock.
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Figure 4.8: Impact of Liquidity Shock on Aggregate Banks Ratio
The lower liquidity regulation makes it optimal for the bank to decrease the
lending rate and give more loan. More lending to the entrepreneur leads to
higher investment and output and causes an increase in ination. These results
inline with some empirical studies about the impact of liquidity regulation. For
example, Cordella et al. (2014) studied the usage of reserve requirements as
the credit stabilisation tools in emerging countries. They found empirically that
reserve requirements have a negative relationship with real GDP and a positive
relationship with the interest rate spread. The result also inline with Gómez
et al. (2019) that showed a signicant negative e¤ect of reserve requirement
and credit growth in Columbia and the e¤ect is moderated for more levered
and liquid banks. In a similar vein but opposite direction of shock, Glocker &
Towbin (2015) empirical study also showed that a positive shock to the required
reserve ratio in Brazil leads to an increase in credit spreads and a contraction
in economic activity. Furthermore, using a DSGE model calibrated with Brazil
data, Carvalho et al. (2013) found that a positive shock to the required reserve
ratio raises banksfunding costs and lending rates which results in a contraction
in output.
As we can see in Figure 4.11, the impacts of both RR or LCR on the real sector
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Figure 4.9: Impact of Negative Technology Shock on Macroeconomic Variables
are similar regarding direction, and the magnitude of the e¤ects are relatively
small. My nding of relatively small impact of liquidity regulation is consistent
with those of Hoerova et al. (2018) in that the impacts of liquidity regulations
on bank credit supply and cost of credit are not quantitatively large. However,
some empirical paper found di¤erent responses of banks to the changes in LCR.
Banerjee & Mio (2017) indicate that the bank in UK responding to a stricter
Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG), which is similar in design with LCR, by
reducing intra-nancial loans and short-term wholesale funding. Therefore the
impact on lending to the non-nancial sector is not signicant. Furthermore,
Bonner & Eij¢ nger (2016) found that the banks in Netherland do not pass on the
higher cost caused by a higher LCR-like regulation to their lending rate. A tighter
liquidity regulation seems to lower the banks interest margin. Duijm & Wierts
(2016) also found that banks adjust more the composition of their liabilities (from
wholesale funding to more stable deposits) rather than changing the composition
of the asset side as a reaction to the LCR policy. Since my model only has one
type of liabilities, the results presented in this chapter can not explore more about
the banks optimal decision regarding liabilities composition.
The impact of RR and LCR on the banks balance sheet and prot are quite
di¤erent, as shown in Figure 4.12. When the central bank decreases the reserve
129
4.4. SIMULATION RESULTS










































3. Risk-Free Assets in Bank






































Figure 4.10: Impact of Negative Technology Shock on Bank Balance Sheet
requirement regulation, the bank reduces its reserves. However, the bank needs
to have more risk-free assets to meet LCR. Therefore, the government bond hold-
ing in the central bank declines whilst government bond holding in the banking
sector increases. In total, the demand for government bond is relatively constant,
implying that taxes would be una¤ected in the economy. Aggregate household
deposits and bank assets are quite stable. The bank obtains more returns from
the conversion from reserves to risk-free assets. The prot of the bank thus
increases.
In contrast, when the central bank loosen the LCR regulation, bank reduce
both reserves and risk-free assets. So the total demand for government bond
decline and the government has to raise more tax to nance government spending.
Higher tax makes household put less deposit in the bank. Bank total asset and
prot decline.
4.4.5 Welfare Implications of Countercyclical Liquidity Regula-
tion
Some countries use countercyclical liquidity regulations as macroprudential policy
tools to mitigate macroeconomic uctuations. In the next simulation, I consider
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Figure 4.11: Impact of Liquidity Regulations on Bank Lending and Output
the case where the central bank sets the reserve requirement rule and the LCR













where  and # denote the degrees of persistence in the policy rule, while 
and 
#
measure the reaction of the policy to counter credit growth. The positive
values of  and # indicate that the central bank raises the liquidity requirement
ratio to avoid a credit boom in the case of an increase in credit growth, and vice
versa.
To assess whether the countercyclical rule is more benecial than constant
rule, I compare the total welfare in the case of a 1% technology shock and a 10%
expectation of liquidity shock under the two alternatives rules40. In this subsec-
tion, the mean of the liquidity shock distribution ("liq) is no longer constant but
40 I can not perform the welfare analysis for the case of unexpected liquidity shock because
that case has to be solved using piece-wise linear pertubation method, while welfare computation
need a second order approximation method.
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Figure 4.12: Impact of Liquidity Regulations on Bank Balance Sheet and Prot









I search the optimal parameters of the liquidity regulations rule that can im-
prove welfare. I simulate the model by using the second-order approximation and
compute the conditional welfare starting at the steady-state condition. Following
Rubio & Carrasco-Gallego (2014), I dene total welfare as the weighted sum of
the households and entrepreneurswelfare (WPt and W
E
t ). Each agents welfare
is weighted by their discount factor so that they receive the same level of utility
from a constant consumption stream:
Wt =
 


















t (i)  aEcEt 1): (4.74)
































= log(cEt (i)  aEcEt 1): (4.78)
I search the optimal reserve requirement policy rules numerically in a grid of
parameters (

; , #; #) that optimiseWt in response to the shocks.
41 I present
the welfare in terms of consumption equivalents (); not only to make results more
intuitive but also to follow the existing studies in the literature. Consumption
equivalent is a fraction of consumption required to equate the welfare under the
constant policy rule, W 0 to the one under the optimal countercyclical rule, W opt.
A positive value means a welfare gain. According to the specication of the utility







W opt  W 0  1; (4.79)
41The grid for 

and # is [0:0.05:0.95] while grid for  and # is [0:0.5:20].







W opt  W 0  1: (4.80)
Table 4.7 shows that under a technology shock, the optimal welfare is gained
when the reserves requirement rule has a relatively high persistence and a high
feedback parameter ( = 0:95 and  = 20). Furthermore, I nd that the com-
bination of both countercyclical RR and LCR does not provide a better welfare
implication compared to only a countercyclical RR. In contrast, Table 4.8 shows
that in the case of a higher expectation of liquidity shock, the combination of
countercyclical RR and LCR improves both households and entrepreneurs wel-
fare. However, in both cases, I nd that the impacts of countercyclical liquidity
regulations on increasing welfare is negligible.
Table 4.7: Countercyclical Parameters and Welfare Under Technology Shock
Parameters Constant Rule Countercyclical Rule
RR Only LCR Only RR and LCR
 0.15 0.95 0.95
 0 20 20
# 0.15 0.95 0.7
# 0 1.5 0
Welfare (in % CE)
- Household (P ) 0.0002 0.00002 0.0002
- Entrepreneur (E) 0.0025 -0.000002 0.0025
- Total 0.0005 0.000003 0.0005
I also assess whether the countercyclical rule can help to reduce volatility. I
compare the standard deviations of the main variables under the constant rule
and those under the countercyclical rule in the case of a technology shock and and
expectation of liquidity shock. I use the optimal parameters obtained from the
previous simulations. The results in Table 4.9 and 4.10 show that the counter-
cyclical reserve requirement and LCR rule have a small impact on the volatility
of bank loan but have no impact on the real variables. These ndings are con-
sistent with those of Primus (2017) who show that although the countercyclical
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Table 4.8: Countercyclical Parameters and Welfare Under Higher Expectation of
Liquidity Shock
Parameters Constant Rule Countercyclical Rule
RR Only LCR Only RR and LCR
 0.15 0.95 0.95
 0 20 20
# 0.15 0.85 0.85
# 0 20 20
Welfare (in % CE)
- Household (P ) 0.00002 0.00004 0.00006
- Entrepreneur (E) 0.00256 0.00259 0.00511
- Total 0.00051 0.00053 0.00103
reserve requirement rule is successful in reducing uctuations in excess reserves
and total reserves, this policy rule has no e¤ect on the real variables. One possi-
ble explanation is that, in Indonesia, both liquidity requirements are not binding
and the bank lending is more a¤ected by demand rather than supply. Therefore,
the e¤ects of the changes of RR and the LCR on lending and on the real sector
are relatively small.
Table 4.9: Volatility under Technology Shock : Constant vs Countercyclical Liq-
uidity Regulations
Variables Constant RR Countercyclical RR
RR Only LCR Only RR and LCR
Std.dev Std.dev Std.dev Std.dev
Loan 0.0817 0.0814 0.0817 0.0814
Labour 0.0128 0.0128 0.0128 0.0128
HH Consumption 0.0454 0.0454 0.0454 0.0454
Ent Consumption 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020
Output 0.0726 0.0725 0.0726 0.0725
Ination 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031 0.0031
Loan Rate 0.0034 0.0033 0.0034 0.0033
4.5 Conclusion
The chapter has presented a model in which the bank endogenously determines
the optimal level of reserves and high-quality liquid asset under Reserve Require-
ment (RR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) regulation. The model has been
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Table 4.10: Volatility under Higher Expectation of Liquidity Shock : Constant
vs Countercyclical Liquidity Regulations
Variables Constant RR Countercyclical RR
RR Only LCR Only RR and LCR
Std.dev Std.dev Std.dev Std.dev
Loan 0.0078 0.0077 0.0078 0.0077
Labour 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
HH Consumption 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
Ent Consumption 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Output 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027 0.0027
Ination 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Loan Rate 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
calibrated to match data for Indonesia over the period 2005Q3 - 2017Q4, to study
the transmission of liquidity shocks and liquidity regulations to the real economy.
First, I study the long-run e¤ect of higher expectation of liquidity shock.
Banks increase their RR and LCR to anticipate higher liquidity shock. To main-
tain prot, the bank raises loan rates and total lending declines. Consequently,
aggregate investment, output and consumption decline. Since reserves can serve
both liquidity regulations, the bank increase reserves but reduce their govern-
ment bond holding. Therefore, the government bonds held by the central bank
increases while the government bonds held by commercial bank declines. In total,
higher expectation of liquidity shock increases total demand of government bonds
and can a¤ect the scal nancing strategy.
Second, I analyse the impact of unanticipated withdrawal on some banks
reserves holdings. The bank responses to the unexpected shock by borrowing
liquidity from the central bank at a penalty rate to full RR and LCR require-
ments. This causes a deterioration in the banks prot and capital, which is then
transmitted into a decline in credit, investment and total output. However, the
impact on aggregate lending and output are relatively small in terms of magni-
tude. For example, an 8.5% of reserves withdrawal in some banks only causes
approximately 0.13% decline in total lending and output.
Third, I analyse the impact of a technology shock, dened as a sudden decline
in total factor productivity. The shock will cause a deterioration in almost all
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component of bank balance sheets, and it leads to a decline of around 1.2% in
total banks assets. Moreover, I found that the impact on lending and output are
also signicant. A 1% decline in TFP can cause an approximately 1.5% decline
in aggregate lending and output.
Fourth, I analyse the impact of loosening the liquidity regulations. The e¤ect
of changes in RR or LCR on the real sector in term of direction are similar.
Lower liquidity requirements lead to a decrease in lending rate, which causes a
slight rise in lending, investment, output and ination. However, the impact of
those regulations on banks prot and government budget is quite di¤erent. As
a reaction to a lower reserve requirement ratio, the bank reduces its reserves but
buys more government bonds to meet the LCR so the total demand of government
bonds is relatively not a¤ected. The bank gets more return from the conversion
of reserves into risk-free assets, and their prots slightly rises. In contrast, the
bank reacts to a decline in LCR regulation by reducing both reserves and risk-
free assets. Therefore, the total demand for government bonds decline and the
government has to raise more tax to nance government spending. Higher tax
makes household deposit less in the bank. Consequently, bank total assets and
prot decline.
Finally, I investigate the welfare implication of countercyclical liquidity regu-
lations. First, I found that in the case of a technology shock, the optimal policy
combination is a countercyclical reserve requirement and constant LCR. Second,
in the case of random expectation of liquidity shock, the combination of counter-
cyclical liquidity reserves requirement and LCR improves welfare. Third, I found
that countercyclical liquidity regulations reduce the volatility of bank loan, but
the impact on the volatility of the real sector variables are negligible.
There are many mechanisms regarding the e¤ects of bank liquidity problem
that have not captured in this chapters model such as the decline in asset prices,
precautionary hoarding by banks, depositors expectations and bank-runs, etc.
Those limitations make the impact of liquidity problems and the benet of liq-
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uidity regulation in this chapter are relatively small. Therefore, future research
can extends the model of this study. For example, it would be interesting to add
an interbank market and introduce heterogeneity among bank regarding liquidity
risk. Issues about the supply and the price of government bond are also important
aspects to explore. Furthermore, another point to address is the incorporation of
credit risk in the model because it potentially motivates the bank to hold more
reserves in post-crisis (Damjanovic et al. (2017)). Finally, it will be interesting
to improve the model such that the liquidity shock is endogenous, considering




This thesis contributes to extend our understanding regarding the transmission
mechanism and welfare implications of macroprudential policies. The main focus
of the thesis is to explore the regulatory arbitrage e¤ect (the shifts of credit
from the regulated banking sector into the non-regulated capital market fund)
and the interaction among liquidity policies. The regulatory arbitrage e¤ect
of macroprudential policies discussed in the second and third chapter has been
a crucial issue addressed by the authorities, especially in advanced economies.
The liquidity-related macroprudential policies explored in the fourth chapter are
relatively used more in emerging economies due to their concerns with large and
volatile capital ows and related systemic risks.1
Several main messages of this thesis are: (i) In general, the implementation
of macroprudential policies generates social welfare gains; (ii) The welfare benet
mostly goes to the entrepreneurs. Thus, a redistribution policy is needed to make
everyone better-o¤; (iii) Considering the regulatory arbitrage, macroprudential
policy authorities should consider not only the condition of the banking sector but
also the non-bank credit in their policy rule; (iv) There are possible unintended
consequences of macroprudential policies in terms of increasing cost of credit
1This argument is supported by the study of Federico et al. (2014) who nd that around
two -thirds of developing countries have used RR policy as a macroeconomic stabilization tool
compared to just one-third of industrial countries.
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and loan default; and (v) There is strong interaction between the impact of
macroprudential policies and scal policies. Therefore, the coordination across
policies is crucial.
The results of the second chapter support the rst, second and fth messages.
In the second chapter, I examined the long-run impact of government subsidy
on banks information acquisition cost and banks monitoring cost. I found that
government subsidy on the banks information acquisition cost could improve ag-
gregate welfare. However, the policy is not Pareto improving since it increases
entrepreneurswelfare at the expense of householdswelfare. The government
could gain economic e¢ ciency by imposing taxes on the labour income to -
nance the subsidy and impose a redistribution policy on the entrepreneur and
households consumption. I also found that a subsidy on monitoring cost, which
is similar to loan guarantee scheme, generates welfare losses both for household
and entrepreneur. Thus, the policy implication of this chapter is that govern-
ment support for lowering the cost of access to the bank is more preferable than
government support for default resolution costs.
The third chapters results support the rst, third, and fourth point of the
thesiss main messages. In this chapter, I studied the e¤ect of the macroprudential
policy in a framework that accounts for the possible substitution from bank-
based nancial intermediation to non-bank intermediation in response to such
policy. I model the macroprudential policy in the form of a premium introduced
by regulation to the banks cost of borrowing. I found that a countercyclical
macroprudential policy that reacts proportionally with bank credit growth is
e¤ective in improving social welfare in the case of banking shocks and uncertainty
shocks. However, in the case of a technology shocks, the policy is less e¤ective. I
found that a modied rule, which reacts not only to bank credit growth but total
credit growth, provides social welfare gains in the case of technology shocks.
Therefore, the main policy implication of this chapter is that macroprudential
authorities should consider the source of the shocks, and take into consideration
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not only the condition of the banking sector but also the credit in the nancial
markets. The result of this chapter also indirectly suggests coordination between
the banking sector regulator and the non-banking sector regulator. Moreover,
although not explicitly discussed in this thesis, coordination of macroprudential
policies across countries is crucial because these policies often have unintended
spillover e¤ects in the form of credit shifting to other countries.
The results of the fourth chapter support the rst and fth main messages of
the thesis. The chapter has presented a model in which the bank endogenously
determines the optimal level of reserves and high-quality liquid asset under Re-
serve Requirement (RR) and Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) regulation. I found
that countercyclical liquidity regulations improve welfare and reduce the volatil-
ity of bank loan, but the size of the impacts are relatively small. I also found that
changing RR and LCR regulation have di¤erent consequences on demand for gov-
ernment bonds, and generate dissimilar impacts on taxes and the banks prot.
Thus, coordination between macroprudential and scal authorities is crucial.
This thesis shows that there are many aspects to be considered by the cen-
tral bank in conducting macroprudential policies. The central bank should be
aware of the spillover e¤ects and unintended consequences of the policies. There
are conditions in which the implementation of macroprudential policies gener-
ate desirable benet on macroeconomic stability, nancial stability and welfare,
but there are also conditions that provide undesirable e¤ects. Understanding the
intended and unintended impact of a policy in facing a particular shock is neces-
sary for designing a policy that can improve both macroeconomic and nancial
stability.
The studies conducted in this thesis can be extended in many exciting direc-
tions. The evaluation of macroprudential policies in this thesis is still focused
only on welfare and macroeconomic stability, i.e. smoothing credit expansion
period and helping to preserve the nancial systems capability to give loans to
the economy during a credit contraction period, whilst the aims of macropruden-
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tial policies are much wider. Therefore, one interesting area of future research
is to extend the models in this thesis and evaluate the impact of macropruden-
tial policies on reducing negative externalities that can lead to systemic risk and
controlling the build-up of the nancial system vulnerabilities. Another possible
area of future research is to explore the interaction of macroprudential policies
with monetary policy and capital ow management which are also essential issues
for the central bankers. There is plenty of scope for future studies to complete
the ndings in this thesis allowing a better understanding of the e¤ect of macro-
prudential policy and to help policymakers designing strategy in maintaining
nancial and macroeconomic stability.
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6.1 Appendix for Basic Model of Chapter 2 and 3




w = real wage
R = return on deposits
m = real cash holding
d = real deposits
 = transfer from the central bank
r = real rent on capital
k = HH capital
Entrepreneur
A = TFP
z = ent. capital
e = ent. consumption
x = working capital
n = ent. networth
"j;i = ent. idiosyncratic productivity levels
q = ent. markup
j = std.dev of "j
"e = known productivity level before the contract
 = information acquisition cost
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Financing Decision
!b = threshold corresponding to repayment of bank loan
!c = threshold corresponding to repayment of CMF loan
"d = threshold of productivity levels to proceed with bank loan
"b = threshold of productivity levels to approach a bank
"c = threshold of productivity levels to borrow from CMF
Monetary authority
ms = money supply




ya = agency costs
lb = total bank loan
lc = total CMF loan
 f = aggregation of ent. prot
 y = aggregation of realised productivity factors
 mb = aggregation of defaulted bank loan
 mc = aggregation of defaulted CMF loan
 rb = aggregation of bank risk premium
 rc = aggregation of CMF risk premium
Financial structure
# = loan to bond ratio
rpb = risk premium bank
rpc = risk premium CMF
 = loan to output ratio
%b = average default of bank loan
%c = average default of CMF loan
% = average default
sa = shares of the rms that abstain from producing
sb = shares of the rms that approach a bank
sbp = shares of the rms that proceed with the bank loan
sc = shares of the rms that borrow from CMF
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Budget constraint:
Mt +Dt + Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] Wt (6.2)
Wt = Bt +R
d
t 1Dt 1 + Ptt + fMt 1 (6.3)
Cash in advance constraint:
fMt Mt   Pt [ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt] + Pt(wtht + rtkt)  0 (6.4)



















+Ptt + fMt 1  Mt
 Dt   Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1]
377775
+2t [Mt   Pt (ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt) + Pt(wtht + rtkt)]
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
(6.5)
Then, deriving the rst-order conditions with respects to consumption, working















t + 2tPtwt = 0, h
1

t ct = wt (6.7)
@L
@kt+1
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@L
@Mt










































= Mt   Pt (ct + kt+1   (1  ) kt) + Pt(wtht + rtkt) = 0





t 1Dt 1 + Ptt + fMt 1  Mt  Dt   Et [Qt;t+1Bt+1] = 0
, Rt 1dt 1
t
+ t  mt   dt = 0 (6.13)
In a competitive equilibrium, fMt 1 = 0 , Bt = 0 and Rdt = Rt: Variable in
small letter represents the variable in real terms, which dened as the nominal
variable divided by the price at the same period. Ination at time t, t is calcu-
lated as PtPt 1 : From equation 6.10 and 6.11 we can derive the deposit rate as an
inverse of the expectation of asset price in the next period,Rdt = Et [Qt;t+1]
 1 :
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"1;it = E ["1;it"2;it"3;it j "1;it] if CMF nance





it   wthit   rtkit (6.16)
Financing constraint :
Ptxit = Pt (wthit + rthit) (6.17)
The Lagrangian is:
L = At"itek1 it hit   wthit   rtkit + t(wthit + rtkit   xit) (6.18)






it   wt + twt = 0
, At"itek1 it hit   wthit + twthit = 0 (6.19)
@L
@Kit
= (1  )At"itek it hit   rt + trt = 0
, (1  )At"itek1 it hit   rtkit + trtkit = 0 (6.20)
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it   (wthit + rtkit) + t (wthit + rtkit) = 0
, yeit   xit + txit = 0





Using equation 6.21, we can rewrite equation 6.19 as:




, yeitxit   wthitxit   (yeit   xit)wthit = 0
, yeitxit   yeitwthit = 0
, xit = wthit (6.22)
Using equation 6.21, we can also rewrite equation 6.20 as:




, (1  )yeitxit   rtkitxit   (yeit   xit) rtkit = 0
, (1  )yeitxit   yeitrtkit = 0
, (1  )xit = rtkit (6.23)
Expected output of production (equation 6.15) can also written in terms of

































Equation 6.22 and 6.23 is aggregated as follows:
xt = wtht (6.26)
(1  )xt = rtkt (6.27)
Aggregation
 Total loan from bank
lbt = (1   t)sbpt (   1)nt (6.28)
 Total bond (loan from CMF)
lct = s
c
t (   1)nt (6.29)





(1   t)sbpt (   1)nt
sct (   1)nt





 Total entrepreneur net worth used for production
ownfund = (1   t)sbpt nt + sctnt
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Total output in the economy is the aggregation of total production of en-











it = "1i"2i"3iqt (1  ) nit
where "b < "1i 6 "c and "2i > "di:












qt (1  ) nt:




where "1i > "c
















"3 (d"3) = 1, we can write the total output as:
yt =  
y ({t) qtnt (6.32)
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where











and {  [qt; Rt;  t; 1;t; 2;t; 3;t; RPt] :
 Total institution cost
Total institution cost is the aggregation of information acquisition cost, yait ;






Total information acquisition cost is computed as yait =  ts
b
tnt
Total monitoring cost is computed as the multiplication of the value
of defaulted entrepreneurs output by monitoring cost rate
First, we compute the total output of entrepreneur who borrow from















 (d"2)  (d"1)
i
qt (1  ) nt
Then, we can rewrite the total monitoring cost of bank as  mb ({) qt (1  ) nt;









 (d"2)  (d"1)
 Second, we compute the total output of entrepreneur who borrow from
CMF and default as follows:
 (!c;23) "1qtnt for "1 > "c
which equal toR
"c
 (!c;23)  (d"1) qtnt
Then, we can rewrite the total monitoring cost of CMF as  mc ({) qtnt;
where  mc ({) =
R
"c
 (!c;23)  (d"1)
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Third, we can compute the total monitoring cost by adding total mon-
itoring cost of bank and CMF as follows:
yamt =  
mb ({) qt (1  ) nt+  mc ({) qtnt
, yamt =
h
(1  ) mb ({) +  mc ({)
i
qtnt
Finally, total institution cost (equation 2.44) can be written as


























where  m ({) = (1  ) mb ({) +  mc ({)
 Aggregate prots of the entrepreneurial sector
Aggregate prots of the entrepreneurial sector is computed as the sum of:
(1) prots of entrepreneurs who abstain from production, (2) prots of
entrepreneurs who produce using bank nancing, and (3) prots of entre-
preneur who produce using CMF nancing.
1. Prot rate of entrepreneurs who abstain from production = nn = 1
2. Prot rate of entrepreneurs who produce using bank nancing =F
b()n
n =
F b () for "b < "1 6 "c and "2 > "d; which equal to
R "c
"b
F b ()  (d"1)
3. Prot rate of entrepreneur who produce using CMF nancing = F
c()n
n =
F c () for "1 > "c; which equal to
R
"c
F c ()  (d"1)
Then, the aggregate prot rate of entrepreneurial sector is
 f ({) = sa +
Z "c
"b
F b ()  (d"1) +
Z
"c
F c ()  (d"1) (6.36)
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where {  [qt; Rt;  t; 1;t; 2;t; 3;t]
 Aggregate risk premium





Therefore, the aggregation of banks risk premium for all entrepreneurs
who use bank nancing ("b < "1 6 "c and "2 > "d) is as follows:














35 (d"2)  (d"1) (6.37)
Using the similar approach, we can get the aggregation of CMFs risk
premium for all entrepreneurs who use CMF nancing ("1 > "c) as
follows:













Then, the average risk premium of bank and risk premium of CMF
can be computed as the total risk premium divided by the share of






















 Average default rate of bank is computed as the total defaulted loan from
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bank divided by the total value of loan from bank
%bt =
 mb ({) (1   t) (   1)nt





 Average default rate of bond is computed as the total defaulted loan from
CMF divided by the total value of loan from CMF
%ct =
 mc ({) (   1)nt






 Total amount of liquidity injections :
Ptt =M
s
t  M st 1 (6.44)
, t =
M st  M st 1
Pt
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(   1) (6.47)
6.1.3 Competitive Equilibrium Condition





















(1   + rt+1)

(6.50)
mt + dt =
Rt 1
t
dt + t (6.51)
0 = mt + wtht + rtkt   ct   kt+1 + (1  ) kt (6.52)
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rt (kt + zt) = (1  )xt (6.54)
wtht = xt (6.55)
et =  
f ({t)nt (6.56)
zt+1 = (1  ) f ({t)nt (6.57)





it; qt; Rt; 3t

= 1 (6.59)
F b ("bt; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) = 1 (6.60)
F b ("ct; qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) = F











6.1. APPENDIX FOR BASIC MODEL OF CHAPTER 2 AND 3
Market clearing:
yat = yt   ct   et   It (6.64)
It = kt+1 + zt+1   (1  ) (kt + zt) (6.65)
mst = mt + dt (6.66)
dt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
(   1)nt (6.67)
lbt = (1   t) sbpt (   1)nt (6.68)
lct = s
c
t(   1)nt (6.69)
xt =
h
(1   t) sbpt + sct
i
nt (6.70)
yt =  
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%t =











c (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t)  









 (d"2)  (d"1) (6.82)
sct = 1   ("c (qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t) ;1t) (6.83)
6.2 Appendix for Chapter 2
This appendix compiles all the relevant competitive equilibrium condition of the
modied model for chapter 2. Types of taxation rate are denoted by: tct for
consumption tax, tlt for labour income tax, and t
ls
t for lump-sum tax
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mt + dt =
Rt 1
t
dt 1 + t (6.87)
0 = mt + (1  tlt)wtht + rtkt   (1 + tct)ct   kt+1 + (1  ) kt   tlst (6.88)
Entrepreneurs









rt (kt + zt) = (1  )xt (6.91)
wtht = xt (6.92)
(1 + tct)et =  
f ({t)nt (6.93)
zt+1 = (1  ) f ({t)nt (6.94)









1 = F b
 







































6.2. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Market clearing
yat = yt   ct   et   It (6.101)
It = kt+1 + zt+1   (1  ) (kt + zt) (6.102)
mst = mt + dt (6.103)
dt =
h 






(   1)nt (6.104)
xt =
h 







yt =  































































 "b  qt; Rt;  t; 2t; 3t; sIt ; sMt  ;1t
(6.115)
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sbpt =
Z ("c(qt;Rt; t;2t;3t;sIt ;sMt )
"b(qt;Rt; t;2t;3t;sIt ;sMt )
Z
("d("1;qt;Rt;3t;sMt )
 (d"2)  (d"1) (6.117)
6.2.2 Derivation of Consumption Equivalent
First, I dene the aggregate welfare as the total of household and entrepreneurs
utility in the steady state:
W (c; h; e) = U(c; h) + U(e)
Second, I dene the level of welfare of the baseline model without policy as
W0(c0;h0; e0); and the welfare in the alternative model with additional policy as
W1(c1;h1; e1). Then I compute consumption equivalent (CE) such that:
W0(c0(1 + CE%); h0;e0(1 + CE%)) =W1(c1; h1; e1)
Using the functional form of household utility as in equation 2.1 and the
linear utility function of entrepreneur, I can derive the consumption equivalent
as follows:





0 + (1 + CE%)e0 =W1(c1; h1; e1)





0 + e0 + e0:CE% =W1(c1; h1; e1)
log(1 + CE%) + e0:CE% =W1(c1; h1; e1) W0(c0; h0; e0) (6.118)
Finally, we can obtain the value of CE using a mathematical solver.
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6.2.3 Detailed Results: Impact of Subsidy on Steady State Val-
ues
Table 6.1: Policy 1 - Subsidy on Bank Information Acquisition Cost, Tax on
Labour Income
Variables subs=0 subs=0.1 subs=0.3 subs=0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9945 0.9927 0.9834
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0302 1.0348 1.0530
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3717 0.3311 0.1575
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5929 0.6497 0.8416
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0354 0.0192 0.0009
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2530 0.2606 0.2511
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp) 0.3180 0.3399 0.3890 0.5904
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 7.0746 13.4945 282.5203
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6284 0.6103 0.5522
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0150 0.0150 0.0152
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0141 0.0136 0.0113
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0152
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6663 0.6672
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 0.9999 0.9996 0.9964
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9044 0.9063 0.9122
Household money cash (m) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0138
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9181 0.9200 0.9260
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3259 0.3259 0.3259
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3179 14.3058 14.2435
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4248 1.4701 1.6355
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7427 15.7759 15.8790
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0327 0.0337 0.0375
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4392 1.4849 1.6520
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0010 0.0034 0.0130
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5849 2.5903 2.6071
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3163 1.3191 1.3277
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3578 1.3602 1.3672
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0103 0.0114 0.0156
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0084 0.0095 0.0138
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3475 1.3488 1.3515
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 0.9999 0.9986 0.9945
HH Income from rent and work (1-t)*wh+rk 1.2728 1.2726 1.2720 1.2675
Tax revenue : t*w*h = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0008 0.0029 0.0110
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0326 1.0333 1.0340
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0285 0.0294 0.0327
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2864 0.2861 0.2849
Total Investment (I) 0.3145 0.3149 0.3155 0.3176
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.06% 0.21% 0.81%
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Table 6.2: Policy 2 - Subsidy on Bank Information Acquisition Cost, Tax on
Consumption
Variables subs=0 subs 0.1 subs=0.3 subs=0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9945 0.9927 0.9834
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0302 1.0348 1.0530
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3717 0.3311 0.1575
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5929 0.6497 0.8416
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0354 0.0192 0.0009
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2530 0.2606 0.2511
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp) 0.3180 0.3399 0.3890 0.5904
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 7.0746 13.4946 282.5232
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6284 0.6103 0.5522
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0150 0.0150 0.0152
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0141 0.0136 0.0113
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0152
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6663 0.6672
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 0.9999 0.9995 0.9960
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9049 0.9082 0.9198
Household money (cash) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0138 0.0139
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9186 0.9220 0.9338
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3261 0.3266 0.3287
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3270 14.3367 14.3632
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4257 1.4732 1.6492
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7527 15.8100 16.0123
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0327 0.0337 0.0375
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4402 1.4881 1.6658
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0008 0.0028 0.0107
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5849 2.5903 2.6071
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3171 1.3219 1.3389
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3586 1.3632 1.3787
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0110 0.0138 0.0250
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0084 0.0096 0.0139
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0025 0.0042 0.0111
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3477 1.3494 1.3537
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 0.9999 0.9986 0.9945
HH Income from rent and work (wh+rk) 1.2728 1.2742 1.2776 1.2892
Tax revenue : t*(c+e) = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0008 0.0029 0.0111
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0326 1.0332 1.0334
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0285 0.0295 0.0330
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2865 0.2867 0.2873
Total Investment I) 0.3145 0.3151 0.3162 0.3202
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.06% 0.21% 0.82%
176
6.2. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Table 6.3: Policy 3 - Subsidy on Bank Information Acquisition Cost, Lumpsum
Tax
Variables subs=0 subs 0.1 subs=0.3 subs=0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9945 0.9927 0.9834
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0302 1.0348 1.0530
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3717 0.3311 0.1575
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5929 0.6497 0.8416
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0354 0.0192 0.0009
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2530 0.2606 0.2511
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp) 0.3180 0.3399 0.3890 0.5904
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 7.0746 13.4945 282.5203
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6284 0.6103 0.5522
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0150 0.0150 0.0152
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0141 0.0136 0.0113
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0152
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6663 0.6672
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 1.0007 1.0021 1.0062
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9050 0.9086 0.9211
Household money (cash) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0138 0.0140
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9187 0.9223 0.9351
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3261 0.3267 0.3291
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3287 14.3423 14.3835
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4259 1.4738 1.6515
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7546 15.8161 16.0350
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0327 0.0338 0.0379
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4403 1.4887 1.6682
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0008 0.0029 0.0111
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5849 2.5903 2.6071
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3173 1.3224 1.3407
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3588 1.3637 1.3806
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0103 0.0114 0.0158
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0085 0.0096 0.0139
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3485 1.3523 1.3648
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 0.9999 0.9986 0.9945
HH Income from rent and work (wh+rk) 1.2728 1.2744 1.2781 1.2910
Tax revenue  = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0008 0.0029 0.0111
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0334 1.0360 1.0441
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0285 0.0295 0.0330
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2866 0.2868 0.2877
Total Investment I) 0.3145 0.3151 0.3163 0.3207
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.06% 0.21% 0.81%
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Table 6.4: Policy 4 - Subsidy on Bank Monitoring Cost, Tax on Labour Income
Variables subs=0 subs=0.1 subs=0.3 subs=0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9952 0.9951 0.9950
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0288 1.0299 1.0331
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3887 0.3871 0.3840
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5687 0.5760 0.5916
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0427 0.0369 0.0244
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2501 0.2561 0.2698
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp) 0.3180 0.3186 0.3199 0.3218
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 5.8026 6.8623 10.9607
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6372 0.6377 0.6398
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0028 0.0023 0.0013
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0148
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0143 0.0141 0.0137
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0148 0.0148 0.0147
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6662 0.6666
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 0.9999 0.9997 0.9991
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9036 0.9039 0.9046
Household money cash (m) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9173 0.9176 0.9183
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3259 0.3259 0.3258
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3260 14.3315 14.3471
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4039 1.4032 1.3997
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7299 15.7347 15.7468
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0322 0.0322 0.0321
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4181 1.4173 1.4138
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0009 0.0026
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5830 2.5840 2.5866
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3152 1.3156 1.3166
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3566 1.3568 1.3570
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0099 0.0102 0.0108
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0080 0.0081 0.0083
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0019 0.0021 0.0026
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3467 1.3466 1.3462
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 1.0004 1.0002 0.9995
HH Income from rent and work (1-t)*wh+rk 1.2728 1.2727 1.2726 1.2724
tax revenue : t*w*h = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008 0.0022
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0321 1.0319 1.0313
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 0.0280
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2865 0.2866 0.2869
Total Investment (I) 0.3145 0.3146 0.3147 0.3149
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.02% 0.06% 0.16%
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Table 6.5: Policy 5 - Subsidy on Bank Monitoring Cost, Tax on Consumption
Variables subs=0 subs 0.1 subs=0.3 subs = 0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9952 0.9951 0.9950
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0288 1.0299 1.0331
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3887 0.3871 0.3840
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5687 0.5760 0.5916
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0427 0.0369 0.0244
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2501 0.2561 0.2698
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp)
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 5.8026 6.8623 10.9607
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6372 0.6377 0.6398
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0028 0.0023 0.0013
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0148
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0143 0.0141 0.0137
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0148 0.0148 0.0147
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6662 0.6666
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 0.9999 0.9997 0.9991
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9038 0.9044 0.9060
Household money cash (m) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9175 0.9181 0.9198
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3259 0.3260 0.3263
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3287 14.3398 14.3703
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4041 1.4040 1.4019
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7328 15.7438 15.7722
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0322 0.0322 0.0321
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4183 1.4181 1.4161
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.0021
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5830 2.5840 2.5866
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3155 1.3164 1.3188
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3569 1.3575 1.3592
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0101 0.0108 0.0126
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0080 0.0081 0.0083
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0021 0.0027 0.0043
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3468 1.3468 1.3466
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 1.0004 1.0002 0.9995
HH Income from rent and work (wh+rk) 1.2728 1.2732 1.2741 1.2766
Tax revenue : t*(c+e) = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008 0.0021
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0321 1.0319 1.0312
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 0.0280
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2866 0.2868 0.2874
Total Investment (I) 0.3145 0.3147 0.3149 0.3154
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.02% 0.06% 0.16%
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Table 6.6: Policy 6 - Subsidy on Bank Monitoring Cost, LumpsumTax
Variables subs=0 subs 0.1 subs=0.3 subs = 0.8 Trend
Financial sector variables
Threshold of e_1 for approaching bank (eps bar b) 0.9952 0.9952 0.9951 0.9950
Threshold of e_1 for borrowing from CMF (eps bar c) 1.0282 1.0288 1.0299 1.0331
Share of firms that abstain from external finance (sa) 0.3893 0.3887 0.3871 0.3840
Share of firms that approacing bank (sb) 0.5651 0.5687 0.5760 0.5916
Share of firms that borrow from CMF (sc) 0.0456 0.0427 0.0369 0.0244
Share of firms that approach bank and borrow (sbp) 0.2470 0.2501 0.2561 0.2698
Share of firms that approach bank but not borrow (sb - sbp) 0.3180 0.3186 0.3199 0.3218
Aggregate bankloans/bond 5.3591 5.8026 6.8623 10.9607
Aggregate debt/equity 0.6371 0.6372 0.6377 0.6398
Risk premium CMF 0.0029 0.0029 0.0028 0.0027
Risk premium of bank 0.0030 0.0028 0.0023 0.0013
Average default of bank 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0148
Average default of CMF 0.0144 0.0143 0.0141 0.0137
Average overall default 0.0149 0.0148 0.0148 0.0147
Aggregate debt to GDP 0.6660 0.6661 0.6662 0.6666
Macroeconomic variables
Household consumption ( c) 1.0000 1.0001 1.0004 1.0011
Household deposit (d) 0.9035 0.9038 0.9045 0.9063
Household money cash (m) 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137 0.0137
Money supply (ms) 0.9172 0.9175 0.9182 0.9200
Work hours (h) 0.3259 0.3260 0.3261 0.3264
Household's capital (k) 14.3236 14.3292 14.3414 14.3745
Entrepeneur's capital (z) 1.4038 1.4042 1.4041 1.4023
Total capital (K) 15.7274 15.7334 15.7455 15.7768
Entrepreneur consumption ( e) 0.0322 0.0322 0.0322 0.0322
Firm's net worth (n) 1.4180 1.4184 1.4183 1.4165
Tax rate (t) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008 0.0021
Real wage (w) 2.5825 2.5830 2.5840 2.5866
Real rent ( r) 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301 0.0301
Entrepreneur's funds (x) 1.3150 1.3155 1.3165 1.3192
Total output (y) 1.3565 1.3569 1.3577 1.3596
Total junk cost (information + monitoring cost, ya) 0.0098 0.0099 0.0102 0.0108
Information cost(ytau) 0.0079 0.0080 0.0081 0.0083
Monitoring cost (ym) 0.0018 0.0019 0.0021 0.0025
GDP (ynet) 1.3468 1.3470 1.3475 1.3488
Entrepreneurial markup over input cost (q) 1.0005 1.0004 1.0002 0.9995
HH Income from rent and work (wh+rk) 1.2728 1.2733 1.2743 1.2769
Tax revenue : t = total subsidy 0.0000 0.0003 0.0008 0.0021
Total consumption ( C) 1.0322 1.0324 1.0326 1.0332
Entrepreneur Investment 0.0281 0.0281 0.0281 0.0280
Household Investment 0.2865 0.2866 0.2868 0.2875
Total Investment (I) 0.3145 0.3147 0.3149 0.3155
Subsidy/GDP (%) 0.00% 0.02% 0.06% 0.16%
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6.3 Appendix for Chapter 3
6.3.1 Additional Impulse Response Functions



















































10-4 Aggregation of Ent. Profit

































































10-3 Real Rent on Capital
No Macropru( =0)
Macropru 1 ( =0.5)
Macropru 2 ( =2)
Figure 6.1: Responses to a Positive Banking Shock with and without Regulation
Premium (additional)






















































10-3 Aggregation of Ent. Profit































































10-3 Real Rent on Capital
No Macropru( =0)
Macropru 1 ( =0.5)
Macropru 2 ( =2)
Figure 6.2: Responses to a Uncertainty Shock with and without Regulation Pre-
mium (additional)
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6.3.2 Derivation of Consumption Equivalent
In subsection 6.2.2 I had derived the consumption equivalent at the steady state.
In this subsection, I derive the computation of consumption equivalent consider-
ing the dynamics of the model in every period.
Household




































Consumption equivalent CEH is fraction of c0t that households willing to give




































































t log(1 + CEH) +W 0 =W 1
, 1
1   log(1 + CE
H) =W 1  W 0
, log(1 + CEH) = (1  )  W 1  W 0
Finally we get the expression of households consumption equivalent:
CEH = exp

(1  )  W 1  W 0  1 (6.119)
Entrepreneur
Similar to the previous derivation, I dene the entrepreneurswelfare in the base-















Using the similar approach as before, we can compute consumption equivalent















, (1 + CEE) =W 1=W o
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And we obtain the entrepreneursconsumption equivalent as:
CEE =W 1=W o   1 (6.120)
Social welfare
Total social welfare is dened as:
Wt = (1  )WHt + (1  E)WEt :
Using the denition of WHt and W
E
t in equation 3.9 and equation 3.10, we
can dene social welfare in the baseline case as:























and the social welfare in the alternative case (with macroprudential policy)
as:























Total Consumption equivalent, CE; is fraction of c and e that households
and entrepreneur are willing to give away in order to obtain the benets of the
optimal policy which can be written in the following form:
W 0((1 + CE) c0t ; h
0








The formulation to compute CE is derived by substituting the components of






















tE (1 + CE) e
0
t
3775 =W 1(c1t ; h1t ; e1t )
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t ) W 0(c0t ; h0t ; e0t )
,

[log (1 + CE)] (1  ) 1
1   + CE
 
1  EW 0E(e0t ) =W 1(c1t ; h1t ; e1t ) W 0(c0t ; h0t ; e0t )
, [log (1 + CE)] + CE  1  EW 0E(e0t ) =W 1(c1t ; h1t ; e1t ) W 0(c0t ; h0t ; e0t )
, [log (1 + CE)] + CE  1  EW 0E(e0t ) W 1(c1t ; h1t ; e1t ) +W 0(c0t ; h0t ; e0t ) = 0:
Then we can use solver to nd the value of CE.
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6.4 Appendix for Chapter 4
6.4.1 Liquidity Regulations in Emerging ASEAN Countries






























Indonesia ü ü ü ü 4
Cambodia ü ü ü 3
Lao P.D.R. ü ü ü 3
Myanmar ü ü ü 3
Philippines ü ü ü 3
Thailand ü ü ü 3
Vietnam ü ü ü 3
Brunei Darussalam ü 1
Malaysia ü 1
Source: 2017 IMFs Macroprudential Policy Survey database:
https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Home.aspx.
6.4.2 List of Variables
Patient households
cP = consumption
Pt = Lagrange multiplier of budget constraint
lP = labor supply
wP = real wage
tP = transfers to patient household
wP = nominal wage ination
Rd = interest rate on deposits
P = lumpsum tax to patient household
Entrepreneurs
cE = consumption
E = Lagrange multiplier of budget constraint
sE = Lagrange multiplier of borrowing constraint
rkt = return on capital
Capital Goods Producers
K = capital goods bought by capital goods producers
i = investment
qk = price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods
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Final Goods Producers
 = consumption goods ination
JR = real prots for rms
x = markup
Banks
Rb = wholesale interest rate
Rb;E = retail interest rate on loans to entrepreneurs
Kb = bank capital in real terms
BE = loans to entrepreneurs in real terms
B = total loans
D = deposits in real terms
penalty = penalty because of liquidity shortage
jb = real prots for banks
RV = reserves
RFB = risk free liquid assets hold by bank
XRR = reserves shortage
XLCR = LCR shortage
Aggregate variables
Y = total output in the economy
Y P = GDP (output used in the policy rule)
firm = total rm adjustment cost
bank = total bank adjustment cost
Central bank
R = monetary policy rate
v = capital requirements
# = run-o¤ rate in LCR requirement
 = reserve requirement ratio
Rx1 = penalty rate for reserves shortage
Rx2 = penalty rate for LCR shortage
RRR = remuneration on required reserve
CB = central bank dividend
RF cb = risk free asset owned by central bank
Government
 = total lumpsum tax
G = government expenditures
RF T = total risk free asset issued by government
RRF = return on risk free asset
Shocks
aE = TFP
"liq = liquidity shock
" = reserve requirement policy shock
"# = LCR shock
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cPt (i) + d
P


















(1  aP ) log  cPt (i)  aP cPt 1  lPt (i)1+1+ i
+Pt
264 wPt lPt (i) + (1 +Rdt 1)dPt 1(i)=t + tPt (i)
 cPt (i)  dPt (i)
375
9>>>>=>>>>; : (6.123)
Then, deriving the rst-order conditions for the households problems with





cPt   aP cPt 1
  Pt = 0
, (1  a
P )










  Pt = 0

















t   cPt   dPt = 0
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t (i)  aEcEt 1) (6.127)
Subject to budget constraint:
















+ bEt (i) + q
k





















264 yEt (i)xt + bEt (i) + qkt (1  )kEt 1(i)



















+ bEt + q
k
t (1  )kEt 1   cEt   wPt lE;Pt   (1 +RbEt 1)bEt 1=t   qkt kEt = 0
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+ bEt + q
k




































  sEt (1 +RbEt ) = 0

































is derived from the prot maximisation problem of
entrepreneur as the followings.
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  wPt lE;Pt   rkt kt 1; (6.137)









  wPt lE;Pt   rkt kt 1: (6.138)











  rkt = 0























Then, we can plug this to continue deriving the rst-order condition of entre-
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The expression of yE
lP ;t
is derived from the prot maximisation problem in
equation 6.138:













Then, we plug this result into the rst-order conditions to get the relationship

















  wPt = 0
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subject to capital formation process:




















where xt = itit 1 ; so that
S(xt) =
i
2 (xt   1)2






qkt (1  S(xt)) it   it

The rst-order conditions with respect to investment decision is:
@CP
@i









































































































































































































Final goods Producers (Retailers)
Nominal prot of retailers is given by:









We can get the real prot by dividing the nominal prot by relative price of
nal goods:











Then, we dene xt = PtPwt as relative price of nal goods to wholesale price,
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subject to demand from labour packers:










































































































Using the symmetric condition in equilibrium WPt (m) = W
P
t ; and the de-
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Then, using the denition of the stochastic discount factor of patient house-
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By applying symmetric equilibrium Rdt (j) = R
d






































Then, simplifying the above equation by dividing it by dt; and using the Euler





































































































































subject to bank balance sheet constraint:
Bt +RVt +RFt = Dt +K
b
t ; (6.155)












































The Lagrangian for wholesale unit problem is:
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t  Bt  RVt  RFt
















  1t = 0


















  1t = 0









  (1 +Rdt )1t = 0 (6.157)













































































+ 1t = 0
,
0BBBBBBBBB@

























1t = 0 (6.158)




















































:f("liq)d"liq   1t = 0
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  (1 +Rdt )1t = 0 (6.160)
Combining equation 6.159 and 6.160 gives us the optimal choices between
holding RF and RV. It shows that the income from risk free asset should be






















Next, by combining equation 6.157 and 6.158 we can obtain optimal choices
between giving loan and holding liquid assets:
0BBBBB@
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Then, combining equation 6.157 and 6.160 gives the optimal choices between



















Liquidity Condition Regime (for Occbin toolkit)
Reserves shortage and LCR shortage are formulated as follows:
XRR = max
n




"liqt Dt   (RFt +RVt   #tDt); 0
o
Since the model involve non linear equation (max function), we need to dene
four regimes in the coding: one is reference regime, and the other three are
alternate regimes. Before that we need to dene a temporary variabelXRR_temp
and XLCR_temp as:
XRR_temp = "liqt Dt   (RVt   tDt);
XLCR_temp = "liqt Dt   (RFt +RVt   #tDt):
 The reference model is used for the case where bank has enough liquidity
to meet both regulations.
Condition: XRR_temp <= 0 and XLCR_temp <= 0 ) XRR = 0 and
XLCR = 0
 The rst alternate model is used for the case where bank experience a
liquidity shortage to meet reserve requirement.
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Condition: XRR_temp > 0 and XLCR_temp <= 0 ) XRR = "liqt Dt  
(RVt   tDt) and XLCR = 0
 The second alternate model is used for the case where bank experience a
liquidity shortage to meet LCR requirement.
Condition: XRR_temp <= 0 and XLCR_temp > 0 ) XRR = 0 and
XLCR = "liqt Dt   (RFt +RVt   #tDt)
 The third alternate model is used for the case where bank experience liq-
uidity shortage to meet both regulations.
Condition: XRR_temp > 0 and XLCR_temp > 0 ) XRR = "liqt Dt  
(RVt   tDt) and XLCR = "liqt Dt   (RFt +RVt   #tDt)
6.4.4 Competitive Equilibrium Equations
Patient Households

















































t (1  )Kt 1 (6.168)
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  lPt 1  (6.173)









 1  lPt 1  1xt (6.175)
Capital Goods Producers


















































(t   Pt 11 P )2yt (6.178)
1  "y + "
y
xt














































































































































































































































RVt  RVt 1=t = RRRt 1t 1Dt 1
1
t
+RF cbt + 
cb




RF cbt = RVt (6.194)
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Government




t 1=t    cbt    t (6.195)
Gt =  Yt (6.196)





t +Gt + q
k








































































6.4. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4


































































log aEt = 








Reserve requirement policy shock
log "t = 




log "#t = 
# log "#t 1 + 
#
t (6.217)
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6.4.5 Sources of Data for Calibration
The data used are at a quarterly frequency and cover the period 2005 Q1 - 2017
Q4. All the GDP-related data is taken from The Indonesian Financial Statis-
tics, while the banking sector data is taken from the Bank Indonesia Banking
Statistics. The variables are dened and measured as follows.
 Household Consumption, Government Expenditures, and Investment are
part of GDP by Expenditure data. I re-base the data to 2000 Constant
Prices (2000=100).
 Output is Gross Domestic Bruto at constant price (2000=100)
 Entrepreneurs Loan is the total of the working-capital loan and investment
loan, divided by GDP deator.
 Risk-Free assets in Bank is the total of central bank certicate (SBI) and
government bond (SPN & SUN) held by the commercial bank divided by
GDP deator.
 Reserves is total reserves of commercial banks held by the central bank
divided by GDP deator.
 Deposits is total third party fund in the liabilities of commercial bank di-
vided by GDP deator. It includes Demand Deposit, Saving and Time
Deposits.
 Policy Rate is the BI rate (from 2005Q3  2016Q2) and 7-day repo-rate
(2016Q3 - 2017Q4). I convert it to quarterly rate by dividing it with 4.
 Deposit Rate is the 1-month deposit rate. I choose 1-month deposit because
the majority of the household deposits is short-term deposit with 1-month
maturity. It also converted to quarterly rate by dividing it with 4.
 Loan rate to entrepreneur is the weighted average of working capital loan
rate and investment loan rate.
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 Ination is an annual growth of Consumer Price Index (CPI) divided by 4
to make it quarterly.
 Risk-free rate is the yield of government bond with maturity 1 year. I obtain
it from Bloomberg with ticker GIDN1Y. At rst I want to use government
bond with maturity 3 month but the issuance of this type of bond is very
limited and not continues.
 Risk weight on loan is computed by dividing the total risk-weighted asset
in the Capital Adequacy Requirement computation by the total loan.
 Capital to weighted loan ratio is calculated by dividing the total bank equity
with the risk-weighted asset.
6.4.6 Distribution of Deposit Outows
Figure 6.3 presents the distribution t of deposit outows in Indonesia. I use
quarterly data from 205Q3 - 2017Q4. Deposit outows is computed as the neg-
ative growth of quarterly deposits. Therefore, the positive value means there is
deposit outows, and negative values means there is deposit inows.The distribu-
tion t is produced using additional tool in Matlab : "Find the Best Distribution"
tool version 1.2.0.0 (467 KB) by Yoav Aminov.
6.4.7 Derivation of Consumption Equivalent
Household
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of Deposit Outows
Consumption equivalent P is fraction of c0t that households willing to give





cP;0; lP;0) =W opt(cP;opt; lP;opt)
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(1  aP ) log(1 + P ) + (1  aP ) log
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(1  aP ) log
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log(1 + P ) +W 0 =W opt
, log(1 + P ) = 1  P
(1  aP )
 
W opt  W 0





W opt  W 0





W opt  W 0  1: (6.219)
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Entrepreneur













t   aEcE;optt 1 )




tE log((1 + 











t   aEcE;0t 1) =W opt
, log(1 + 
E)
1  E
+W 0 =W opt
, log(1 + E) = (1  E)
 
W opt  W 0
, (1 + E) = exp  (1  E)  W opt  W 0
, E = exp  (1  E)  W opt  W 0  1: (6.220)
Social Welfare
Total social welfare is dened as:
Wt = (1  P )WPt + (1  E)WEt :
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Using the denition of WPt and W
E
t in equation 4.73 and equation 4.74, we can
dene social welfare in the baseline case as:
W 0t =





(1  aP ) log
















and social welfare in the optimal case as:
W optt =





(1  aP ) log














t   aEcE;optt 1 )
3775 :
Consumption equivalent  is fraction of cPt and c
E
t that households and en-
trepreneurs willing to give away in order to obtain the benets of the optimal
policy. The concept of the consumption equivalent in this case follows:
W 0((1 + ) cP;0t ; l
P;0
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 aE (1 + ) cE;0t 1)
9>=>;
3777777777775































3777775 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt )
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cP;0t   aP cP;0t 1
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tE log (1 + )
3777775 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt )
,
2664 (1  P )
1P
t=0




tE log (1 + )
3775 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
,
2664 (1  P ) (1  a








3775 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
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,
264 (1  P ) (1  aP ) log (1 + ) 11 P
+(1  E) log (1 + ) 11 E
375 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
,
264 (1  aP ) log (1 + )
+ log (1 + )
375 =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
, (2  aP ) log (1 + ) =W opt(cP;optt ; lP;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
, log (1 + ) = W
opt(cP;optt ; l
P;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
(2  aP )
,  = exp
"
W opt(cP;optt ; l
P;opt; cE;optt ) W 0(cP;0t ; lP;0; cE;0t )
(2  aP )
#
  1 (6.221)
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